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Abstract 
In recent years, practitioners and academics have become increasingly concerned 
that traditional discounted cash ﬂow valuation models, such as the net present 
value model, are not capable of adequately capturing the value of managerial ﬂex­
ibilities to delay, grow, scale down, or abandon projects. The eﬀect of ignorance 
of such managerial ﬂexibilities can be potentially substantial, with the possibility 
of producing biased decisions. Real options analysis provides the insights that 
business investment projects can be conceptually compared to ﬁnancial options 
and is therefore able to seize the value of managerial ﬂexibilities. 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a theoretical model based on option pric­
ing theory to evaluate the managerial ﬂexibilities arising in a variety of mergers 
and acquisitions, which vary in payment forms. The thesis shows how transac­
tions can be structured as a real exchange options, given the share price of each 
participating ﬁrm is subject to a speciﬁed degree of uncertainty. The takeover 
decisions of bidder or target, i.e., the takeover threshold to bid or to accept the 
bid, is obtained through the analysis. In addition, the thesis provides valuable 
theoretical insights into the following aspects: 
•	 The impact of the form of payment on the decision making process for each 
participant and corresponding merger terms 
•	 The payment form that minimizes the threshold to trigger a transaction 
•	 The allocating rule of mergers and acquisitions synergy when payment form 
threshold is employed 
In the latter part of thesis, an empirical study is conducted on mergers and 
acquisitions completed by US public bidders between January 1985 and April 
2004 excluding all ﬁnancial institutions deals. Strong support is found from the 
data that some of the target ﬁrm characteristics such as expected growth rate 
and volatility are signiﬁcant in explaining the payment form choices. 
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Introduction 
When an interested bidder approaches a target ﬁrm, the payment can be made 
in various forms. Two basic methods of payment include a pure shares oﬀering or 
a pure cash oﬀering. In a shares oﬀering, the company shares of bidder ﬁrm are 
provided in exchange for shares in the target company. A cash oﬀering is done 
in a more straightforward manner: the bidder simply pays a certain amount of 
cash, agreed upon before the deal, to gain the control of the target ﬁrm. In many 
cases, however, a blend of cash and shares is utilized and it is referred to as a 
mixed oﬀering. 
One of the implications from the Nobel winning Modigliani-Miller capital struc­
ture irrelevance principle is that in a perfectly eﬃcient market - i.e., in the absence 
of taxes, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information - payment form should 
not matter. The research exploring the rationale of diﬀerent payment forms how­
ever relaxes one or a few assumptions that Modigliani and Miller lay down for the 
market. Asymmetric information, tax, agency problems, market friction along­
side other theories have been proposed to explain the existence of payment form 
variation. 
This thesis is also one of the attempts to answer that fundamental question: why 
does payment form matter in a takeover deal? In the mean time, it explores the 
economic impacts of various payment forms on the success or, in many cases, the 
failure of mergers and acquisitions transactions and how payment form choices 
aﬀect the takeover decisions for all participants. 
The model develops within a market friction framework. It is assumed that cash 
and shares are not freely convertible due to high transaction costs so that when a 
particular payment form is presented, the takeover participants are “stuck” with 
this payment form and its takeover decision must base on this particular payment 
form. What justiﬁes this assumption is in reality the market impact when one 
tries to purchase/sell a large amount of shares during a very short period can be 
so large that it becomes unfeasible to do so. 
Given that takeover participants stick to whatever payment form is presented, 
the next question is how payment forms aﬀect their decisions. In short, the 
rationale is when presented with diﬀerent payment forms, takeover participants 
face diﬀerent level of “uncertainty” associated with the transaction payoﬀ, leading 
to diﬀerent optimization strategy driven by their respective takeover option. In 
other words, the thesis establishes a direct link between strategic considerations of 
takeover participants, captured by a real options analysis, and the payment form 
used in the deal. Given that a majority of previous research focuses on exploring 
the optimal timing of the takeover deal by taking into no account of the impact 
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from payment form, this direct link can be deemed as one of the main theoretical 
contributions of the thesis. It contributes to the research ground investigating 
rationale for the medium of exchange in corporate deals by being one of the very 
ﬁrst attempts to introduce real options framework. 
Although a signiﬁcant part of the thesis is dedicated to investigate that direct 
link in a more formal fashion, it is my aim to provide here the basic rationale in 
laymen’s term. 
An option to wait suggests investor can make their investment at any time at the 
right price, i.e., ﬂexibility has value. The thesis assumes following the literature 
that the bidding ﬁrm holds a real option to purchase the target ﬁrm and the 
target ﬁrm holds a real option to sell its own ﬁrm. 
One of most widely discussed real options implications is that uncertainty aﬀects 
the investment decision. What does uncertainty mean? It essentially suggests 
that there are various possible scenarios that can play out in the future therefore 
one can potentially beneﬁt from waiting to make a better decision. Consider an 
investor who has the right to purchase an asset (which changes value over time 
randomly) worth of 101 pounds with 100 pounds cash. If the investor decides 
to complete this investment, he will receive immediately one pound of proﬁt. 
However the investor is aware that this asset can potentially increase value in 
the future and might for example rise to 120 pounds that yields a potential 20 
pounds of proﬁt. A rational investor should therefore account for the probability 
of such scenarios when making the decision. This is how real options optimization 
process works. Real options analysis suggests there is a threshold beyond which 
the investor should optimally exercise his option - i.e., complete the investment ­
and take the immediate proﬁt. Let me assume the threshold is 10 pounds in this 
case. As a result, if the investor ﬁnds himself in a situation where he can pay 100 
pounds cash to purchase the asset mentioned above that is worth 110 pounds, he 
should stop waiting and complete the deal. 
Interestingly, if the same investor wants to purchase another asset, of which value 
also changes over time randomly but governed by diﬀerent source of randomness, 
he might ﬁnd himself in the situation where he will need for example an extra 15 
pounds of proﬁt to give up the right to wait. The reason is that with this diﬀerent 
asset, the possible scenarios that could happen vary and so do the probabilities 
associated with each of those scenarios. The real options analysis will suggest a 
diﬀerent threshold for the investor to exercise the option. 
To this point, it is clear that “uncertainty aﬀects decisions” means when asset 
changes value over time, it creates uncertain payoﬀ for the decision maker to 
purchase/sell this particular asset. Using a real options analysis, the decision 
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maker therefore requires an extra amount of proﬁt (i.e., the threshold) to give up 
the ﬂexibility. And the diﬀerent sources of randomness associated with the asset 
are likely to result in diﬀerent real options thresholds. 
The analysis for participant’s decision in a corporate takeover deal is not that 
diﬀerent. The complicating factor is that for most cases, there are two sources of 
randomness involved. For example, in a shares oﬀering, target ﬁrm is essentially 
exchanging one random asset - his own ﬁrm’s shares - with another random 
asset, the bidder ﬁrm’s shares. While the math needed to solve the optimal 
strategy becomes more complex, the rationale stays the same - uncertainty drives 
decisions. 
Let me present another illustrative example. Target ﬁrm’s total shares are cur­
rently valued at 1,000,000 pounds and bidder ﬁrm can oﬀer either cash or shares 
to purchase all the outstanding shares. According to the analysis above, the tar­
get ﬁrm understands that his option to sell has value and this value needs to be 
compensated. Let me assume that target requires 10% more to justify his option 
when he sells his ﬁrm against cash. The important point is that this value varies 
in accordance with the payment form presented. An extreme example should 
help illustrate the idea. Let me further assume that bidder ﬁrm’s shares are 
identical to target ﬁrm’s shares. When the bidder ﬁrm’s shares are presented to 
exchange for target ﬁrm’s shares, there is in fact no uncertainty associated with 
the potential payoﬀ target ﬁrm can obtain from the deal. If 1,000,000 pounds of 
bidder ﬁrm’s shares are oﬀered to exchange for 1,000,000 pounds of target ﬁrm’s 
shares, despite the fact that the value of these shares still ﬂuctuates over time, 
it will stay as a proﬁtless deal for target ﬁrm forever. In other words, the value 
of options to wait for the target ﬁrm is essentially zero as there is no potential 
beneﬁt from waiting. In this case, target will need far less than 10% to enter the 
deal. 
It should be clear now that diﬀerent payment forms will result in diﬀerent thresh­
olds for target ﬁrm to justify his own real option. The same rationale applies to 
the bidder. To summarize, from a pure real options perspective, payment form 
matters for takeover decisions. The thesis presents this idea in a more mathe­
matical manner. 
Before proceeding to the main content, it is my aim to provide further information 
to justify the methodology that will be used throughout the whole thesis: real 
options analysis. Since the term is introduced, real options thinking has emerged 
as a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on analysis in mergers and acquisitions. Bruner (2004) 
highlights four reasons why analysts and executives today should strive to employ 
real options thinking in a merger deal: 
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•	 Real options are easy to understand. Real options is actually interchange­
able with notions such as “rights”, “ﬂexibility,” or “commitments” that are 
frequently discussed by corporate managers. 
•	 Real options value can be specially considerable for a ﬁrm that is growing, 
with the ability to do things other ﬁrms cannot, and/or has unique assets. 
For some industries such as technology, pharmaceuticals, and aerospace, 
where there exists the pervasiveness of real options, the real options value 
can easily exceeds half of the total value of the ﬁrm and therefore cannot 
and should not be ignored. 
•	 Executives and mergers and acquisitions deal designers can easily create 
and destroy real options value, with a large impact on careers. 
•	 Real options thinking is able to capture eﬀects that the discounted cash 
ﬂow method cannot show. Apart from managerial ﬂexibility, discounted 
cash ﬂow analysis is also criticized for not being able to reﬂect qualities 
about an asset that are not considered in projected cash ﬂows. As a result, 
discounted cash ﬂow analysis alone often leads to inaccurate estimation of 
the asset value. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.
 
Chapter 1 provides a review on the current literature in two main aspects: mergers
 
and acquisitions and real options. Motives for mergers and acquisitions, empirical
 
performance of deals, valuation methods, takeover bidding theories, and methods
 
of payment are covered in the ﬁrst subsection, followed by a review of recent
 
contributions to real options theory. The chapter concludes with the research
 
questions to be discussed throughout the thesis.
 
Chapter 2 presents a basic model, providing fundamental framework for all the
 
models discussed subsequently.
 
Chapter 3 and 4 both focus on the payment form threshold. Two models vary in
 
assumptions in terms of synergy created through the deal and other aspects of
 
deal design and therefore require diﬀerent solving process. However, the results
 
demonstrate strong consistency.
 
Chapter 5 is the empirical investigation of the predictions generated.
 
Chapter 6 concludes the whole thesis. It summarizes main ﬁndings, empirical
 
and theoretical contributions, implications of the results, research limitations,
 
and future research directions. The rest part is bibliography and appendixes.
 
Chapter 1 
Literature review and research 
questions 
1.1 Mergers and acquisitions 
1.1.1 Terminology 
Given that the deﬁnitions for mergers and acquisitions activities are not unique 
and sometimes vary considerably between authors, it is necessary to provide a 
clear deﬁnition at the beginning of the thesis. 
Following Weston et al. (1998), I deﬁne mergers as the process of combining 
two or more companies, generally by oﬀering the stockholders of one company 
with securities in the acquiring company or cash or a combination of shares 
and cash in exchange for the surrender of their stocks. The word merger refers to 
negotiations between friendly parties who arrive at a mutually agreeable decision. 
Tender oﬀers usually convey that one ﬁrm or person is making an oﬀer directly 
to the shareholders to sell their shares. Tender oﬀers can be either friendly or 
unfriendly. Friendly tender oﬀers occur when the the directors of the target 
company endorse the tender oﬀer proposal; unfriendly tender oﬀers do not have 
the same agreement from the target ﬁrm. An acquisition is an alternative term to 
tender oﬀer. Mergers and acquisitions (tender oﬀers) are two forms of takeovers. 
It is hence appropriate to refer to these activities interchangeably as takeovers or 
M&As or M&A activity. 
It is widely accepted by economists that mergers can be grouped based on whether 
they take place at the same level of economic activity. From this point of view, 
mergers may be horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. A horizontal merger in­
volves two ﬁrms operating and competing in the same kind of business activity. 
Horizontal mergers are regulated by the government for their potential negative 
eﬀect on competition as they could create monopoly power and gain monopoly 
proﬁt. Vertical mergers occur in diﬀerent stages of production operation. For 
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instance, in the oil industry, it involves exploration, production, reﬁning and 
marketing to the ultimate consumer. The reasons why ﬁrms might want to 
be vertically integrated include technological economies that result in cost re­
duction or enhanced information eﬃciency. Conglomerate mergers involve ﬁrms 
in unrelated types of business activities. Conglomerate mergers can be further 
sub-categorized into ﬁnancial conglomerates and managerial conglomerates. Fi­
nancial conglomerates develop ﬁnancial planning business and control systems 
for groups of segments that may be otherwise unrelated from a business point of 
view. Financial conglomerates undertake strategic planning in terms of assign­
ing funds to segments according to performance of the segments. The operating 
decisions, however, are not delivered by ﬁnancial conglomerates. Managerial con­
glomerates carry the attributes of ﬁnancial conglomerates still further by provid­
ing managerial advice and interactions on decision, which enhance the potential 
for performance improvement. 
In a tender oﬀer, the bidder typically seeks the approval of the management 
in the target company, and, in the mean time, makes an oﬀer directly to the 
shareholders in the target ﬁrm. Approval by over 50% of the shareholders in the 
target ﬁrm gives control to the bidder. In a merger, traditional legal doctrine 
held that the minority must agree to the terms negotiated. In a tender oﬀer, 
the oﬀer is extended to individual shareholders so that the management and the 
board of directors can be bypassed. 
Tender oﬀers may be conditional or unconditional. For example, the oﬀer can be 
contingent on obtaining 50% of the shares of the target. Tender oﬀers possibly 
will be restricted or unrestricted with respect to some classes of equity holders. 
By law, shareholders of a target ﬁrm have a 20-day waiting period before they 
decide whether to accept the tender oﬀer or not. The law also requires that when 
a new tender oﬀer is made, the stockholders of the target company must have 10 
business days to consider that new oﬀer. 
Tender oﬀers can be made through a so-called two-tier format. The ﬁrst tier 
receives an oﬀer with superior terms, which typically consists of pure cash pay­
ment, and the second tier can only receive a lower price or less favorable terms. 
The second tier is often paid in securities such as debt or equity of the bidder. A 
variation of two-tier oﬀer is the “three-piece-suitor”. The three steps include (1) 
an initial toehold, (2) a tender oﬀer to obtain control, and (3) after control and 
a majority of shareholders have tendered, a freeze-out purchase of the minority 
shareholders. 
14 Chapter 1. Literature review and research questions 
1.1.2 Motives for M&As 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) summarize three major motives for 
M&As that are widely discussed in the literature: synergy, agency, and hubris. 
The synergy motive indicates that economic gains can result from merging the 
resources of the two ﬁrms. Therefore, the return to both bidder and target share­
holders would be positive. The agency motive suggests that managers of the 
bidder ﬁrm, who are not acting to maximize shareholders’ value, enhance their 
own welfare at the expense of shareholders via a takeover deal. It should be 
noted that the target ﬁrm, although being identiﬁed by the bidder management 
as a way to increase its own welfare, would gain a positive return from the deal. 
The gains to the bidder ﬁrm, however, as well as the total gains of the deal, 
should both be negative. The hubris theory claims that M&As are the result of 
mistakes in evaluating the target ﬁrm. Bidder ﬁrm engages in takeovers simply 
because they overestimate the beneﬁt of the deal, which in fact consists of no 
synergy. The takeover deal motivated by hubris can be described as a zero-sum 
game where the total gain is zero and the bidder ﬁrm overpays due to its over­
optimism. The payment to the target represents a value transfer between the 
target and the bidder. 
Weston et al. (1998) provides a comprehensive framework to examine the 
motives for mergers and acquisitions. I list the main points as below: 
1. Total value increase 
(a) Eﬃciency increase 
(b) Operating synergy 
(c) Diversiﬁcation 
(d) Financial synergy 
(e) Strategic realignments 
(f) The Q-ratio 
(g) Information 
2. Hubris - bidder overpays for target 
3. Agency - managers make value-decreasing takeovers to increase size of ﬁrm 
4. Redistribution 
(a) Taxes - redistribution from government 
(b) Market power - redistribution from consumers 
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(c) Redistribution from bondholders 
(d) Labor - wage adjustments 
(e) Pension reversions 
Total value increased 
Eﬃciency increase 
If a relatively ineﬃcient target is successfully taken over by a relatively eﬃcient 
bidder, value can be increased by improving the eﬃciency of the target. Value 
can also be increased when management of either side can improve the eﬃciency 
of the combined ﬁrm. Combining ﬁrms may achieve better capital allocation and 
better utilization of investments. A discrepancy in eﬃciency would most likely 
to be a factor in mergers between ﬁrms in related industries. 
Operating synergy 
The theory based on operating synergy points out that economies of scale or scope 
are the major factors driving takeover deals. It assumes the ﬁrms are operating at 
levels of activity that fall short of reaching the potentials for economies of scale or 
scope before the merger. Through the deal, the complementarity of capabilities 
can be achieved. For example, merging a ﬁrm strong in research and development 
but weak in marketing with a ﬁrm strong in marketing but weak in research and 
development is expected to provide operating synergy. 
Diversiﬁcation 
Compared to shareholders who can diversify across industries and ﬁrms in the 
capital market, employees of the ﬁrm have a very limited opportunity to diversity 
their labor income sources. Managers and other employees are at greater risk 
especially when the industry where their ﬁrm operates declines, as their ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital is not transferable or only transferable within the industry. 
As a consequence, ﬁrms may diversify, i.e., engage in a cross-industry takeover, 
to encourage ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital investments that make their employees 
more valuable and productive. 
Financial synergy 
Financial synergy theory considers complementarities between merging ﬁrms, not 
in management capabilities, but in matching the availability of investment oppor­
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tunities and internal cash ﬂows. It is widely accepted that internal ﬁnancing costs 
less than external ﬁnancing. Firms operating in a declining industry normally 
possess large internal cash ﬂows but small investment opportunities. Firms in 
a growing industry normally have the opposite position and may have needs for 
additional ﬁnancing. Combining the two may result in both a better allocation 
of capital and lower costs of internal ﬁnancing. 
Another possible ﬁnancial beneﬁt generated from a takeover deal comes from a 
greater debt capacity. The debt capacity of the combined ﬁrm can be greater 
than the sum of the two ﬁrms’ individual capacity prior to the deal, and this 
therefore provides an extra tax saving. The studies Leland and Skarabot 
(2003) and Leland (2005) attempt to explore this sort of beneﬁt. They both 
state that pure ﬁnancial synergy, i.e., a better capital structure to enhance the 
total value of combined ﬁrm, can be captured via a merger. Fluck and Lynch 
(1999) also discuss ﬁnancial synergy driven takeovers. 
Strategic realignments 
Takeovers motivated by strategic realignments have an emphasis on seeking new 
management skills to develop capabilities of the ﬁrm to adapt to changing envi­
ronments. Acquiring external capabilities is believed to be quicker and safer than 
developing internal capabilities. 
The Q-ratio 
The Q-ratio is the ratio of the market value of the ﬁrm’s securities to replacement 
costs of its assets. If Q-ratio of the ﬁrm is substantially less than 1, it provides 
an opportunity for ﬁrms operating in the same industry to acquire additional 
capacity in a cheaper way by purchasing all the shares of the ﬁrm than directly 
purchasing the same amount of assets in the market. Dong et al. (2006) 
examine empirically Q theories of takeovers in diﬀerent time periods and conclude 
the evidence is broadly consistent with hypotheses. 
Information 
The information theory attempts to explain why target shares seem to be reval­
ued upward on a long-term base in a tender oﬀer regardless of being successful or 
not, found by Bradley (1980) and Dodd and Ruback (1977). The informa­
tion that target shares are undervalued is disseminated by the tender oﬀer and 
therefore it is not necessary for the target ﬁrm to take any particular action to 
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cause revaluation. Alternatively, a tender oﬀer might inspire target ﬁrm manage­
ment to take some value-enhancing actions and therefore results in an upward 
revaluation of target ﬁrm shares. 
Hubris 
R.Roll (1986) was the ﬁrst to suggest that the optimism and overconﬁdence 
can play a crucial role in the takeover decision with his ”hubris” theory of corpo­
rate takeovers. He argues that takeovers are the result of the winner’s curse that 
causes bidders to overoptimistic with the target value and consequently overpay. 
Assuming strong market eﬃciency in all markets, the market price of the tar­
get ﬁrm already reﬂects its full value and therefore the higher valuation of the 
bidder in excess of the target’s true economic value results from its excessive 
self-conﬁdence (pride, arrogance). 
The hubris/overconﬁdence helps interpret the evidence on merger announcement 
eﬀects that while target ﬁrms earn positive abnormal returns through the deal, 
bidding ﬁrms, on the other hand, are found to realize negative to zero abnormal 
returns (see for example, Jensen and R.Ruback (1983)). 
As a recent contribution to this area, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) take a 
look at the UK market for more evidence for overconﬁdence and its consequence 
in corporate takeover deals. A distinct feature of the UK data (1980-2004) is that 
91% of takeovers are associated with private targets and therefore the decision to 
acquire is more likely to be based on managers’ beliefs about potential synergies 
due to the lack of the public information. The evidence provides further support 
to the prediction that overconﬁdent managers fail to generate superior abnormal 
returns relative to those created by “rational” managers. 
Agency issue 
It is worth distinguishing two diﬀerent views in terms of agency problems’ ap­
plication to M&A activities. Jensen and W.Meckling (1976) discuss the 
implications of agency problems. One of the agency problems results from a 
conﬂict of interest between managers, who own only a fraction of the ownership 
shares of the ﬁrm, and other equity holders. The partial ownership structure may 
incentivize managers to pursue private welfare as the cost of other shareholders. 
There are a number of organizational and market mechanisms, such as compensa­
tion arrangements for managers (Fama (1980)) or stock market as the function 
of external monitoring device (Fama and Jensen (1983)), which attempt to 
mitigate or control agency problems. Nevertheless, when all these mechanisms 
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are not suﬃcient to control agency problems, takeovers are believed to act as 
an external control device of last choice (Manne (1965)). Manne (1965) also 
states that a ﬁrm’s managers are exposed to a threat of takeover if their perfor­
mance lags behind due to agency problems. On the other hand, some scholars 
consider M&As as a direct outcome of agency problems rather than a solution. 
Mueller (1969) argues that managers, whose compensation is assumed to be 
a function of the size of the ﬁrm, have the incentive to increase the size of their 
ﬁrms, which can be realized through a takeover deal. Free cash ﬂow hypothesis 
(Jensen (1986)) provides a combined view of the two points aforementioned. It 
shows how takeovers are both evidence of conﬂicts of interest between sharehold­
ers and managers, and a solution to the problem. Free cash ﬂow theory predicts 
that mergers are more likely to destroy value, rather than create value. The 
theory believes that free cash ﬂows should be paid out to shareholders, reducing 
the power of management and subject managers to the scrutiny of public capital 
markets more frequently, which in turn mitigates agency problems. However, 
takeover is an alternative way for managers to spend cash instead of paying it 
out to shareholders and will consequently lead to ineﬃciency. On the other hand, 
leveraged buyouts (LBO), which normally involve a large amount of debt issuing, 
provide a device of bonding the managers’ promise to pay out future cash ﬂows 
to shareholders, which hence alleviates the impact of agency problems. 
Redistribution 
Tax gains 
Tax represents a form of redistribution from the government or public at large. 
Takeovers may be motivated by the carryover of net operating losses and tax 
credits, stepped-up asset basis, and the substitution of capital gains for ordinary 
income. Intimidating inheritance taxes may also drive the sale of privately held 
ﬁrms with aging owners. However, it should be noted that tax gains are likely to 
be a reinforcing reason rather than a major motive in a sound takeover. 
Market power 
Mergers might be driven by increased concentration leading to collusion and 
monopoly eﬀects. There is evidence that concentration is the result of severe 
and continuing competition, which causes the composition of the leading ﬁrms 
to change over time. 
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Redistribution from bondholders 
McDaniel (1986) and Warga and Welch (1993) ﬁnd that in leveraged buy­
outs in which debt is intensively used, there is evidence of negative impacts on 
bondholders. If the debt level is increased by very high orders of magnitude, the 
downgrading of corporate bond of bidder ﬁrm should be resulted for some cases 
and represent a value redistribution from bondholders to shareholders. 
Redistribution from labor 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) draw the attention to redistribution from labor to 
shareholders. They argue that the trust between shareholders and labor can be 
breached in various circumstances as a consequence of a takeover. For example, 
the investment made by employees to develop ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills are not paid their 
full value when previous labor contracts are broken by the new control group. 
Pension fund reversions 
Pontiff et al. (1990) examine another aspect of the breach of trust. They ﬁnd 
that there is evidence of executing pension asset reversions in both hostile and 
friendly takeovers. Terminations or returning excess funding to the ﬁrm beneﬁt 
shareholders, and workers lose. 
Apart from the framework provided by Weston et al. (1998), in a recent 
work by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), a market misvaluation problem has been 
presented. It states that a ﬁrm with overvalued equity might become the bidder 
of a takeover deal, and the one with undervalued or relatively less overvalued 
equity becomes takeover targets. Friedman (2004) presents similar idea and 
also provides empirical evidence. 
1.1.3 The performance of M&As 
Both practitioners and researchers would be interested in the following questions: 
Do M&A activities really increase value? If value is created, is it maintained? 
Is value maintained merely in the short term or for a long term? Attempting 
to provide answers for these questions, a number of empirical studies focus on 
examining the performance of M&As. I review the major discoveries in the 
following contents. 
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Successful takeovers 
Jensen and R.Ruback (1983) review 13 studies with sample data ending 
mostly in the late 1970s. Six of the studies are on mergers and seven on ten­
der oﬀers. They show a 30% positive return to target shareholders in successful 
tender oﬀers and 20% in successful mergers. Jarrell et al. (1988) summarizes 
results for 663 successful tender oﬀers from 1962 to 1985 and observe positive re­
turns to targets within ranging from 19% to 35%. Bradley et al. (1988) 
examine the period July 1963 to December 1984. The sample consists of 236 
successful tender oﬀers. The returns to targets are between 19% and 35%, which 
vary in diﬀerent subperiods. A more recent study with a 1,814 sample covering 
the years 1975 through 1991, produced by Schwert (1996), indicates targets 
in successful tender oﬀers achieve 35% positive return. It it tempting to con­
clude that targets in successful tender oﬀers or mergers earn substantial positive 
returns. The only issue is the magnitude. 
With respect to returns to bidder ﬁrms, Jensen and R.Ruback (1983) conclude 
that the excess returns to bidder ﬁrms in successful tender oﬀers are positive 4% 
and zero in mergers. Positive but insigniﬁcant returns to bidder ﬁrms in successful 
tender oﬀers are also found by Jarrell et al. (1988). Bradley et al. (1988) 
have similar results for tender oﬀers. For 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the returns to 
bidding ﬁrms are respectively around 4%, 1.3% and -3%. The data for the 1960s 
and the 1980s is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Schwert (1996) suggests that on 
average the abnormal returns to bidders are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. 
In general, the excess returns to bidders in successful takeovers are close to zero, 
which is consistent with the expectation under perfectly competitive market. 
Weston et al. (1998) draw a conclusion that evidence suggests returns to 
target ﬁrms increase over the decades as a result of tighten government regulation 
and increasingly sophisticated defensive strategies developed by target ﬁrms. On 
the other side, returns to bidding ﬁrms suﬀer from the same factors over time. 
As a result, an opposite pattern for bidder’s returns has been observed during 
the same period. 
Unsuccessful takeovers 
Jensen and R.Ruback (1983) discover that for unsuccessful tender oﬀers both 
bidders and targets experience negative excess returns of modest size, but nei­
ther statistically signiﬁcant. In terms of mergers, target ﬁrms also experience 
negative but statistically insigniﬁcant returns, while the bidder ﬁrms experience 
statistically signiﬁcant negative returns. Bradley et al. (1983) show that 
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unsuccessful targets (the targets not taken over within the ﬁve-year period) ex­
perience positive returns at the beginning (within 60 days). After two years, 
their returns become negative and drift between a range of -5 to 10% during the 
subsequent three years. On the other hand, the experiences of unsuccessful bid­
ding ﬁrms vary greatly, depending on the initial response in the announcement 
period and subsequent moves of bidders. Weston et al. (1998) suggest the 
penalization for losing value-creating opportunities might help explain the loss 
for takeovers participants in unsuccessful deals. 
Total returns 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) investigate a question of critical impor­
tance: in aggregate, do M&As create value? They develop tests to distinguish 
deals driven by three diﬀerent motives: synergy, agency and hubris. They test 
330 tender oﬀers during 1963-1966 and ﬁnd that about 75 % of the deals in the 
sample yield positive total return. The correlation between target and total gains 
is positive when the total gains are positive and is negative when the total gains 
are negative. They conclude that total returns are positive for most deals as 
synergy seems to be the dominant driving force in takeovers. 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) examine 153 mergers among large banks dur­
ing the period 1985-1991 and point out that the average total return to a com­
pleted bank merger is slightly positive but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. 
However, the total merger returns for later years in their sample are signiﬁcantly 
positive. 
A recent study by Mulherin and Boone (2000) examines 1,305 acquisition and 
divestiture deals during the period of 1990-1999. They ﬁnd that both acquisitions 
and divestitures create wealth measured by the combined share price reaction to 
the announcement, which supports the argument that synergy eﬀect is one of the 
major drives for transactions. They also ﬁnd that combined bidder and target 
returns are signiﬁcantly correlated to the ratio of target to bidder value. 
Post-takeover performance 
Healy et al. (1992) study the post-takeover performance of the 50 largest U.S. 
mergers between 1979 and 1984 and conclude that the industry-adjusted post-
takeovers show improvement from better management of the assets. They ﬁnd 
that the event returns for the ﬁrms, on average, correctly forecast post-takeover 
performance. 
Covering the ﬁrms smaller than in Healy et al. (1992), Agrawal et al. 
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(1992) obtain the evidence that the shareholders of bidding ﬁrms actually expe­
rience a wealth loss of about 10% over the ﬁve years following the deals. Their 
returns are adjusted for size eﬀects and for beta-weighted market returns. 
Weston et al. (1998) conclude that the results of post-takeover performance 
are sensitive to sample selection and measurement methodology. Some takeovers 
perform well, but others do not. They point out that since the industry-adjusted 
post-takeover performance obtained by Healy et al. (1992) is positive, while 
the market or economy-wide adjustments result in negative returns, found by 
Agrawal et al. (1992), it might imply that takeovers take place mainly in 
industries where performance is inferior to the whole economy. 
Competition eﬀect 
Bradley et al. (1983) analyze the competition eﬀect on M&A transactions 
by comparing the excess return in single bidder case with that in multiple bidder 
contests. The results are consistent with what one expects - bidders on average 
“pay too much” under the competition threat. Generally, the competition makes 
the excess returns to bidders nearly zero and beneﬁts targets. Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) also examine the impact of competition among bidders and 
conclude that competition appear to aggravate agency problem and stimulate 
hubris. 
Fuller et al. (2002) does not fall into any category discussed above. They 
look into shareholder returns for the same bidder who makes bid for ﬁve or more 
public, private and/or subsidiary targets within a short time period. They ﬁnd 
that bidders experience positive gains when buying a private ﬁrm or subsidiary 
but losses when purchasing a public ﬁrm. Besides, returns to bidders are greater, 
the larger the target ﬁrms, and if bidder oﬀers shares. 
To summarize, empirical ﬁndings appear to support that M&A activities do create 
value, while a majority part of the value goes to the target. 
1.1.4 Valuation of takeover bid 
As discussed previously, it can be concluded that some M&A activities do gener­
ate a positive economic eﬀect. Some deals, however, fail to do so. In some cases, 
bidders seem paying too much under competition, which is the major reason of 
M&A failures. Legally, target shareholders have a waiting period to evaluate the 
tender oﬀer and this gives other potential bidders the chance to join the bidding. 
In a takeover contest, it is obvious that the bidder with the highest estimate 
of target value will be able to submit the highest oﬀer and eventually win the 
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contest. Therefore, the valuation of a takeover deal is crucial to both theoretical 
and practical issues. 
Weston et al. (1998) provide summary to some widely accepted valuation ap­
proaches. It is commonsense that similar companies should be valued at similar 
prices. Based on this rationale, the comparable companies or comparable trans­
actions approach values the M&A transactions straightforwardly. These methods 
are easy to apply and appeal the M&A participants. Moreover, it can be used 
to establish valuation relationships for a company that is not publicly traded. 
However, the weakness of this method is also apparent. One cannot always ﬁnd 
similar transactions or similar companies, thus this method can only provide an 
approximate estimation. 
Traditional corporate ﬁnance theory recommends to use the discounted cash ﬂow 
(hereafter DCF) approach to value a project. In terms of M&A valuation, DCF 
method is still applicable. The spreadsheet and formulae approach fall into this 
category and reader may refer to Weston et al. (1998) for more detail regard­
ing these two methods. However, every method has its own weakness and DCF 
method is no exception. 
Implementing the DCF method (both the formulae method and spreadsheet 
method) requires forecasting post-takeover cash ﬂows and estimating a proper 
discount rate relative to these projected cash ﬂows. The DCF approach provides 
a rational economic framework for valuing takeovers that the marketplace gen­
erally follows. However, the DCF method is highly sensitive to cash ﬂows and 
discount rate estimation and is also highly sensitive to takeovers made for growth, 
proﬁt, margin, and terminal value. In addition, a target company’s future cash 
ﬂows depend on the method of takeover payment and the purchase price, letting 
alone that discount rate is also in debate. 
Myers (1987) proposes a similar idea about the problems of DCF method. He 
states that applying DCF analysis correctly has to overcome human and orga­
nizational problems that bias cash ﬂows and discount rates. Besides, it is less 
helpful in valuating businesses with substantial growth opportunities or intan­
gible assets. The basic insuﬃciency of the DCF approach to capital budgeting 
is that it ignores management’s ability to revise its original strategy. In other 
words, DCF method is unable to consider managerial ﬂexibility while there are 
various kinds of management strategies under an uncertain environment, which 
should be reﬂected in an evaluation model. Myers (1987) also discusses the 
problems of DCF method with respect to bridging today’s investments with to­
morrow’s opportunities. Sometimes an investment may appear irrational today 
when viewed in isolation, for example, with a negative net present value (NPV). 
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However, it is still reasonable to undertake this investment in the future when 
market conditions turn favourable. 
As a solution to above problems, real options analysis has been widely discussed 
in recent years. In the traditional DCF method, One forecasts the future and 
treat the forecast as if it were true. One uses a risk adjusted discount rate. Real 
options analysis (Howell et al. (2001)), however, shows that the future is 
unforeseeable; one knows only the market condition of today, and one uses the 
risk-free rate of discount. Schwartz and Trigeorgis (2001) remark that there 
are three major advantages using this risk-neutral framework to value investment 
projects in comparison with the traditional NPV method. First, it properly 
considers all the ﬂexibilities that a project might have. Second, it uses all the 
information contained in market prices (e.g., futures prices) when they exist. 
Third, it makes use of the powerful analytical tools developed in contingent claims 
analysis to determine both the value of the investment project and its optimal 
operating policy. The real options literature will be discussed in section 1.2. 
1.1.5 Takeover bidding theories 
Once the valuation of a target is obtained, a bidder issues a tender oﬀer to the 
shareholders of the target based on that valuation. Generally, the bidder deter­
mines its oﬀer price by adding some takeover premiums to its target valuation. 
Where do takeover premiums come from and what is the critical premium that 
makes the takeover successful? Both of them are main issues involved in takeover 
bidding theories. 
Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) develop a model of the takeover market, in 
which the bidder has a choice between two takeover mechanisms: mergers and 
tender oﬀers. Tender oﬀers are modelled as an English auction in which bidders 
arrive sequentially and compete for each other. Mergers, however, are modelled 
as bargaining process between the bidder and target management who negotiates 
for the target shareholders. Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) focus on the 
important distinction between these two takeover mechanisms in the content of 
information: more information is released when a public tender oﬀer is made than 
when relative secret merger negotiations occur. They show that there exists a 
unique level in the range of possible synergy gains. Tender oﬀers are only possible 
when the bidder is able to generate synergy greater than that threshold. Other­
wise, the bidder will make only merger attempts. The results imply that target 
returns from tender oﬀers should be higher than those from mergers, and should 
increase with potential competition. Bidder’s returns, on the other hand, are neg­
atively correlated with competition. Besides, the compensation package of target 
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management also has an impact on the choice of takeover mechanisms: to get 
tender oﬀers, target shareholders must provide their managers golden parachutes. 
Many eﬀorts have been made to describe tender oﬀers. Two diﬀerent theories have 
been discussed. One of them assumes that either there is only one target share­
holder or all the shareholders behave as a unit to rule out any free-rider problem, 
and there are multiple bidders involved in the competition (e.g., Berkovitch 
and Khanna (1991), Giammarino and Heinkel (1986), Fishman (1988), 
Hirshleifer and Png (1989), Daniel and Hirsleifer (1995) and Khanna 
(1997)). The other one bases on the assumption that there is only one bidder who 
provides the tender oﬀer directly to a large number or even inﬁnite number of 
independent shareholders (for example, Grossman and Hart (1980), Gross­
man and Hart (1981), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Bagnoli and Lipmen 
(1988), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Harrington and Prokop (1993) 
and Yilmaz (1999)). 
Giammarino and Heinkel (1986) set up a model in which the target makes 
the decision to accept or reject the ﬁrst bid, when rejection still allows a second 
bidder to enter. The model assumes a common synergy to both potential bidders 
and allows the bidders to make any number of bids. However, two bidders are 
not equally informed and therefore sometimes it causes the uninformed bidder to 
overbid. 
Fishman (1988) constructs a two-bidder takeover bidding model in the context 
of asymmetric and costly information. The ﬁrst bidder has the ability to aﬀect 
the second bidder’s decision by conveying the information from his initial bidding 
price. After observing the ﬁrst bidder’s initial price, the second bidder updates 
his valuation of the target, which aﬀects his bidding strategy. Taking into account 
the second bidder’s bidding strategy, the ﬁrst bidder settles on his initial oﬀer 
price. Fishman (1988) models this strategic interaction between two potential 
bidders. The ﬁrst bidder can deter the second bidder from oﬀering a pre-emptive 
high price that signals a high valuation or accommodate the competition by 
oﬀering a lower price. The essence of Fishman (1988) is that “it is not the bid 
itself that preempts a second bidder, but rather the information conveyed by the 
bid”. The model implies that the lower the cost of exploring the information to 
the second bidder, the more incentive the ﬁrst bidder would have to initiate an 
auction. 
Hirshleifer and Png (1989) present a model based on a similar framework. 
They assume that ﬁrst bidder makes either a pre-emptive bid or a lower bid 
that induces the second bidder to investigate and possibly compete. In stead 
of assuming that bidder may costlessly revise its bid as the price changes, they 
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assume that bidding is costly. Standard English auction is therefore incomplete 
as a model of takeover bidding. The price of target may not be the minimum of 
bidders’ valuations less the bidding cost and the price of target need not be higher 
with competitive bidding than with a single pre-emptive bidding. They show 
that the expected price of the target may be higher when the ﬁrst bidder makes 
a pre-emptive bid and therefore the regulatory and management policy eﬀorts 
to encourage competition may seem ineﬃcient in terms of both the expected 
takeover price and social welfare. 
Daniel and Hirsleifer (1995) analyze the large jumps in corporate takeover 
bidding contest via a theory of sequential bidding. By modelling tender oﬀer as 
costly information sequential bidding game, Khanna (1997) also introduces the 
eﬀect of management’s resistance and agency costs. The aim of the ﬁrst bidder’s 
pre-emptive oﬀer is to shorten the bidding length, exclude other bidders, and 
then decrease the expected value of the target. The target’s resistance can be 
viewed as a mechanism to delay this eﬀort and improve the target shareholder’s 
value. However, resistance may also result in agency costs, which could destroy 
shareholder’s value. 
On the other hand, Grossman and Hart (1980) have led to a large literature 
on the “free rider” problem in takeovers. This problem is based on atomistic 
stockholders. Every stockholder has his own rational expectations that none of 
their decisions can aﬀect the outcome of takeover attempts. Therefore, each 
of them demands a post-takeover value for his share (otherwise, he would free 
ride on the improvement brought by the bidder). Thus, the bidder can never 
gain from a takeover and will not make any oﬀer. Even if small stockholders 
are uncertain about the type of bidder, Grossman and Hart (1981) conclude 
that “free rider” problem still persists. According to Grossman and Hart 
(1980), exclusive device can be built into the corporate charter to overcome this 
problem. The idea is to exclude minority stockholders from enjoying the beneﬁts 
of takeover. 
A large numbers of papers have been written on analyzing the robustness of 
this free rider problem. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Hirshleifer and 
Titman (1990) point out that even if shareholders are atomistic, takeover bid 
is still proﬁtable. It is because bidders can earn an excess return on its current 
holdings. However, both of them do not explain how bidders acquire the initial 
shares. Bagnoli and Lipmen (1988) make a more realistic assumption regard­
ing the pattern of target shareholders. They suggest that stockholders are ﬁnite 
and ownership concentrates on some pivotal stockholders who cannot free ride on 
the takeover. They conclude that takeovers can succeed without exclusionary de­
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vices. Harrington and Prokop (1993) explore the free rider problem within 
a dynamic framework, which means that bidders are allowed to make more than 
one bids. Therefore, anticipation of a more attractive oﬀer in the future makes 
stockholders more inclined to reject the oﬀer now, which decreases the expected 
proﬁt from a takeover bid. They conclude that exclusionary devices may indeed 
be necessary even when ownership is highly concentrated. 
In a static and inﬁnite number of shareholders model, it seems that there are 
only two approaches to overcome the free rider problem: a conditional oﬀer that 
often provides the private beneﬁts for the bidder (Grossman and Hart (1980)) 
and initial holdings (toehold) (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Hirshleifer 
and Titman (1990)). However, Yilmaz (1999) presents a new framework in 
which shareholders are uncertain about the motives of the bidder. A bidder 
makes an oﬀer either because it can generate higher cash ﬂows or to pursue high 
private beneﬁts of control. Consequently, shareholders cannot simply free ride on 
the improvements by the takeover that could never happen. Therefore, takeover 
proﬁts may be positive and free rider problem does not have to happen deﬁnitely. 
A latest research (Fairchild and GarroPaulin (2007)) investigates the dif­
ference in the corporate ownership structure between developed and developing 
economies. They develop a game-theoretic model attempting to explain the sepa­
ration of cash ﬂow rights and control rights after the mergers evidenced in Mexico 
market. They demonstrate that the risk-aversion and private beneﬁts factor can 
play roles in explaining the separation. For example, they ﬁnd that higher risk-
aversion can induce an incumbent manager to wish to minimize his equity stake 
but in the same time, with high private beneﬁts, he would wish to retain control. 
1.1.6 Methods of payment 
The payment in mergers and acquisitions deals can be made in various forms: a 
pure cash oﬀer, a pure share oﬀer or a combination of cash and share. “In a per­
fect market with symmetrically informed agency, the medium of exchange chosen 
to accomplish a corporate combination is economically irrelevant; the level and 
division of the merger-induced gains are the same whether the transaction is exe­
cuted by means of an all-cash oﬀer or by some combination of cash and securities 
of the combined ﬁrm.” (Eckbo et al. (1990)). However, most empirical ﬁnd­
ings seem to support that both takeovers and takeover-induced abnormal returns 
are systematically related to the payment form. The choice of payment method 
in mergers and acquisitions is a very diﬃcult issue because it is impacted by a 
wider range of variables and empirical studies are often contradictory. 
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Asymmetric information 
Myers and Majluf (1984) put forth the existence of asymmetric information 
between deal participants and market investors and they argue the method of 
ﬁnancing an investment conveys information. They suggest that shares are used 
to ﬁnance a new investment opportunity because these shares are overvalued. 
On the other hand, if debt is issued to ﬁnance a new project, it implies the 
management team believes its common shares are undervalued. 
Travlos (1987) conﬁrms asymmetric information theory by analyzing data be­
tween 1972 and 1981. He shows that returns to target ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly 
positive in the two-day announcement period and there are higher abnormal re­
turns in cash deals than in share deals. For bidders, Travlos (1987) ﬁnds that 
stock exchange bidding ﬁrms experience signiﬁcant losses at the announcement 
of the deal. In terms of cash oﬀers, bidding ﬁrms earn normal rates of return due 
to the highly competitive nature of takeover market. 
Hansen (1987) proposes a model analyzing information asymmetry and employ­
ing the adverse selection and Nash Bargaining Equilibrium theories. In Hansen 
(1987), no mixed oﬀers can be observed because bidders use expected costs of 
synergy to signal their value to the target. The main diﬀerence between a cash 
oﬀer and a share oﬀer is that the value of a share oﬀer is dependent on takeover 
returns, while it is not the case in a cash oﬀer. He argues that when a target ﬁrm 
knows its value better than a potential bidder, the bidder favors oﬀering shares, 
which have desirable contingent-pricing characteristics, rather than cash. His 
analysis covers 106 deals for manufacturing and mining ﬁrms during the period 
1976-1978. 
Fishman (1989) focuses on the role of the medium of exchange in preempting 
competition. In this model, targets and bidders are asymmetrically informed and 
bidders’ oﬀers bring forth potential competition. He concludes that cash has the 
advantage to preempt competition by signaling a high valuation for the target 
ﬁrm, hence providing higher returns to target shareholders. 
In Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990), the role of payment forms (cash, eq­
uity and a combination of two) in competition among bidders and their eﬀects on 
returns to shareholders are investigated. It is also one of the asymmetric infor­
mation models attempting to examine the interaction between informed bidders 
with favorable private information about potential synergy and uninformed tar­
gets. Their results, consistent with empirical ﬁndings, imply higher returns to 
both bidding and target ﬁrm’s shareholders in cash deals than in share deals. 
They further argue that a higher proportion of cash used in a mixed oﬀer will 
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lead to higher abnormal returns to shareholders for both bidder and target. 
Cornett and De (1991), however, ﬁnd results that contradict the asymmetric 
information models. They examine 132 inter-state bank mergers between 1982 
and 1986 and show that bidder’s shareholders have positive abnormal returns 
which are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, in cash oﬀers, share oﬀers and mixed oﬀers. 
Two explanations are presented: (1) the impact of asymmetric information in 
banking sector might not be as important as in non-banking sectors; and (2) 
a share oﬀer, in banking deals, might present some good information such as 
eﬃciency in asset management. 
Following Fishman (1989) and Hansen (1987), Eckbo et al. (1990) provide 
a theoretical explanation for the relation between the mix of cash and shares 
in an oﬀer and the bidder’s private information about its value as well as the 
value of the synergy. They identify that the true post-deal value of the bidder 
ﬁrm is revealed to the target by the composition of the mixed oﬀer, and this 
revealed value is increasing and convex in the amount of cash used in the oﬀer. 
Interestingly, their own empirical work conducted in the same paper does not 
seem to support their model predictions by using 182 Canadian takeovers in the 
period of 1964-1982. 
A more recent work (Cornu and Isakov (2000)) provides the results which are 
consistent with the argument that cash oﬀers signal a high-valuing bidder and 
deter competition. Linn and Switzer (2001) manage to ﬁnd evidence for this 
proposition. 
Taxation 
A number of authors point out that the impact of taxation cannot be ignored by 
analyzing the choice of the payment method. It is widely addressed that cash 
oﬀers are considered as immediately taxable for the target’s shareholders and 
therefore require a higher premium to oﬀset the incremental tax payment. On 
the other hand, share oﬀers are favored from target shareholders’ perspective as 
they are generally non-taxable until capital appreciation on shares are realized. 
From bidders’ point of view, a higher takeover premium from a cash oﬀer will lead 
to higher amortization of the goodwill in post-takeover years (which is no longer 
a problem under current US GAAP). The subsequent earnings will be artiﬁcially 
brought down, resulting in lower tax payment. Bidder shareholders will therefore 
prefer a cash oﬀer if tax beneﬁts from the deal is superior to higher premium 
paid, while the management team of target ﬁrm might make the opposite choice 
if they want to avoid ﬁrm performance artiﬁcially decreasing from amortization. 
(Blackburn et al. (1997)) 
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Wansley et al. (1983) cover the mergers for the period 1970-1978 and show 
that target ﬁrm’s cumulative average residual for 41 days through the announce­
ment date when the method of payment is cash is 33.53% as compared with 
17.47% when shares are used. The cumulative average residual for mixed pay­
ment form is 11.77%, lower than either pure cash or pure share. Wansley et al. 
(1983) believe tax plays an important role in payment choice as cash transaction 
are taxable to target shareholders so higher premiums paid to compensate for 
taxes to be paid. In additional, they point out that when shares are used, the 
bidding ﬁrm must go through Securities and Exchange Commission registration 
and it is not necessary to do so for cash oﬀers. Consequently, it takes longer 
time to complete a share oﬀer deal. The longer time before the deal is ﬁnalized, 
the higher possibilities for target management to develop a defense and a higher 
possibility for a rival bidder to turn up. These actions can result in high prices, 
which, nevertheless, could be oﬀset by even higher preemptive cash bids. 
In a later research, Harris et al. (1987) show that cash oﬀers produce higher 
abnormal returns for targets. They examine a large sample of 2,500 acquisitions 
that have taken place in the UK and the USA between 1955 and 1985. The 
results have shown that cash only and share only oﬀers have been the most 
frequent payment methods used in M&As. They develop the theory called tax 
and transaction cost eﬃcient: shareholders who care about the liability of paying 
capital gains taxes prefer share oﬀers, while the others will accept cash. However, 
they also state that, although being a possible explanation, there is no clear 
evidence that capital gains taxation is the major drive for the choice of payment 
method. 
Huang and Walking (1987) ﬁnd similar results: average cumulated abnormal 
returns for cash oﬀers are 29.3%, while 14.4% in share oﬀers and 23.3% in mixed 
oﬀers. The attractiveness of cash oﬀers is explained by the impact of taxation. 
Management control 
The management control theory is ﬁrst presented by Harris and Raviv (1988) 
and Stulz (1988) and it argues that managers are reluctant to give up control 
so that they prefer not to ﬁnance takeovers by issuing shares. Amihud et al. 
(1990) conduct an empirical work on the relation between corporate control and 
the method of ﬁnancing a corporate takeover. Their sample consists of ﬁrms that 
appear in the 1980 list of Fortune 500 companies and that take over other ﬁrms 
during the years 1981-1983. They ﬁnd that the higher the managerial ownership 
fraction of the bidding company, the larger the probability of takeovers ﬁnanced 
by cash rather than by a share exchange, which supports the management control 
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theory. 
A later article by Martin (1996) covering 846 takeovers completed during 1978­
1988 in either New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or American Stock Exchanges 
(AMEX) ﬁnds consistent evidence. He argues that that higher managerial own­
ership is negatively related to the likelihood of stock ﬁnance. 
All the studies aforementioned focus on the incentive of bidding ﬁrm. Ghosh 
and Ruland (1998) present a study investigating primarily on target corpora­
tions and the motivation of their managers to obtain inﬂuence in combined ﬁrms 
after takeovers. They select the 50 largest acquisitions for each year from 1981 
through 1988 and their results provide support to the hypothesis that managers 
of target ﬁrms who own large percentages of shares in their ﬁrms prefer receiv­
ing shares in exchange for their ownership and top managers are therefore able 
to maintain their voting inﬂuence to retain their jobs. They suggest that tar­
get’s managerial ownership is even more important than the bidders’ managerial 
ownership in explaining the method of payment for takeovers. 
Yook et al. (1999) examine the relative importance of two mainstream theo­
ries working to explain the choice of payment form in a corporate takeover deal: 
information asymmetry and management control. Using the inside trading as the 
proxy to measure asymmetric information, they ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more inside sell­
ing by the management of bidding ﬁrms before stock oﬀers relative to cash oﬀers 
as managers believe that overvalued shares prices will drop after a share involved 
takeover deal. In terms of management control concerns, they ﬁnd that bidders 
with large inside holdings are more likely to oﬀer cash, which demonstrates their 
strong desire to avoid diluted control. 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) use the data from European takeovers in the 1997­
2000 period. In their model, the bidding ﬁrm is facing a tradeoﬀ between corpo­
rate control concerns of issuing equity and rising ﬁnancial distress costs by issuing 
debt. In contrast, a seller faces a tradeoﬀ between tax beneﬁts of stock and the 
liquidity and risk-minimizing beneﬁts of cash consideration. Their ﬁndings are 
also consistent with the management control theory as they ﬁnd that corporate 
control incentives to choose cash are particularly strong when a bidder’s control­
ling shareholder has an intermediate level of voting power in the range of 20-60% 
- a range where it is most vulnerable to a loss of control. The incentive to avoid 
issuing shares is even strengthened when target shareholders are highly concen­
trated, which acts as an additional threat to bidder’s control power in the newly 
created ﬁrm. 
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Other factors 
Apart from information, taxation and management control factors that are widely 
discussed, researchers believe there are some other issues that will aﬀect the 
choice of payment in takeovers such as the size of participating ﬁrms, investment 
opportunity, and business cycle, etc. 
Grullon et al. (1997) examine 146 bank mergers during the period of 1981­
1990 and their ﬁndings support the size eﬀect. They ﬁnd that the smaller the 
bidder in relation to target bank and the higher the bidder’s capital adequacy 
ratio, the more likely it is that the shares are chosen. Their ﬁndings are also in 
line with prior studies that target banks earn positive abnormal returns. 
However, some other studies, such as Martin (1996) and Ghosh and Ruland 
(1998), do not seem to support the size eﬀect. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant links be­
tween relative size of bidder and target and payment methods chosen in takeover 
transactions. Ghosh and Ruland (1998) argue it is the result of negotiation 
between two sides: if target is relatively larger than bidder, it prefers shares ﬁ­
nancing to maintain their interest and inﬂuence in the merged company; however 
bidder favors cash payment to avoid diluting their existing ownership in the ﬁrm. 
Martin (1996) also explores the relationship between the payment method and 
ﬁrm’s investment opportunities and business cycle conditions. He uses Tobin’s 
q-ratio, the ratio of the market value of a company’s debt and equity to the 
current replacement cost of its assets, as the proxy for ﬁrm’s growth opportunity. 
The ﬁrms with greater q-ratio are believed to possess higher incentive to invest 
for future growth. Martin (1996) states that bidding ﬁrms with greater growth 
opportunities are more likely to use shares as the payment method in takeovers 
as they require cash to fund their growth investments. Moreover, Martin (1996) 
sheds light on the free cash ﬂow (or cash availability) proposition that if bidders 
have suﬃcient cash ﬂows in hand but few proﬁtable investment opportunities, 
they tend to ﬁnance the takeover deals by cash. 
Martin (1996) collects changes in the Standard and Poor’s 500, index changes in 
Moody’s BAA bond yield, changes in the index of 11 leading economic indicators 
and changes in industrial production to describe the business cycle. He identiﬁes 
that Standard and Poor’s 500 is signiﬁcantly positively related to share ﬁnancing, 
which provides evidence for business cycle proposition. 
Zhang (2003) examines how various factors, such as relative size, return on 
equity, dividend payout ratio, and ownership and market-to-book value of both 
bidding and target ﬁrms, inﬂuence the payment method in takeovers deals. He 
collects data from 103 UK mergers and acquisitions in the period 1990 through 
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1999. His research conﬁrms relative size eﬀect and free cash ﬂow theory. He also 
argues that better performance of bidding ﬁrm, measured by larger market-to­
book value, favors the choice of shares. However, Zhang (2003) ﬁnds no evidence 
for the management ownership hypothesis. 
In a more recent work, Swieringa and Schauten (2007) look for evidence 
from Dutch mergers and acquisitions market. Their ﬁnal data sample consists of 
227 mergers and acquisitions announced during the period 1996-2005 by public 
bidders from the Netherlands. They believe the following characteristics signif­
icantly aﬀect the payment method in their sample: bidder’s fraction of closely 
held shares, bidder’s asset size, bidder’s market-to-book ratio, relative deal size, 
intra-industry deals and asset acquisitions. Swieringa and Schauten (2007) 
ﬁnd no clear evidence for the management control theory. 
As outlined above, a number of hypotheses have been advanced to explore the 
choice of payment methods. The literature review of this speciﬁc area will con­
clude with a list of hypotheses in relation to payment form choice and its conse­
quential impact on the performance of the deal. 
•	 The asymmetric information hypothesis: 
–	 The returns to both bidding and target ﬁrm’s shareholders are higher 
in a cash deal than in a share deal. (Travlos (1987),Fishman (1989), 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990)) 
–	 A higher proportion of cash used in a mixed oﬀer should result 
in a higher return to shareholders for both bidder and target. 
(Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990)) 
•	 The tax implication hypothesis: A higher return to target shareholders 
must be given to oﬀset the greater tax exposure for a cash oﬀer. (Wansley 
et al. (1983), Harris et al. (1987), Huang and Walking (1987) ) 
•	 The management control hypothesis: 
–	 The higher the managerial ownership fraction of the bidding company, 
the higher the chance that deal is ﬁnance by cash rather than shares. 
(Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), Amihud et al. (1990), 
Martin (1996), Faccio and Masulis (2005)) 
–	 The cash oﬀer is favored when target ﬁrm managers own a signiﬁcant 
proportion of shares in their ﬁrms. (Ghosh and Ruland (1998)) 
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•	 The relative size eﬀect hypothesis: The smaller the bidder in relation 
to the target, the shares are more likely to be used. (Grullon et al. 
(1997)) 
•	 The investment opportunities hypothesis: The greater growth op­
portunities for bidders, the more likely share ﬁnancing is used. (Martin 
(1996)) 
•	 The free cash ﬂow hypothesis: The more the free cash ﬂows owned by 
bidding ﬁrms, it is more likely that cash is used. (Martin (1996)) 
•	 The target pre-deal performance hypothesis: If the pre-deal perfor­
mance of the target ﬁrm is bad, the bidder tends not to keep the ineﬃcient 
management of the target ﬁrm, giving rise to cash ﬁnancing more preferred. 
(Zhang (2003)) 
•	 The correlation hypothesis: The intra-industry deals are more likely 
to be ﬁnanced with shares than cross-industry deals. (Swieringa and 
Schauten (2007)) 
•	 The deal size hypothesis: The larger the size of deals, the more likely 
the deal is ﬁnanced with shares. (Swieringa and Schauten (2007)) 
•	 The bidder ownership structure hypothesis: Bidders with an inter­
mediate fraction of closely held shares favor cash more than bidders with 
a relatively low or high ownership stake. (Swieringa and Schauten 
(2007)) 
1.2 Real options 
1.2.1 A new view of investment 
“Economics deﬁnes investment as the act of incurring an immediate cost in the 
expectation of future rewards”(Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Most investment 
decisions share three important characteristics to diﬀerent degrees. First, invest­
ment is partially or completely irreversible. In other words, the initial cost of 
investment is at least partially sunk. Second, there is uncertainty over the future 
returns from investment and even the investment costs. Third, there are ﬂexibil­
ities with the timing of investment decisions. One can always choose to postpone 
its investment and wait for new information that might favor investment decisions 
in the future. 
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Traditional corporate theory suggests a very straightforward three-step rule to 
determine how to make an investment. Firstly, work out the present value of 
expected stream of earnings the project will generate. Secondly, calculate the 
present value of the stream of investment costs associated with the project. The 
ﬁnal step will be working out the diﬀerence between these present values. The 
diﬀerence is so called net present value (NPV) and the decision simply relies on 
the sign of NPV: if it is positive, make the investment; otherwise, abandon it. 
The NPV rule is straightforward, although it still involves some diﬃcult issues 
such as determining the proper risk-adjusted discount rate or estimating the 
expected proﬁts. Essentially it has a very straightforward judging rule: yes or 
never, based on the sign of the NPV. Clearly, NPV rule fails to take into account 
one important characteristic of investment decision: the ﬂexibility to delay it. 
In other words, NPV rule simply ignores an opportunity cost, which should be 
included as part of the total investment costs, arising from the fact that investors 
have the right to delay their investment decisions. 
Since Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) develop the ﬁnancial 
option pricing theory, more and more studies have been accomplished to use this 
idea on the “real” business investment decision. For example, a company with 
an opportunity to invest in a project is like a ﬁnancial call option: it has the 
right but not the obligation to buy an asset in the future. Since the investment 
is irreversible, once the company makes this investment, it “exercises” its call 
option. In other words, when a company makes this irreversible investment, it 
gives up its option value. Therefore, the option value should be incorporated into 
the whole project cost as an opportunity cost. Once this analogy has been set up, 
the generalized option pricing theory provides us a powerful tool to evaluate this 
opportunity cost quantitatively. In additional to the valuation, the investment 
timing can also be determined endogenously via a real options analysis. 
1.2.2 Mathematical background 
Before proceeding to the review of real options models, I intend to provide a brief 
introduction to the mathematical tools that are widely used in real options anal­
ysis. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provides a systematic description of applying 
a real options approach to capital investment decisions of ﬁrms. Two mathemat­
ical techniques are applied to evaluate a real options embedded project: dynamic 
programming and contingent claims analysis. In fact, they are closely related to 
each other and lead to the same outcome in many cases. However, they rely on 
diﬀerent assumptions concerning the ﬁnancial market and discount rate. 
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Dynamic programming breaks a whole sequence of decisions into two compo­
nents: an immediate decision and a valuation function (continuation value) that 
incorporates the consequences of all subsequent decisions, starting with the po­
sition that results from the immediate decision. The optimal action is the one 
that maximizes the sum of immediate proﬁt and continuation value. For a ﬁ­
nite timing horizon, the very last decision can be found using static optimization 
methods and one can work backwards all the way to the initial decision. If the 
time horizon is inﬁnite, what might seem like an even more complicated calcula­
tion is simpliﬁed by its recursive nature: each decision leads to another problem 
that looks exactly like the original one. Sometimes, it is even possible to obtain 
an analytical solution. 
Contingent claims analysis bases on the economy that has the market for quite 
a rich menu of assets of all kinds. It is always possible to ﬁnd some portfolios 
of traded assets (even if they are not directly traded, one can obtain an implicit 
value for them by relating them to other assets) to replicate the pattern of rate 
of return from the investment project. In order to avoid any arbitrage opportu­
nities, the value of the investment project must equal the value of the replication 
portfolio. Therefore, investment project value can be derived from the market 
traded asset value. Once the value of investment opportunity is obtained, the 
timing of investment that achieves this value will be found consequently. 
It will be proved useful to have a brief discussion of stochastic process that serves 
as a fundamental building block for all the models developed in the thesis. I 
will start from a Wiener process - also called a Brownian motion and then move 
to geometric Brownian motion, which is most widely accepted in the ﬁnancial 
investment literature to describe the movement of share prices. 
According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), A Wiener process is a continuous-time 
stochastic process with three important properties. One, it is a Markov process. 
Markov process essentially means that the probability distribution for all future 
values of the process depends only on its current value, and is independent of any 
past values of the process or any other current information. It means, to make a 
best forecast of its future value, the only information that is useful is its current 
price. Two, the Wiener process has independent increments. The probability 
distribution for the change in the process over any tiny interval is independent 
of any other time interval. Three, changes in the process over any ﬁnite interval 
of time have a normal distribution, with a variance that increases linearly with 
the time interval. 
The Markov property of the Wiener process makes it suitable to describe some 
of the properties of stock prices. In a weak form of market eﬃciency, public 
� � 
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information should be incorporated in the current price of the stock immedi­
ately, therefore any past pattern of prices can be deemed as useless information 
to predict future value. This characteristic of share prices is perfectly in line 
with the Markov property. However, as share prices will never fall below zero, 
the normal distribution is ineﬀective in describing this feature. Alternatively, 
a geometric Brownian motion assumes that changes in stock prices are lognor­
mally distributed, i.e., the changes in the logarithm of stock prices are normally 
distributed. 
A geometric Brownian motion can be described by the following stochastic dif­
ferential equation: 
(1.1) dx = µxdt + σxdz, 
or 
dx 
(1.2) = µdt + σdz. 
x 
In the above equations, µ is called the drift/expected growth parameter and σ the 
diﬀusion/variance parameter. The percentage changes in x, dx/x, are normally 
distributed. Since these are changes in the natural logarithm of x, absolute 
changes in x, dx, are lognormally distributed. 
If the initial value (the value at the current time) x(0) is given by x0 and the 
value at time t by x(t) , the geometric Brownian motion indicated by equation 
(1.1) or (1.2) has an analytical solution: 
(µ−σ2/2)t+σz(t)(1.3) x(t) = x0e . 
It can be further shown that the expected value of x(t) at time t, is given by 
(1.4) E [x(t)] = x0eµt, 
and the variance of x(t) is given by 
2 2µt(e(1.5) V [x(t)] = x0e σ
2t − 1). 
Given that the discount rate r exceeds the drift (growth) rate µ, the present value 
of a proﬁt ﬂow that follows a geometric Brownian motion can be given by � � ∞ � � ∞ 
(1.6) E x(t)e −rtdt = x0e −(r−µ)tdt = x0 . 
0 0 r − µ 
Another technique being very useful for real options analysis is Ito’s Lemma. The
 
stochastic processes have a part of which value is random over time, therefore in
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� 
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terms of ordinary rules of calculus, these processes do not have a time derivative. 
Fortunately, Ito’s Lemma allows us to diﬀerentiate and integrate functions of 
stochastic processes and furthermore conduct analysis based on it. 
I only provide a statement of the lemma here and readers who have interests can 
refer to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Neftci (2000) and Øksendal (2005) for 
proof and other detail. 
Let x(t) be an stochastic process described by 
(1.7) dx = a(x, t)dt + b(x, t)dz, 
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process, and a(x, t) and b(x, t) are known 
and non-random functions. The above process is well known as Ito or generalized 
Wiener process. 
Consider a function F (x, t) that is at least twice diﬀerentiable in x and once in t. 
The total diﬀerential of this function, dF , suggested by Ito’s Lemma, is given by 
∂F ∂F 1 ∂2F ∂F 
(1.8) dF = + a(x, t) + b2(x, t) dt + b(x, t) dz. 
∂t ∂x 2 ∂x2 ∂x 
Function F can involve several Ito processes. For example, suppose that F = 
F (x1, . . . , xm, t) is a function of time and of the m Ito processes x1, . . ., xm, where 
(1.9) dxi = ai(x1, . . . , xm, t)dt + b1(x1, . . . , xm, t)dzi, i = 1, . . . , m. 
The correlation coeﬃcient between any two Wiener processes are given by ρi,j , 
which satisﬁes that E(dzidzj ) = ρi,j dt. Ito Lemma provides the total diﬀerential 
dF by 
∂F ∂F 1 ∂2F 
b2dF = + ai(x1, . . . , t) + i (x1, . . . , t)∂t ∂xi 2 ∂x2 ii i � 
1 ∂2F 
(1.10) + ρi,j bi(x1, . . . , t)bj (x1, . . . , t) dt 
2 ∂xi∂xj
i�=j 
∂F 
+ bi(x1, . . . , t) dzi. 
∂xii 
In the following, I will present a model originally developed by McDonald and 
Siegel (1986) and further discussed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), to illustrate 
the basic techniques involved in a standard real options analysis. 
The model considers a ﬁrm with an opportunity to invest in a single project. The 
cost of the investment, denoted by X, is known and ﬁxed. However, the value of 
the project, denoted by S, follows a geometric Brownian motion: 
(1.11) dS = µSdt + σSdz, 
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where µ and σ are respectively drift and diﬀusion (variance) parameter. The 
term dz stands for a standard Brownian motion or Wiener process. 
The ﬁrm’s investment opportunity is therefore equivalent to a perpetual call 
option - the right but not the obligation to incur the investment cost, X, to 
achieve the outcome of the investment, S. The timing to exercise such a real 
investment option is when the investment will be conducted. As aforementioned, 
the optimal investment rule can be derived in two ways: dynamic programming 
or contingent claim analysis. With the rationale of the two methods behind us, 
the more technical detail will be covered as follows and it will allow us to compare 
these two approaches. 
I will start from dynamic programming. Let F (S) be the value of the ﬁrm’s 
option to invest. It yields no cash ﬂows up to time T when the investment is 
undertaken. Therefore the only return from holding this investment opportunity 
is its capital appreciation. Hence, the Bellman equation in the continuation 
region, i.e., the value of S for which it is not optimal to invest, is expressed by 
(1.12) rF dt = E(dF ), 
where r is a proper discount rate. The above equation indicates that over time 
interval dt, total expected return on the investment opportunity, rF dt, should 
have the same value as its expected rate of capital appreciation. 
Ito’s lemma gives the value of dF : 
∂F ∂F 1 ∂2F 
(1.13) dF = dt + dS + (dS)2 . 
∂t ∂S 2 ∂S2 
As the investment decision is irrelevant to calender time, the value of dF should
dt 
= F �(S)dS + F ��(S)(dS)2 
be zero. Let F �(S) and F ��(S) denote ∂F 
∂S 
and ∂
2F 
∂S2 
respectively, and the above 
equation becomes: 
1 
(1.14) dF . 
2 
Noting that E [dz] = 0 and E [(dz)2] = dt, the expected value is given by 
(1.15) E [dS] = µSdt, 
(1.16) E [(dS)2] = σ2S2dt. 
Hence equation (1.12) becomes 
(1.17) 
1 
σ2S2F ��(S) + µV F �(S) − rF = 0. 
2 
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In addition, the value of F (S) must satisfy the following boundary conditions: 
(1.18) F (0) = 0, 
(1.19) F (S ∗ ) = S ∗ − X, 
(1.20) F �(S ∗ ) = 1, 
where S∗ represents the value of S upon the time of exercise. 
Condition (1.18) arises from the observation that if S goes to zero, it will stay at 
zero with the implication of the stochastic process for S. As a result, the option 
to invest will be of no value when S = 0. Condition (1.19) is so-called “value­
matching” condition that imposes equality between the value of the investment 
option and the payoﬀ of the option upon exercise. Said diﬀerently, the value 
should be equal to immediate net payoﬀ S∗ −X upon exercise. Finally, condition 
(1.20) is the “smooth-pasting” condition. It ensures that investment occurs along 
the optimal path by requiring a continuity of slopes at the trigger threshold. If 
F (S) were not continuous and smooth at the critical exercise point S∗, one could 
do better by exercising at a diﬀerent point. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) state that although the equation (1.17) is a second-
order diﬀerential equation, there are three boundary conditions that must be 
justiﬁed. The reason being is that even if the position of the ﬁrst boundary (S = 
0) is known, the position of the second boundary is not. In other words, the “free 
boundary” S∗ must be determined as part of the solution, which consequently 
requires the third condition. 
Equation (1.19) has another useful interpretation. Rearranging it gives S∗ = 
I + F (S∗). When the ﬁrm decides to invest, it obtains the project value S∗ . In 
additional to the direct or tangible cost of investment X, the ﬁrm also forfeits its 
intangible opportunity cost F (S∗), which is ignored by the traditional corporate 
ﬁnance theory, such as NPV rule. 
Equation (1.19) is an ordinary second-order homogeneous diﬀerential equation 
and therefore should have a general solution expressed as a linear combination of 
any two independent solutions: 
(1.21) F (S) = ASβ1 + BSβ2 , 
where A and B are constants that are yet to be determined. The values of β1 
and β2 are two roots of the quadratic equation 
(1.22) 
1 
σ2β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0. 
2 
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The two roots are 
(1.23) β1 = 
1 
2 
− µ 
σ2 
+ 
�� 
µ 
σ2 
− 1 
2 
�2 
+ 
2r 
σ2 
> 1, 
� �2
1 µ µ 1 2r 
(1.24)	 β2 = − − − + < 0. 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 
The boundary condition (1.18) implies that B must be zero, and the solution 
therefore must take the form 
(1.25)	 F (S ∗ ) = AS ∗β1 . 
Substituting (1.25) into (1.19) and (1.20) gives: 
(1.26)	 AS ∗β1 = S ∗ − X, 
β1S 
∗β1−1(1.27)	 = 1. 
Solving them provides: 
β1
S ∗ (1.28)	 = X, 
β1 − 1
(β1 − 1)β1−1 
(1.29)	 A = . 
ββ1 Xβ1−1 1 
Equation (1.28) speciﬁcally presents the optimal investment rule. Since β1 > 1, 
I have β1 > 1 and therefore S∗ > X. It implies that the investment rule 
β1−1 
suggested by simple NPV analysis, which is, invest whenever the value of project 
β1exceeds its associated cost, is not valid anymore. The multiple 
β1−1 reﬂects the 
magnitude of optimal investment rule, which relies on the parameters σ, µ and 
r. 
β1Dixit and Pindyck (1994) examine the characteristics of 
β1−1 in more detail 
β1and ﬁnd that as volatility σ increases, β1 decreases, and β1−1 should increase. The 
result reveals one of the most important implications from real options analysis: 
uncertainty delays investment. The greater the uncertainty (volatility) is involved 
in future project value, the larger is the gap between V ∗ and X, i.e., the larger the 
return the investor will require to give up its irreversible investment opportunity. 
It is widely accepted that dynamic programming has its weakness in that it is 
based on an arbitrary and constant discount rate, r. To estimate the proper value 
of this discount rate, one has to account for investor’s risk preference, which 
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varies over diﬀerent investors in the market. Contingent claims method is 
an alternative method that avoids doing so and therefore is of many scholars’ 
interest. 
Contingent claims analysis, however, also requires one important assumption: the 
market must be suﬃciently “complete” so that one can always ﬁnd an asset or 
construct a dynamic portfolio of assets to replicate the uncertainty of underlying 
asset, e.g., S. In other words, there must always exist an asset or a portfolio, the 
price of which is perfectly correlated with S. 
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), let S be the price of an asset or a dynamic 
portfolio of assets perfectly correlated with S. Let ρSm be the correlation of S 
with the market portfolio. It is assumed that S is perfectly correlated with S, 
hence ρSm = ρSm. It is further assumed that this asset or portfolio pays no 
dividend, therefore the entire return is from capital gains. Thus, S should follow 
the stochastic process described by 
(1.30) dS = µSSdt + σSSdz. 
To evaluate investment projects with contingent claims analysis, let F (S) denote 
the value of ﬁrm’s option to invest and S follow a standard Brownian motion 
satisfying equation (1.11). The basic idea is to construct a risk-free portfolio, 
determine its expected rate of return, and equate that expected rate of return to 
the risk-free rate. 
To construct a risk-free portfolio, one should hold the option to invest, F (S), 
and, in the same time, go short n = F �(S) units of the project or equivalently, 
the asset or portfolio S that is perfectly correlated with S. Let Φ denote the 
value of this portfolio hence Φ = F − F �(S)S. As F �(S) may change over time 
as S changes over time, the portfolio must be constructed dynamically, i.e., the 
composition of the portfolio will change over time. However, over a inﬁnite small 
time interval dt, the value of n can be treated as ﬁxed. 
Considering δS as the dividend or cash ﬂows paid out to the holder, the short 
position in the portfolio will have to make a payment of δSF �(S) to compensate 
the long side investors. Therefore, the total return from holding the portfolio 
over a short time interval dt is 
(1.31) dF − F �(S)dS − δSF �(S)dt, 
where dF can be expanded using Ito’s Lemma: 
(1.32) dF = F �(S)dS +
1 
F ��(S)(dS)2 . 
2 
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Therefore the total return on the portfolio is given by 
(1.33) 
1 
F ��(S)(dS)2 − δSF �(S)dt. 
2 
Note that dS = µSdt + σSdz, hence the return on the portfolio becomes 
(1.34) 
1 
σ2S2F ��(S)dt − δSF �(S)dt. 
2 
To avoid arbitrage possibilities, this return must equal the risk-free rate: 
(1.35) 
1 
σ2S2F ��(S)dt − δSF �(S)dt = rf [F − F �(S)S]dt. 
2 
Eliminating dt on both sides and rearranging gives the following diﬀerential equa­
tion that F (S) must satisfy: 
(1.36) 
1 
σ2S2F ��(S) − (rf − δ)SF �(S) − rf F = 0 
2 
The equation obtained above is very similar to what one can obtain from a 
dynamic programming analysis (equation 1.17). In fact, under the assumption of 
risk neutrality, i.e., the discount rate r is equal to the risk-free rate rf , the results 
obtained from the two methods are identical. I therefore omit the subsequent 
steps to derive the optimal investment rules through boundary conditions. 
If the investment represents an opportunity of exchanging two stochastic assets, 
the above analysis has to be adjusted accordingly. Consider an investment op­
portunity that involves exchanging two stochastic assets S1 and S2. For example, 
S1 might represent the stochastic future payoﬀs from the investment and S2 the 
random investment costs. The net payoﬀ from the project clearly will be the dif­
ference of the two random assets S1 −S2, which in most cases should be stochastic 
as well. The exercise strategy therefore should maximize the expected value of 
this diﬀerence while the involvement of two random variables makes the analysis 
mathematically more diﬃcult. 
To be in line with standard real options literature, S1 and S2 follow the geometric 
Brownian motions: 
(1.37) dS1 = µ2S1dt + σ1S1dzS1 , 
(1.38) dS2 = µ1S2dt + σ2S2dzS2 . 
The correlation coeﬃcient between the two sources of uncertainty is constant and 
equals to ρ: 
(1.39) E [dzS1 dzS2 ] = ρdt. 
� � � 
� � 
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Intuitively, one expects that the option of exchanging two stochastic variables S1 
and S2 will be held when S1 is low or S2 is high. Such option should be exercised 
when S1 becomes suﬃciently high for given S2, or S2 becomes suﬃciently low for 
given S1. Following the intuition, one should expect the option to be exercised 
when the ratio of S1 to S2 exceeds a certain threshold, which is the optimal 
investment rule. 
Let F (S1, S2) be the value of option to invest. Since the investment opportunity 
yields no cash ﬂows up to time when the investment is executed, the only return 
from holding it is its capital appreciation. In the continuation region, the Bellman 
equation is: 
(1.40) rF dt = E(dF ), 
where r is an appropriate discount rate or rate of expected return, and E(dF ) on 
the right hand side denotes the expected change of capital appreciation. 
Expanding the right hand site of the above equation applying the general two-
dimensional Ito’s Lemma 
∂F ∂F 1 ∂2F 
(1.41) dF = dt + dXi + dXi, dXj ,
∂t ∂Xi 2 ∂Xi∂Xji i j 
and noting that since this investment optimization problem is time-independent, 
there is no partial derivative with respect to time. Thus 
(1.42) 
E(dF ) = E FS1 dS1 + FS2 dS2 +
1 
FS1S1 (dS1)
2 +
1 
FS2S2 (dS2)
2 + FS1S2 dS1dS2 ,2 2 
where for any value function F , Fi (i = S1, S2) denotes the ﬁrst-order partial 
derivative of F with respect to i and Fii (i = S1, S2) denotes the second-order 
partial derivative of F with respect to i. 
Substituting for dV and dI (terms with dt of order greater than one can be 
ignored) provides: 
(1.43) E(dS1) = µ1S1dt, 
(1.44) E(dS2) = µ2S2dt, 
(1.45) E(dS2) = σ2S2dt,1 1 1 
(1.46) E(dS2) = σ2S2dt,2 2 2 
(1.47) E(dS1dS2) = ρσ1σ2S1S2dt. 
Substituting the above expected value into equation (1.40) and (1.42) leads to 
the partial diﬀerential equation that the investment option must follow: 
(1.48) FS1 µ1S1+FS2 µ2S2+
1 
FS1S1 σ1
2S1
2+
1 
FS2S2 σ2
2S2
2+FS1S2 ρσ1σ2S1S2−rF = 0. 2 2 
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Upon the time of exercise, the immediate payoﬀ (S1 
∗ − S2 ∗) from the option must 
equal the value of the option (F (S1 
∗, S2 
∗)). In additional, to avoid arbitrage, 
smooth-pasting conditions must be satisﬁed: 
(1.49) F (S ∗ 1 , S 
∗ 
2 ) = S 
∗ 
1 − S ∗ 2 , 
(1.50) FS∗ 1 (S 
∗ 
1 , S 
∗ 
2 ) = 1, 
(1.51) FS∗ 2 (S 
∗ 
1 , S 
∗ 
2 ) = −1. 
An additional boundary condition is given by requiring that, as the ratio of two 
exchanging assets (S1/S2) is too small, the ratio of option value to S2 tends to 
be zero. The idea behind it is not hard to explain. If S1 is too small compared 
with its cost S2, investors should ﬁnd the option very unattractive because the 
opportunity to invest would never be proﬁtable. 
F (S1, S2)
(1.52) lim = 0 
(S1/S2)→0 S2 
The feature that the boundary itself is an unknown makes problems of this kind 
quite diﬃcult. Precisely, it involves solving free-boundary problems for elliptic 
partial diﬀerential equations, and analytical solutions are rarely available. How­
ever, the homogenous property of equation (1.48) makes it possible to reduce the 
dimension of the problem and obtain an analytical solution. 
Intuitively, the optimal investment decision should depend on the ratio S1/S2 
rather than the absolute value of either S1 or S2. A new variable is created: 
R ≡ S1/S2. Thus 
(1.53) F (S1, S2) = S2f(S1/S2) = S2f(R), 
where f is the function to be determined. 
Successive diﬀerentiation gives: 
(1.54) FS1 (S1, S2) = fR(R), 
(1.55) FS2 (S1, S2) = f(R) − RfR(R), 
(1.56) FS1S1 (S1, S2) = fRR(R)/S2, 
(1.57) FS1S2 (S1, S2) = −RfRR(R)/S2, 
(1.58) FS2S2 (S1, S2) = R
2fRR(R)/S2. 
Substituting them into the partial diﬀerential equation (1.48) and the boundary 
conditions yields: 
(1.59) 
1
(σ1
2 + σ2
2 − 2ρσ1σ2)R2fRR(R) + (µ1 − µ2)RfR(R) − (r − µ2)f(R) = 0,
2
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with boundary conditions: 
(1.60)	 f(R ∗ ) = R ∗ − 1, 
(1.61)	 fR∗ (R 
∗ ) = 1, 
(1.62)	 lim f(R) = 0. 
R→0 
A general solution for equation (A.33) is given by: 
(1.63)	 f(R) = ARβ1 + BRβ2 , 
where A and B are constants, and β1 and β2 are respectively positive and negative 
roots of the subsequent quadratic equation: 
(1.64) 
1
(σ1
2 + σ2
2 − 2ρσ1σ2)β(β − 1) + (µ1 − µ2)β − (r − µ2) = 0 
2
Solving the above equation gives: 
1 µ1 − µ2
β1 = − 
2 σ1
2 + σ2
2 − 2ρσ1σ2 
(1.65)	 � �2 
µ1 − µ2 1 2(r − µ2)
+	 − + > 1 
σ1
2 + σ2
2 − 2ρσ1σ2 2 σ12 + σ22 − 2ρσ1σ2 
1 µ1 − µ2
β2 = − 
2 �σ12 + σ22 − 2ρσ1σ2 (1.66)	 � �2 
µ1 − µ2 1 2(r − µ2)−	 − + < 0 
σ1
2 + σ2
2 − 2ρσ1σ2 2 σ12 + σ22 − 2ρσ1σ2 
Boundary condition (A.36) indicates that B = 0 and reduces the two solutions 
for β to a single one: 
(1.67)	 f(R ∗ ) = AR ∗β1 
Substituting (A.40) into (A.34) and (A.35) yields: 
(1.68)	 A(R ∗ )β1 = R ∗ − 1 
(1.69)	 Aβ1(R 
∗ )β1−1 = 1 
Solving it for A and R∗ gives the optimal investment rule: 
S∗ 1 β1(1.70)	 = R ∗ = 
S∗ 2 β1 − 1 
Basic features of the result obtained above, suggested by Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) are laid out as follows: If either σ1 or σ2 increases, β1 will decrease, and the 
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multiple β1 will increase. Volatility delays the investment as greater uncertainty 
β1−1 
over future payoﬀ enhances the incentive of decision makers to delay the decision 
β1and therefore wait for more information. However, the multiple 
β1−1 will decrease 
if the correlation coeﬃcient between the two sources of uncertainty increase. It 
can be explained by a reducing uncertainty over the ratio through a greater 
correlation between changes in S1 and S2, holding their variances ﬁxed. In an 
interesting extreme case, if both S1 and S2 follow the same stochastic processes 
(diﬀerent initial values are allowed) and are perfectly correlated (ρ = 1), the 
option value to exchange S1 for S2 shrinks down to zero as there is actually no 
uncertainty involved exchanging two identical random assets and the investment 
rules will be subject to a standard NPV analysis, determined by the initial value 
of each random process. 
1.2.3 Review of basic models 
Leaving mathematical preliminaries behind us, I can now turn to reviewing some 
classic real options models. I also intend to provide necessary technique details 
for the studies most related to my research. 
Myers (1987) is the ﬁrst author to extend the idea of ﬁnancial options to real 
assets. He puts forth the thinking of discretionary investment opportunities as 
“growth options”. Following Myers (1987), Kester (2001) conceptually devel­
ops the growth option further more. Trigeorgis and Mason (1987) provide 
another conceptual real options framework. Their work bases on the traditional 
NPV approaches to capital budgeting and puts forward the idea of expanded 
NPV, which includes the real options premium to justify managerial ﬂexibility. 
Introducing the contingent claims analysis, they conceptually discuss a variety of 
real operating options: the option to defer investment, the option to expand, the 
option to contract and other types of operating options such as option to shut 
down operations temporarily, to switch use, or to abandon a project permanently 
when future market conditions turn out worse than originally expected. Other 
attempts to construct a conceptual framework for real options include Dixit and 
Pindyck (2001) and Trigeorgis (1988). 
These conceptual discussions work to provide a general conceptual framework 
for analyzing investment opportunities under the real options scenario. They 
describe various real options that might be embedded in investment opportunities 
and seek strategic planning with value maximization. These discussions serve as 
a conceptual basis for integrating the ﬁnancial options methodology into real 
investment decisions. 
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Brennan and Schwartz (2001) consider a natural resource investment, the 
sector normally with a relative high volatility. They argue that traditional dis­
counted cash ﬂow approaches are subject to some severe limitations and problems 
such as the estimation of future output prices, and the determination of a proper 
discount rate. More importantly, they fail to account for the managerial ﬂexibil­
ity that investors possess in terms of their future decisions. They suggest that a 
natural resource investment, such as a gold or copper mine, may be valued with 
the help of established ﬁnancial option pricing approach pioneered by Black 
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). 
In a continuous time setting, Dixit (1992) provides quantitative analysis on how 
much real options are worth. The optimal timing derived from value maximizing 
strategy provides a clear picture of how traditional net present value analysis 
is misleading. Speciﬁcally, he demonstrates why investors should invest until 
price rises substantially (two or three times with some reasonable parameters) 
above its long-run average cost and why it is not optimal to abandon a business 
immediately after it starts generating negative payoﬀ. 
Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis (1994) consider a ﬁrm that has a choice to switch 
various operating modes to produce diﬀerent outputs with uncertain demand. 
They suggest this ﬂexibility to switch can be treated as a build-in option, which 
provides an extra value that cannot be ignored. The analysis discusses the impact 
of switching costs on the option value of switching and its consequent optimal 
exercise strategy. The hysteresis eﬀect, an idea similar to what Dixit (1992) 
points out, is also discovered through the analysis, i.e., even if short-term situation 
favors the decision of immediate switching, there is still the value of waiting. 
Pindyck (1991) reviews some basic models of irreversible investment to illustrate 
the option-like characteristics of investment opportunities, and shows how to 
value the option value of deferring in a continuous time setting, via both option 
pricing (contingent claims) and dynamic programming analysis. 
There are various real options embedded in real investment opportunities. I tend 
to follow Trigeorgis (2001) to group common real options and then give a brief 
review of some classic models in each category. 
Option to defer or option to wait is probably one of the most well known real 
options. A typical deferring option brings forward the idea that management, 
who holds an investment opportunity associated with uncertain payoﬀ in the 
future, can wait to see if earning from the investment justiﬁes spending irreversible 
investment costs. The option to wait is analyzed by McDonald and Siegel 
(1986). 
Some staging investment, as a series of sequences, creates the option to abandon 
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the project in midstream if new information favors it to do so. Essentially, each 
stage of the investment can be viewed as an option on the value of subsequent 
stages, which also represents an investment option. This kind of investment 
should be valued within a compound option framework and its embedded options 
are widely accepted as time to build options or sequential options. Majd and 
Pindyck (1987) falls into this category. 
If market conditions are more favorable than originally expected, investors should 
have the ﬂexibility to expand the scale of production or accelerate resource uti­
lization. If market evolves towards a converse way and the conditions are worse 
than expected, the investors would like to reduce operating scale or, when the 
market conditions are bad enough, temporarily shut down the operation and start 
up again in the future. These real options, suggested by Trigeorgis (2001), are 
generally treated as options to alter operating scale. They consist of options to 
expand, to contract and to shut down and restart. McDonald and Siegel 
(1985), Trigeorgis and Mason (1987), Pindyck (1988) and Brennan and 
Schwartz (2001) cover this category. 
Sometimes, market conditions are severely unfavorable and to alter operating 
scale is no longer an eﬃcient decision. Management may have to abandon current 
operations permanently to realize the resale value of initial investments. Option 
to abandon is discussed by Myers and Majd (1990). 
So far, it is assumed that investment costs (inputs) are certain and only future 
payoﬀs (outputs) are allowed to be uncertain. However, if the investment costs 
are also involved with some uncertainty, the investment execution becomes an 
exchange of two uncertain assets. Margrabe (1978) provides a rigorous study 
on exchanging options (option to switch). Other studies regarding option to 
exchange are given by McDonald and Siegel (1985) and Kulatilaka and 
Trigeorgis (1994) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)1 . 
The subsequent topic focuses on growth options. An early investment, such as 
research and development (R&D) or a strategic acquisition, is a prerequisite or 
initial platform that a chain of interrelated projects can build on. It essentially 
provides future growth opportunities that can follow up the initial movement. 
Real options of this kind are normally modelled as growth options and there are 
a number of papers fallen into this area such as Trigeorgis and Mason (1987), 
Trigeorgis (1988), Pindyck (1988) and Kester (2001). 
Several studies, such as Trigeorgis (1993) and Brennan and Schwartz 
(2001), attempt to handle a more complex situation. Some real-life projects 
involve a number of real options, whose value may be dependent on each other. 
1 See Chapter 6. 
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The eﬀort has been made to discover how various real options interact with each 
other and therefore the combined option value may diﬀer from the sum of separate 
option values. 
In the following, I will present a more detailed review of some representative 
research in each of the category mentioned earlier. McDonald and Siegel 
(1986) present a continuous-time framework to analyze a ﬁrm’s investment in 
a single project. They derive analytical formulas for the value and timing of 
waiting option to invest in an irreversible project, when both the value of the 
project and the cost of investing are stochastic (geometric Brownian motion). 
In additional to investment timing and the value of waiting, optimal scrapping 
timing and the issue of computing a correct discount rate are also covered by their 
research. McDonald and Siegel (1986) furthermore explore the situation 
that the present value of net future cash ﬂows takes a discrete jump to zero via 
modelling it as a mixed Poisson-Wiener process. 
Majd and Pindyck (1987) investigate the time-to-build options embedded in 
investment projects that have the following characteristics: ﬁrst, investment costs 
occur sequentially over time; second, the rate of expenditures being made can­
not exceed a certain maximum rate; third, the investment opportunities will not 
generate any cash ﬂows until the entire sequence is completed. They show the op­
timal decision rule in each stage of the project and the project valuation through 
option pricing techniques. They also show dependence of investment decision 
on the maximum rate the expenditures must be made and how the level of risk 
brings forward a greater impact on the investment decisions due to the ﬂexibility 
that ﬁrm has in making sequential investments. 
Myers and Majd (1990) suggest that to permanently abandon a project for its 
salvage value is analogous to an American put option on a dividend-paying asset. 
A numerical technique (ﬁnite-diﬀerent method) is employed due to the absence of 
a closed-form solution. Essentially, they point out that the project life should not 
be ﬁxed. It is subject to the decision to abandon the project, which is determined 
by a value maximizing strategy via options theory. Their propositions challenge 
the traditional discounted cash ﬂow rules that routinely rely on a known project 
life and therefore have considerable practical implications. 
Margrabe (1978) develops a model for exchange options. Some common ﬁ­
nancial arrangements are equivalent to options to exchange one risky asset for 
another. This option is simultaneously a call option on one asset and a put option 
on the other asset. Margrabe (1978) suggests to view a cash tender oﬀer as an 
exchange option. Both bidder and target hold the exchange option value, while 
target is giving up this value when a cash oﬀer has been launched. Therefore, the 
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target should charge the bidder a premium to compensate the loss of exchange 
option value. He concludes that the value of such an option depends not only 
on the current values of the assets that might be exchanged, but also on the 
relationship between the rates of return on the two assets, and the duration life 
of the option. 
Pindyck (1988) examines capacity choice and expansion, based on the assump­
tion that ﬁrms cannot continuously and incrementally add capital. Pindyck 
(1988) argues that a ﬁrm’s capacity choice is optimal when the balance between 
the present value of expected cash ﬂows from a marginal unit of capacity and the 
total costs of that unit is achieved. Therefore he suggests to calculate the value 
of an extra unit of capacity ﬁrst and then move on to determining the value of 
the option to invest in this unit, together with the optimal timing for exercising 
the option. 
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) is the ﬁrst attempt to value investment 
projects in natural resources using a risk-neutral framework. In their analy­
sis, the spot price of the commodity is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian 
motion, which is a standard process to model stock prices in the option pricing 
literature. 
Most of the earlier literatures, despite their tremendous theoretical contribution, 
are not able to explain some real-life projects that are more complex in that they 
involve more than one real options. Most importantly, the value of a collection of 
multiple real options is not the simple sum of individual real option as values of 
them may interact. Trigeorgis (1993) is one of the attempts to explain explic­
itly the nature of real options interaction. Trigeorgis (1993) points out that 
there are some situations that option interactions are small and therefore simple 
option value additivity can be a good approximation. However, the situations 
that option interactions have a signiﬁcant impact on the combined value of a 
collection of real options are also identiﬁed and therefore invalidate option addi­
tivity. Besides, the option interactions eﬀect can be either positive or negative 
and Trigeorgis (1993) also identiﬁes the conditions for each case. 
1.2.4 Strategy and competition 
The real options models that have been reviewed so far assume that the ﬁrm 
has a monopoly right to invest in a given project, ignoring the possibility that 
other ﬁrms might enter the market and compete for the same project. As a 
result, a ﬁrm that owns the option to invest or disinvest a project can exercise 
its real options in a totally free manner. In other words, the value of the real 
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options owned by the ﬁrm is unaﬀected by any strategic consideration arising 
from potential competition. 
Unfortunately, most ﬁrms do not have monopoly right to invest in practice. They 
may have to consider the possible entry of new competitors, or further expansion 
of existing competitors. The value of option to wait is inevitably impacted by the 
feature of competition. For simplicity, consider a industry with a large number 
of ﬁrms and each ﬁrm acts competitively. Each ﬁrm has the capacity to produce 
one unit of output, activated by incurring a ﬁxed cost. The price of output is 
essentially aﬀected by two aspects: the current output ﬂow of the whole industry 
and a factor that represents uncertainty (which can be of ﬁrm-speciﬁc, or indus­
try, or both). Non-strategic real options theory would suggest the investment 
is justiﬁed only when the current output price exceeds the sunk cost by a large 
margin, the value of which is given by the option value of waiting. However, 
ﬁrms cannot wait until its “optimal” timing in a non-competition world as the 
fear of competition would make it invest early. The value of option of waiting is 
cut by the nature of competition, and in some extreme cases even drops to zero. 
The output price cannot be set exogenously as it is in a monopoly framework. It 
must be treated as an endogenous variable of industry equilibrium. The above 
example is only one of the possible forms of competition and diﬀerent competi­
tion forms would result in diﬀerent impacts on the real options value. Therefore, 
it raises a fundamental doubt concerning the earlier literature and scholars start 
to appreciate the importance of incorporating competition eﬀects. 
This subsection focuses on option game models and also covers several papers 
discussing strategy. Option game models are the combination of option pricing 
theory and game theoretic concepts. Option pricing and game theory are comple­
mentary theories. The ﬁrst one deals with maximization of value but ignore the 
strategic interaction among competitors. Game theory is designed to deal with 
this caveat. On the other hand, real options approach ﬁlls the gap where game 
theory pays very little attention to payoﬀs in details and lacks links to market 
values. 
Smit and Ankum (1993) is one of the earliest attempts to combine a real options 
analysis and a game-theoretical approach. Using a simple binomial model, they 
conceptually illustrate the impact of competition on project value and its optimal 
decision rules. They conclude with suggesting diﬀerent investment tactics to ﬁrms 
with various market positions in terms of their competitive advantage. 
Grenadier (1996) develops a leader-follower game-theoretical real options 
model in the real estate market. The value of investing options owned respec­
tively by leader and follower is obtained and the equilibrium exercise strategies 
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are achieved consequently. Grenadier (1996) sheds light on the real options 
game research in a duopoly setting. 
Luehrman (ober) provides a conceptual framework to explore how option pric­
ing can be applied in improving decision making in terms of the timing and the 
sequence of a portfolio of strategic investments. In additional to the choice of 
developing multiple projects in sequence, Childs et al. (1998) argue that they 
can also be developed in parallel. They develop a real options model to provide a 
decision mechanism and consequently determine which investment policy is op­
timal. They ﬁnd that the variances of the projects, the correlation coeﬃcient 
between projects’ present values, the development and implementation costs and 
the time duration for development all have signiﬁcant impacts on the decision. 
They conclude that a high correlation, a low volatility, and a high implement cost 
will favor the choice of sequential development in contrast with parallel develop­
ment. Besides, their results lead to an interesting argument that it is not always 
optimal to develop the project with higher net present value. Volatility plays 
a very important role as the development of high variance project is associated 
with signiﬁcant learning. 
Smit and Trigeorgis (1993) argue that some early investment commitments 
such as R&D investment or an initial plan in a new market, should be treated 
strategically as a ﬁrst necessary link in a chain of interrelated investment de­
cisions. With this consideration, the initial investment, which may seem unfa­
vorable if considered in isolation, still provides considerable strategic value and 
therefore can be optimal. According to their analysis, the decision to implement 
such a pioneer investment faces a tradeoﬀ between two eﬀects: the ﬂexibility 
eﬀect and the net commitment eﬀect. The ﬁrst eﬀect arises from a standard 
option value of waiting for better information. In short, it is the beneﬁt from 
ﬂexibility. The net commitment eﬀect indicates that early strategic investment, 
which would sacriﬁce ﬂexibility eﬀect, may lead to an indirect impact on the 
competitor’s reaction and the resulted competitive equilibrium. In some extreme 
cases, the entire market structure will alter and the subsequent optimal invest­
ment strategy will be applied accordingly. To summarize, the net commitment 
eﬀect is the eﬀect to improve the ﬁrm’s strategic position and enhance the value 
of its future growth opportunities. 
Kulatilaka and Perotti (2001) conduct an analysis on strategic growth op­
tions. In their model, the initial investment is interpreted as the acquisition of 
growth opportunities relative to competitors, which will be exercised if market 
conditions are favorable. In line with other game-theoretical real options models, 
they argue that both strategic value, arising from a preemptive eﬀect to improve 
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the strategic competition position, and ﬂexibility value, arising from the alterna­
tive value of not investing, have to be taken into account. Through an imperfect 
competition model, they show that uncertainty (risk) may not always encourage 
the choice of not investing, which is contrary to the standard results obtained 
in the real options literature. Uncertainty may favor the investment when extra 
proﬁts from strong market share because a better strategic competition position 
dominates its downside risks. 
Grenadier and Weiss (1997) form an analogy between the adoption of inno­
vations and the exercise strategy of a chain of future real investment options. For 
example, to upgrade to a new generation of technology can be treated as holding 
an option to exchange one innovation for the next one. Therefore, the investment 
in the early stage of a new technology not only incudes the value of current in­
novation itself, but also incorporates the future option to upgrade. This kind of 
feature can be discussed within a compound option framework. They ﬁnd that 
a ﬁrm’s optimal migration strategies are path-dependent, which means that two 
ﬁrms facing the same choice will still choose diﬀerently due to the fact that they 
have made diﬀerent previous investment decisions. 
Grenadier (1999) models the information through the exercise of real options 
in an imperfect information setting. Grenadier (1999) points out that each 
agent in the market holds some private information, which is conveyed through 
their respective exercise strategy. Each agent exercises its own investment op­
tions not only depending on its own signal, but also on the revealed signals of 
other agents. Essentially each agent faces a tradeoﬀ between early exercise to 
receive greater potential payoﬀ and the beneﬁts of waiting for information re­
vealed by other market participants’ actions. Grenadier (1999) concludes that 
consequent market equilibrium exercise will be sequential, with the agents who 
own the most information exercise ﬁrst and therefore reveal information to the 
least informed agents, or does not exercise. 
Huisman and Kort (1999) combine the framework of Fudenberg and Ti-
role (1985) with a real options analysis. They consider two identical ﬁrms which 
both have the possibility to make an investment that generates some uncertain 
payoﬀ. As two ﬁrms are operating in the same market, and the investment deci­
sion of one ﬁrm will therefore have an impact on its rival’s payoﬀ and its exercise 
strategy. Their model identiﬁes three scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario that a 
preemption equilibrium occurs, ﬁrms invest in a leader-follower manner. In the 
second scenario, two ﬁrms invest simultaneously when demand is large enough. 
The third scenario leads to two possible outcomes: a preemption equilibrium 
when uncertainty is low and a collusive equilibrium (both ﬁrms invest in the 
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same time) when demand is large. They furthermore argue that the leader in the 
preemption equilibrium has to sacriﬁce some of its waiting option to preempt its 
rival and therefore has a lower threshold than in a monopoly situation. It shows 
explicitly that competition erodes the option value to wait. Their results also 
show that, compared with a monopoly case, the strategic option value of waiting 
is essentially the same in a collusive equilibrium. 
Weeds (2002) also adopts the continuous time framework of Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1985) and examines a winner-takes-all patent system. There are several 
forms of uncertainty involved: the uncertain technological success of the project 
and stochastic economic value of the patent to be won. Again, in a two-player 
game, each player has to take into account both the value of waiting and the 
fear of preemption. Weeds (2002) discovers similar results with Huisman and 
Kort (1999) in a preemptive leader-follower non-cooperative equilibrium. He 
also points out that the non-cooperation will delay investment as each holds back 
from investing in the fear of starting a patent race. 
Grenadier (2002) provides a general solution for equilibrium investment strate­
gies in a Cournot-Nash oligopolistic framework. He ﬁnds that the Nash equilib­
rium exercise strategies are identical to those obtained in an “artiﬁcial” perfectly 
competitive equilibrium, with a modiﬁed demand function. Therefore what seems 
a more complex case of oligopolistic settings can be solved from the results of 
models where there is perfect competition. 
In a more recent work, Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) consider entry 
exercise strategies with preemption eﬀects under incomplete information. They 
ﬁnd that the value of waiting delays investment while the fear of preemption 
speeds up the investment and therefore the investment threshold in a multiple 
ﬁrm equilibrium lies somewhere between the zero-NPV threshold and the optimal 
strategy of a monopolist. The level of the threshold depends on the distribution 
of competitors’ costs and the implied fear of preemption. 
They consider a ﬁrm i, with an investment opportunity that generates an output 
price, or a ﬂow of proﬁt P by incurring a sunk cost Xi. P , without loss of any 
generality, follows a standard geometric Brownian motion: 
(1.71) dP = µP dt + σP dz. 
The above equation indicates that the output price, as well as the proﬁt ﬂow 
generated from the project, is expected to grow at the trend rate µ. I start from 
analyzing the value of investment opportunity in a monopolistic setting, denoted 
by V . It is contingent on the value of the basic asset P , which enables us to price 
V with the procedure of contingent claims valuation. 
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A riskless portfolio consisting of the asset to be valued (V ) and basic asset (P ) is 
constructed. As the portfolio is riskless, it must earn the risk-free rate of return. 
The standard procedure yields a diﬀerential equation for the unknown value of 
the project which can be solved subject to boundary conditions. 
Consider a portfolio at time t, which contains one unit of the project value, V (P ), 
and a short position of n units of output price, P . During an inﬁnite small interval 
of time (t, t + dt), the value of n can be seen as a constant. The value of n should 
also make the portfolio riskless, and therefore should equal to V �(P ). 
The holder of the project will receive revenue P dt over the time interval of length 
dt. The short position in this portfolio must require a payment that equals to the 
dividend yield, namely, δP dt = (r − µ)P dt; otherwise no rational investors will 
enter into the long side of the transaction. Here r represents a proper discount 
rate, the value of which can be obtained through capital asset pricing model. 
Consequently, holding the portfolio yields net revenue (P −nδP )dt. On the other 
hand, the capital gain of the portfolio should have the value dV − V �(P )dP . 
Therefore total return (Φ) from holding the portfolio over a short time interval 
dt is: 
(1.72) Φ = dV − V �(P )dP + P dt − δP V �(P )dt. 
Using Ito’s Lemma to expand dV and rearranging yields: 
(1.73) Φ = [P − δP V �(P ) + 1 σ2P 2V ��(P )]dt. 
2 
The return Φ must equal the riskless return rf [V (P ) − V �(P )P ]dt. Thus, v(P ) 
must satisfy the following diﬀerential equation 
(1.74) 
1 
σ2P 2V ��(P ) + (rf − δ)PV �(P ) − rf V (P ) + P = 0. 
2 
A general solution to the above equation is a linear combination of two indepen­
dent solutions A1P 
β1 and A2P 
β2 and any particular solution of the equation such 
as P/δ. β1 and β2 are the two roots of the fundamental quadratic equation 
1 
(1.75) Q ≡ σ2β(β − 1) + (rf − δ)β − rf = 0. 
2 
It is also worth mentioning that β1 > 1 and β2 < 0. 
Thus, the solution of V (P ) can be expressed by 
(1.76) V (P ) = A1P 
β1 + A2P 
β2 + P/δ, 
where the A1 and A2 are yet to be determined by the boundary conditions. 
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According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the value of the project contains 
two parts: the fundamental component (P/δ) and the speculative components 
(A1P 
β1 + A2P 
β2 ). 
The fundamental component of the value of the project can be interpreted as the 
expected present value of the revenue stream Pt when the initial level is P . It 
can be proved by the following analysis. Considering the features of geometric 
Brownian motion, it is given that E [Pt] = Peµt. Discounting at an appropriate 
discount rate r gives: � ∞ 
(1.77) Peµte −rtdt = P/(r − µ) = P/δ. 
0 
However, the speculative component, A1P 
β1 + A2P 
β2 , should be ruled out. 
First, it makes sense that V (0) = 0. According to the features of the geometric 
Brownian motion, if the price is ever zero, it will forever stay at zero and therefore 
the value of the project should also stay at zero. The above analysis provides 
that A2 must be zero. 
The other term, A1P 
β1 , interpreted by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), represents a 
speculative opportunity that “people might value the asset above its fundamentals 
if they expected to be able to resell it later at a suﬃcient capital gain”2 . Such 
speculative opportunity must be ruled out and then the value of project should 
only contain its fundamental component: 
(1.78) V (P ) = P/δ, 
Therefore, the value of the project, V , being a constant multiple of P , should also 
follow a geometric Brownian motion with the same drift and diﬀusion parameters. 
Hence the investment problem can be reduced to the model aforementioned. 
Let F (P ) denote the value of investment project as a function of the output price. 
It must satisfy the following diﬀerential equation 
(1.79) 
1 
σ2P 2F ��(P ) + (rf − δ)PF �(P ) − rf F (P ) = 0,
2 
via a contingent claims analysis; 
or 
(1.80) 
1 
σ2P 2F ��(P ) + µP F �(P ) − rF (P ) = 0,
2 
through a dynamic programming analysis. 
2 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for further detail. 
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Again, the above two equations are identical under a risk neutral assumption, 
i.e., r = rf . 
The above diﬀerential equations can be solved by the following three boundary 
conditions: 
(1.81)	 F (0) = 0, 
(1.82)	 F (P ∗ ) = V (P ∗ ) = P ∗ /δ − Xi,i i i 
∗ V �(P ∗ (1.83)	 F �(Pi ) = i ) = 1/δ. 
Thus, the optimal investment rule, i.e., the threshold of output price above which 
it is optimal to complete the project, can be expressed by 
β1
P ∗ (1.84)	 i = δXi. β1 − 1 
Upon exercise, the value of investment project has the value given by 
β1
(1.85)	 Vi 
∗ = Pi 
∗ /δ = 
β1 − 1 Xi. 
Therefore, the value of the ﬁrm prior to investment is � �� �β1P ∗ P 
(1.86)	 V = i − Xi . 
δ Pi 
∗ 
If the ﬁrm is threatened by preemption, intuitively the value of option to wait 
will be reduced. For simplicity, consider there exists only one competitor, ﬁrm 
j, which is an otherwise identical ﬁrm with an investment cost Xj . As equation 
(1.85) indicates, a diﬀerent cost will result in a diﬀerent investment threshold. If 
the threshold Pj 
∗ is lower than Pi 
∗, ﬁrm i will be preempted by ﬁrm j and loses 
any further opportunity to invest. Therefore, ﬁrm i must determine its threshold 
by considering the threat of preemption, i.e., the probability that it has the lower 
threshold. 
To introduce incomplete information, they assume that ﬁrm i conjectures that 
ﬁrm j invests when P ﬁrst hits its threshold Pj 
∗ . However ﬁrm i only knows the 
distribution of Pj 
∗, denoted by Fj . Fj has a continuously diﬀerentiable density 
function Fj 
� with positive support on an interval, [PL
∗, P U 
∗ ]. 
Thus the probability that ﬁrm i can preempt its competitor or ﬁrm i has the 
lower threshold is described by 1 − Fj (Pi ∗), which depends on its own investment 
threshold. Therefore the value-matching condition and smooth-pasting condition 
must be adjusted accordingly: 
∗	 ∗ ∗ (1.87)	 Vi(Pi ) = [1 − Fj (Pi )][(Pi )/δ − Xi] 
V � ∗ (1.88) i (Pi ) = [1 − Fj �(Pi ∗ )][(Pi ∗ )/δ − Xi] + Fj (Pi ∗ )/δ 
59 Chapter 1. Literature review and research questions 
Solving them yields the equation that the threshold Pi 
∗ must satisfy: 
P ∗F �(P ∗)i j iβ1 + 1−Fj (P ∗)
(1.89) P ∗ = i δXi.i P ∗F �(P ∗)i j iβ1 − 1 + 1−Fj (P ∗ i ) 
The above results provide some interesting insight to the eﬀect of competition. 
Let P ∗ denote the investment threshold suggested by NPV rules. It is easily NPV 
∗obtained that PNPV = δXi. To avoid confusion, notions are re-organized. The 
optimal threshold for ﬁrm i facing no competition is P ∗ = β1 δXi and the Monopoly β1−1 
one that ﬁrm faces the threat of preemption is P ∗ , the value of which is P reemption
given by the above equation. 
P ∗F �(P ∗)i j iTo compare the these thresholds, one must evaluate the value of the term ,
1−Fj (P ∗)i 
which clearly is non-negative. Therefore the following relationship must hold: 
(1.90) P ∗ ≤ P ∗ ≤ P ∗ NPV Preemption Monopoly. 
It shows that the optimal investment strategy when incomplete information and 
preemption are introduced may lie anywhere between the zero-NPV threshold 
and the optimal strategy of a monopolist, depending on the conjecture of the 
rival’s threshold. 
In fact, the threshold obtained through the model converges to either case. If 
the fear of preemption is very small, in an extreme case, the chance of winning 
for ﬁrm i (1 − Fj (Pi ∗)), will simply be one. Even if it increases its threshold, it 
does not aﬀect the probability of winning. Therefore, the derivative, Fj 
�(Pi 
∗), will 
be zero. It makes the threshold converge to P ∗ On the other hand, if the Monopoly. 
fear of preemption is suﬃciently large, ﬁrm i believes there is no chance that its 
threshold will be lower than that of its rival. The term 1 − Fj (Pi ∗) will have the 
value of zero. 
In a later work, Shackleton et al. (2004) consider optimal entry strategies in 
a two-ﬁrm, inﬁnite-horizon stochastic game. They assume that market capacity 
is only big enough for one ﬁrm but its idle rival has the option to reclaim the 
market whenever optimal to do so. Their paper makes the ﬁrst attempt to solve a 
two-state-variable strategic game as the model allows for diﬀerent but correlated 
stochastic processes associated with each ﬁrm’s net operating proﬁtability. They 
point out that if entry costs are ignored, the ﬁrm with the highest opportunity 
cost, i.e., the ﬁrm who would realize the highest current payoﬀ by exercising 
its entry option, will operate in the market. With the existence of ﬁxed costs to 
enter the market, the hysteresis eﬀect is found in the entry decisions of competing 
ﬁrm. The eﬀect of hysteresis is positively related to investment entry cost and 
volatility, but negatively related to the correlation of rival ﬁrms operations. 
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Mason and Weeds (2005) ﬁnd similar results with Kulatilaka and Per­
otti (2001) that a higher volatility may provide an incentive to hasten rather 
than delay investment, under a duopoly competition model. It is mainly due to 
the impact of uncertainty on the equilibrium outcome of the timing game among 
players. 
In a very recent work, Pawlina and Kort (2006) examine the situation where 
two ﬁrms have opportunities to invest in a proﬁt-enhancing investment project 
but need to face diﬀerent investment costs. Three diﬀerent equilibrium strategies 
are obtained. First, a relatively small asymmetry in investment costs will result 
in a relatively small ﬁrst-mover advantage and therefore two ﬁrms are optimal to 
invest at the same time. Second, in the case where the ﬁrst-mover advantage is 
large enough, the ﬁrm who owns the costs advantage will invest ﬁrst and preempt 
its rival. Third, in the situation where asymmetry both in costs and ﬁrst-mover 
advantage are suﬃcient, a sequential investment action will be observed. 
Real options game models are well summarized by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
(Chapter 8 and 9), Trigeorgis (1996) (Chapter 9) and Smit and Trigeorgis 
(2004). 
1.3 M&A and real options 
Mergers and acquisitions are one of the most well known investment approaches 
for corporate managers. They share the exact same three characteristics with an 
investment opportunity in general as I have discussed before. First, the takeover 
process is partially or completely irreversible. Once the deal is processed and the 
payment is made, there is no turning back. Second, the value of the target ﬁrm 
involves a great deal of uncertainty, which may be impacted by macroeconomic 
conditions, politic conditions or even market sentiment. The value of takeover 
payment, if made in shares of bidder ﬁrm, also ﬂuctuates over time. Third, 
corporate managers are able to choose the timing to conduct the deal, with at 
least a certain amount of ﬂexibility. Managers have the right to make their 
takeover decisions when market favors the deal the most. 
As a consequence, mergers and acquisitions have become one of the subjects 
investigated widely by a real options approach. Smith and Triantis (2001) 
make one of the early contributions. They show that through a series of acquisi­
tions over time, long-term acquisition programs can signiﬁcantly alter a bidder’s 
competitive position (and even the structure of its industry) with the develop­
ment of growth options. Takeovers also involve ﬂexibility options and divesti­
ture options. Flexibility options arise when ﬁrms with signiﬁcant ﬂexibility in 
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organization, marketing, manufacturing and ﬁnancing may reap additional ben­
eﬁts from strategic acquisitions involving diversiﬁcation and acquiring ﬂexible 
resources. Divestiture option value is created by the option to divest parts/all 
of the acquired companies at a later date, and future sale of these assets may 
substantially limit downside risk. Real options make a considerable contribution 
to the shareholders value in their framework. 
Another conceptual paper regarding takeovers options is contributed by Dapena 
and Fidalgo (2003). They model tender oﬀers as a combination of a waiting 
option and a growth option. Waiting option value is created through sequential 
investment instead of investing at once, through purchasing minority sharehold­
ings, investors own potential growth options that carry all private beneﬁts they 
can seize by making follow up investments. From their perspective, information 
releasing is crucial in deciding the exercise price of a growth option. 
Smit (2001) points out that some initial transactions, which are part of a “buy­
and-build” acquisitions strategy (the initial acquisition plays a strategic role for 
the follow-on transactions to provide a platform that later deals can build on 
and leverage core eﬃciencies onto), cannot be treated properly by a traditional 
NPV analysis. The strategic value that traditional NPV analysis ignores can be 
suﬃciently large and have a signiﬁcant impact on the decision mechanism for 
such acquisition deals. Similarly, the competitive feature of acquisitions bidding 
contest cannot be ignored either. Smit (2001) also discusses the strategic inter­
action among competing bidders and shows possible strategies of each bidder, 
considering their respectively market position. Essentially, he suggests treating 
the strategic acquisition as a package of corporate real options actively managed 
by the ﬁrm in a context of competitive responses or changing market condi­
tions. In his model, standard acquisition with no follow-on actions is the option 
to“exchange” the target value to the buyer against a future price and platform 
acquisition is viewed as the compound options in a series of synergistic deals. 
Early research on real options approach to mergers and acquisitions sheds light 
on the concepts of various options captured by a corporate takeover deal. Under 
these frameworks, scholars have made signiﬁcant contributions to a more rigorous 
and technical analysis in continuous time setting. 
Lambrecht (2001) examines three diﬀerent forms of M&A activities including 
mergers, stock oﬀers and cash oﬀers in a real options framework. He models 
the ﬁrms’ instantaneous proﬁt as the Cobb-Douglas production function with 
decreasing returns to scale, therefore the ﬁrms’ proﬁt is a convex function of 
its output prices. This has important consequences with respect to the eﬀect 
of uncertainty on takeover decisions and the model’s feasibility to account for 
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economies of scale. In his model, mergers are modelled as a Nash equilibrium 
in which both companies simultaneously determine the timing and terms of the 
deal. Because of this feature, the timing of mergers is eﬃcient from a global 
optimization prospective, i.e., it happens at the time when the value of synergy 
is maximized. Stackelberg leader-follower game is employed to model the stock 
and cash oﬀers. In these oﬀers, essentially the target ﬁrst determines the terms 
of the deal, and the bidder subsequently determines the time. The separation of 
timing and terms decision results in ineﬃciency and therefore stock oﬀers and 
cash oﬀers will happen ineﬃciently late compared with mergers or the threshold 
obtained from a global optimization approach. Besides, he ﬁnds that cash oﬀers 
are even more ineﬃcient because of its non-participation eﬀect as the exchange 
of cash with its company shares prevents target ﬁrm from having a stake in the 
newly created ﬁrm. Consequently, the payoﬀ structure and the incentives of the 
bidder and the target are not aligned. In other words, the bidder has the incentive 
to delay the transaction and wait for a lower bidding premium, while the target 
does not have such incentive because it does not hold any real options. In terms 
of the returns, bidders get the highest returns in cash oﬀers and targets prefer 
stock oﬀers. Lambrecht (2001) provides theoretical support to the empirical 
ﬁndings that merger and acquisitions activities are cyclical. Lambrecht (2004) 
develops his previous work by incorporating costs in the production function and 
has a brief discussion on the impact of market power. 
Bernile et al. (2006) make another attempt to answer why mergers happen in 
the pattern of waves. They consider a horizontal merger that is motivated only 
by strategic considerations. It is demonstrated through a real options analysis 
that ﬁrms’ propensity to merge is highest during periods of extremely high and 
extremely low demand, which provides a theoretical explanation to merger waves. 
The results are generated from strategic interaction among the incumbents and 
the potential entrant. The decision to merge another ﬁrm in the industry is 
aﬀected by a trade-oﬀ between enhancing the incumbents’ combined proﬁts and 
the possibility of new entry to erode the incumbents’ proﬁts, which is triggered by 
higher prices and higher potential outsiders’ proﬁts. In the case of high demand, 
the incumbents cannot prevent entry and therefore tend to conduct a merger deal 
anyway to increase proﬁts. During periods when the demand is very low, even 
if the merger deal is executed, the market condition is still too bad to trigger 
any new entry. Consequently, the incumbents will be better oﬀ merging. To 
summarize, the incumbents’ merging decision has a very limited impact on the 
entry decision, and the value enhancement considerations dominate the decision 
to merge. 
Lambrecht (2004) abstracts from two important issues in takeover deals: com­
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petition and imperfect information. He assumes that bidder ﬁrm has the mo­
nopolistic right to enter into a takeover deal and in his model the deal partici­
pants have complete information. Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) study the 
takeover game in the context of competition and imperfect information. They 
model the competition in which two potential bidders diﬀer in terms of synergy 
beneﬁt and transaction costs. The critical diﬀerence is that target is put into an 
advantageous position and as a result the bargaining power of bidder is decayed. 
Takeover contest is modelled as an ascending English auction in which the bidder 
with the highest bid wins the competition. Imperfect information from outside 
investors rather than eﬃcient market leads to abnormal stock returns on the an­
nouncement of the takeover. In additional, Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) 
rely on two diﬀerent degrees of correlation between the bidder and the target 
stock returns, while Lambrecht (2004) considers only one source of uncertainty 
that mostly applies to horizontal mergers. Through exchange option analysis, 
Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) predict that returns to target from takeover 
are asymmetrically higher than returns to bidder, and returns to bidder could be 
negative in some extremely competitive cases. Their ﬁndings are consistent with 
empirical evidence. 
Smit et al. (2005) present another takeover competition real options model 
with imperfect information. However, their study diﬀers in terms of the na­
ture of imperfect information compared with Morellec and Zhdanov (2005). 
Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) assume that outside investors have incom­
plete information and can update their beliefs by observing the behavior of par­
ticipating ﬁrms. Nevertheless, in Smit et al. (2005), there exists information 
asymmetry even among the participants and information is not free. Poten­
tial uninformed bidders need to incur due diligence costs (costs to purchase the 
takeover options) to acquire the information regarding their respective target 
value expectation (underlying value of the takeover options) before making a 
bid (exercise price). Implementing asymmetric and costly information auction 
to takeover bidding process, the model presents a two player setting, where the 
initial bidder may decide to make a preemptive or an accommodating bid after 
conducting due diligence. When the initial bidder makes a preemptive bid, the 
cost to buy the option is higher than the second bidder’s takeover option value. 
Therefore, the second bidder chooses not to enter the bidding contest and the 
ﬁrst bidder acquires the target at this preemptive bid. On the other hand, when 
the initial bidder accommodates the competition, an English auction opens up 
and the bidder with the highest valuation of target wins the auction, with the 
right to acquire the target at the second highest bid. Their model leads to a num­
ber of predictions: for example, more heterogeneity (lower correlation between 
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potential bidders) generates higher value appropriation. However, very high level 
of correlation also leads to a rise in value appropriation under incomplete infor­
mation. 
The models reviewed so far consider takeover deal as a deterring option. They 
investigate into the optimal timing when bidder makes its bid towards the tar­
get, with or without competition threat. However, when market is unfavorable, 
corporate management may want to divest the ﬁrm purchased earlier and real­
ize resale value through divestment. Lambrecht and Myers (2007) develop 
a real options model of takeover disinvestment when the market is declining. 
They consider a public ﬁrm with dispersed outside shareholders. They consider 
an agency problem that managers do not act to maximize outside shareholder’s 
value but to focus on their own welfare. However, agency problem is controlled 
by the fear of managers that outside shareholders are able to exercise their prop­
erty rights and take control of the ﬁrm. They furthermore assume that there 
is a cost associated with collective action, otherwise the agency problem can be 
easily prevented. In order to avoid that, managers need to provide enough money 
to pay to the outside shareholders. Their results show that agency problems do 
damage the value: managers always tend to delay the abandonment when de­
mand declines and therefore miss the optimal timing when the shareholder value 
is maximized. As a device to solve this agency ineﬃciency, golden parachutes 
are introduced. However, Lambrecht and Myers (2007) ﬁnd that golden 
parachutes can only alleviate the ineﬃcient delay rather than eliminate it. An 
“optimal” golden parachute that would induce the manager to choose the closure 
time in the ﬁrst best closure is always too expensive for outside shareholders and 
therefore cannot obtain their approvement. They also consider the impact of 
ﬁnancial leverage on the managers’ decision and discover an optimal debt level to 
achieve the most eﬃcient abandonment. In the last part of their analysis, they 
compare four alternative takeover mechanisms and their respective impact on the 
eﬃcient abandonment. Financial investors take over the ﬁrm at exactly the right 
level of product demand and therefore pursue the ﬁrst-best outcome. A hostile 
takeover might involve a takeover contest and therefore the fear of preemption 
might push the bidder to invest earlier than the ﬁrst-best timing. Management 
buyouts (MBOs) and mergers of equals are found to lead to ineﬃcient delay as 
either managers lose the ability to capture cash ﬂow when they take over and 
shut down or negotiation between two ﬁrms’ managers reduces the power of the 
target shareholders to extract value from the bidder. 
Morellec and Zhdanov (2006) also analyzes the interaction between ﬁnanc­
ing strategies and takeover activities. Their model assumes that both bidder and 
target ﬁrms are levered. Their results indicate that in an asymmetric equilibrium 
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of ﬁnancial leverage, the bidder with the lowest leverage wins the takeover battle. 
The winner of the takeover contest is expected to lever up after the takeover deal. 
In equilibrium, the leverage ratio of the winning bidder is substantially lower than 
the leverage ratio that is optimal to balance tax beneﬁts of debt and bankruptcy 
costs, and it helps explain why two otherwise identical ﬁrms choose the diﬀerent 
ﬁnancing strategies. 
Most recently, empirical evidence on the explanatory power of real options starts 
to emerge. Moran and Betton (2004) model acquisition as a Stackelberg 
leader-follower game with complete information using real options techniques. 
They test the hypotheses related to acquisition premium with a sample of 228 
US target ﬁrms during the period of 1982-2001. They ﬁnd that target volatility 
and market to book ratios are important determinants of acquisition premiums, 
which is consistent with the model predications. 
Dunis and Klein (2005) choose a small sample covering 15 mergers and acqui­
sitions in the European ﬁnancial services industry in late 1990’s. They discover 
that from an option theory point of view, those deals are not overpaid as the 
option premium almost doubles the actually paid takeover premium. Besides, 
their results indicate that the actual volatility is much higher than the implic­
itly assumed volatility and post-merger performance is overestimated. However, 
the sample size of 15 signiﬁcantly limits the implication of work by Dunis and 
Klein (2005). Campbell and Kraussl (2006) extend their sample to 100 
mergers and acquisitions in the European banking industry. They ﬁnd that aver­
age takeover option premium is 14% and both the size of the bidding banks and 
the debt to equity ratio of target banks signiﬁcantly aﬀect this premium. 
Following the model developed by Morellec and Zhdanov (2005), Hack­
barth and Morellec (2006) furthermore discuss the impact of a takeover deal 
on the stock returns of participating ﬁrms and provide some empirical evidence 
to support their propositions. The timing and terms of takeovers are determined 
by a Nash equilibrium that two ﬁrms determine the timing and terms of deal 
simultaneously. The model indicates that the beta of the bidder will achieve an 
appreciation prior to the announcement, and a depreciation at the time of the 
announcement, when the ﬁrm has a higher pre-announcement beta than the tar­
get ﬁrm. On the other hand, if the bidding ﬁrm has a lower pre-deal beta than 
its target, its beta will experience a drop before the announcement and a rise at 
the time of announcement. The empirical evidence obtained from a sample of 
1090 takeovers of publicly traded US ﬁrms in the period between 1985 and 2002 
is consistent with the model predictions to some extent. 
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1.4 Research questions 
Academic research dealing with the application of option pricing theory to valuing 
real assets have appeared in the ﬁnance literature since Myers (1987). However, 
practical application of these ideas, especially in mergers and acquisitions indus­
try, takes place mainly in the last several years. 
Most of the current real options takeover models fall into one of the following 
two categories: the valuation of a takeover as an individual investment project, 
and takeover related ﬁnancing and investment decisions. The papers in the ﬁrst 
category discuss several most important questions involved in the valuation of a 
takeover deal: how much should a bidder pay, how much should a target require, 
when is optimal to make an oﬀer, how is the competition going to aﬀect decision 
making on both sides, and how does the information content result in asymmetry, 
etc. (Such as Lambrecht (2004) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005)) The 
second category, however, focuses on the possible impacts of taxes, asset liquidity, 
debt policy and manager-shareholder conﬂicts on takeover decisions. (Such as 
Lambrecht and Myers (2007) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2006)) 
My research belongs to the ﬁrst category mentioned above. It aims to develop 
a dynamic real options model for the joint determination of price and decision 
rules of takeovers under uncertainty. It, however, has its focus on one of the most 
important aspects in takeover transactions: the payment choice of the deal. I 
aim to ﬁll, to the best of my knowledge, a research gap where current literature 
lacks of discussion. A choice of takeover payment method, such as cash, shares 
or a mixture of cash and shares, certainly has an impact on the valuation of the 
deal and the decision making strategy of both participants. In terms of a simple 
real options analysis, a pure cash oﬀer represents a deal exchanging a stochastic 
asset with a non-stochastic asset. A pure share oﬀer, on the other hand, involves 
exchanging two stochastic assets. It is well known that in real options analysis, 
the degree of uncertainty decision-makers face greatly inﬂuences their decisions. 
Everything else being equal, a disparity in uncertainty undoubtedly will lead to 
diﬀerent strategies. This is why I believe it is curial to investigate the properties 
of the payment form threshold in a takeover deal. 
The thesis is designed to answer the following questions: 1. What is the payment 
form threshold in a takeover transaction? 2. Which factor impacts the payment 
form threshold and to what extent? 3. If a deal is made by the payment form 
threshold, how is the synergy allocated among participants? Empirical evidence 
is also provided for the model predictions at the end of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 
Takeovers threshold for a cash oﬀer 
takeover 
This chapter introduces a basic model providing a fundamental framework for all 
the models discussed throughout the thesis. Most of the model assumptions that 
are laid out below will apply to the subsequent models to a certain degree. The 
model relies on the analogy between takeover opportunities and deferring options 
for both bidder and target ﬁrms and therefore the decision to conduct a takeover 
is modelled as a strategic investment decision under uncertainty, which calls for 
the need to conduct a real options (in continuous time) analysis. 
2.1 Model assumptions 
Consider a situation where one company (the bidder) approaches another com­
pany (the target) with an oﬀer to purchase all its outstanding shares against cash 
at a price X. For simplicity, the model does not consider partial control of the 
target ﬁrm, i.e., the purchase of only part of target ﬁrm’s outstanding shares. 
While the focus will move on to a variety of payment forms, the current chapter 
looks at the pure cash oﬀer only. It is further assumed that cash is available in 
any required quantity at no additional costs. 
The model looks at the takeover deals from a diﬀerent way than most of the 
other research in the literature. For example, Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) 
assume both bidder and target shareholders are attempting to maximize the syn­
ergy eﬀect (i.e., as an endogenous factor that can be aﬀected by participants’ 
decision) generated from the deal ﬁrst and then determine the allocation rule of 
the synergies. In my model, in contrast, the synergy eﬀect is deﬁned as a per­
centage of the value of the target ﬁrm and this percentage value is an exogenous 
factor that cannot be inﬂuenced by the decision of any takeover participants. 
Each participant’s takeover options value give rises to a speciﬁc synergy eﬀect 
threshold required. The takeover deal will not go through unless this threshold 
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is met (as discussed in the following chapter, diﬀerent payment forms can lead 
to various levels of thresholds, which therefore gives role to a threshold payment 
form that requires the lowest level of synergy eﬀect threshold). 
The model set-ups allow for the role of a synergy eﬀect threshold that links the 
incentive of two takeover participants. It will be shown in the subsequent analysis 
that a deal will only be observed if the synergy eﬀect is not less than a certain 
threshold. The rationale is simple. Both bidder and target require a premium 
to compensate their respective real option and a deal will only emerge when the 
synergy eﬀect is large enough to accommodate both option premiums in the same 
time. 
Bidder and target are acting to maximize the values for their respective share­
holders, thus ignoring any agency problems. All the takeover costs such as the 
fees paid to investment bankers and lawyers are assumed to be insigniﬁcant to af­
fect the takeover decision and then are ignored. There exists a constant discount 
rate r. Both bidder and target are risk neutral and therefore the discount rate 
r is just the risk-free rate. The model ignores the “free-rider” issue by assuming 
one individual shareholder controlling the whole ﬁrm. 
The source of uncertainty relates to the cash ﬂows from the businesses of the 
target ﬁrm. In particular, it is assumed that the present value of these cash ﬂows 
(denoted by ST ) is observable and governed by the following stochastic diﬀerential 
equations: 
(2.1) dST = µT ST dt + σT ST dzT , 
where µT and σT are respectively the drift (growth) and diﬀusion (volatility) 
parameters and the target ﬁrm has complete information regarding the stochastic 
property of ST . In the same time, the stochastic property of ST is also available 
for the bidding ﬁrm. 
On the other hand, the bidder understand that with a potential synergy eﬀect, 
the target is worth more than ST . The value enhancement due to this synergy 
eﬀect is deﬁned as a fraction of the target ﬁrm: αST . It is furthermore assumed 
that target ﬁrm has complete information regarding the potential synergy eﬀect 
however the bidder ﬁrm is assumed to have all the bargaining power and therefore 
is able to make it take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Under these assumptions, it is hence 
rational for the target to make the takeover decision purely based on the real 
options optimization, regardless of the existence of the synergy eﬀect. 
The value of cash payment is denoted by X and it links the takeover decisions of 
bidder and target. Bidder ﬁrm pays X, which is its investment cost, to exchange 
for (1 + α)ST , which reﬂects its payoﬀ. On the other hand, the target gives up 
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its own company, valued at ST by itself, to receive its payoﬀ X. 
2.2 Model developments 
With both parties having the ﬂexibility whether to make a bid and whether to 
accept this bid, respectively, it is appropriate to use a real options approach to 
model this decision-making process. One of the most important implications from 
a real options analysis is the hysteresis eﬀect, i.e, even if the short-term conditions 
favor the decision of immediate investment, waiting can still be optimal. In other 
words, both bidder and target are optimal to participate such a takeover deal 
until investment return exceeds its corresponding investment cost by a substantial 
premium, measured by each ﬁrm’s opportunity cost. In the following, I will 
illustrate this idea in more detail. 
The analysis starts from assuming that both sides employ a traditional NPV 
method. In a NPV analysis, investors should take a positive NPV project and 
reject the one with negative NPV. As a consequence, as long as the takeover 
surplus is marginally larger than 0 for both bidder and target in the same time, 
one should be able to observe a takeover. 
Mathematically, the conditions for a takeover to happen in the NPV framework 
should be given by 1 
(2.2) NPVBidder = (1 + α)ST − X ≥ 0, 
and 
(2.3) NPVTarget = X − ST ≥ 0. 
Combining these two equations, it can be obtained that as long as the synergy 
eﬀect α is marginally greater than 0, a takeover transaction should be observed. 
In other words, the lowest required synergy eﬀect to justify a takeover transaction 
should be just 0. Apparently, this synergy eﬀect threshold will be constant at 0 
regardless of the method of payment. 
However, the above argument will no longer hold in a real options framework. 
It is well known that the optimal investment rule, as described in a real options 
framework, is to invest when the asset value exceeds the investment cost by a 
option premium. In other words, it is optimal to invest when immediate net 
payoﬀ from the project exceeds the value of option to wait, which depends on 
the uncertainty or the randomness the investor will have to face. 
1 For simplicity, I ignore all possible costs that might occur throughout the deal. 
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As a result, the following conditions must be fulﬁlled to trigger a deal: 
(2.4) (1 + α)ST − X ≥ F B , 
(2.5) X − ST ≥ F T , 
where F B and F T are the values of takeover options owned by the bidder and 
target respectively. Condition (2.4) speciﬁes what the bidder would like to accept 
to enter a takeover deal and (2.5) describes the condition for target. If and only 
if both conditions are fulﬁlled in the same time, a deal is observed. Noting that 
option value to wait should be positive, I can then conclude that there exists a 
synergy eﬀect threshold αmin (the lowest required synergy eﬀect), below which 
two conditions stated above cannot be fulﬁlled simultaneously: 
F B + F T 
(2.6) α ≥ αmin = > 0. 
ST 
2.2.1 Bidder’s takeover decision 
The value of bidder and target’s takeover options is denoted respectively by 
F B(ST ) and F 
T (ST ). The takeover decision of the bidder ﬁrm is derived ﬁrst. 
Following a standard real options argument, bidder only enters a deal when the 
immediate payoﬀ (1 + α)ST − X exceeds the opportunity cost F B (ST ), which 
reﬂects the value of an option to delay a deal. 
Noting that ST 
∗ refers to the target’s fundamental value upon the time of the 
takeover, the result is presented below. 
Lemma 1. Deﬁne ST 
∗ as the fundamental value of target at time of takeover, the 
value of takeover option for bidder is � �βBX/ST
(2.7) F B = [(1 + α)ST 
∗ − X] 
RB 
for X/ST > R
B , 
(2.8) = (1 + α)ST − X for X/ST ≤ RB . 
The takeover threshold for bidder is given by 
βB − 1 
RB(2.9) = (1 + α),
βB 
where βB has the value of � �2
1 µT µT 1 2r(2.10) βB = − + − + > 1 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 T T T 
The takeover threshold implies that if the ratio of X/ST is equal to or less than 
RB , it is optimal for bidder to enter a takeover deal. 
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Proof. See appendix. 
Through a simple re-arranging, one can have the bidder’s threshold represented 
X βB −1by = . The interpretation of the result becomes easier with this 
(1+α)ST βB 
form given βB 
βB 
−1 should be less than one with βB being larger than 1. As the deal 
involves uncertainty, the biding ﬁrm is only happy to make an oﬀer if a positive 
return is expected (i.e., the value of (1 + α)ST must be larger than X) and the 
gratitude of this positive return is suggested by the above equation. 
2.2.2 Target’s takeover decision 
While the opportunity to buy target ﬁrm resembles a call option to the bidder, 
the opportunity to sell its own ﬁrm represents a put option to the target. The 
value of this option still depends on the stochastic property of ST . The option 
to sell diﬀers from the option to buy in the sense that if value of the asset (ST ) 
to be sold approaches inﬁnity, it will never be optimal to sell it and therefore the 
options value will become worthless. 
Lemma 2. Deﬁne ST 
∗ as the fundamental value of target at time of takeover, the 
value of takeover option for target is � �βTX/ST
(2.11) F T = [X − ST ∗ ] RT for X/ST < R
T , 
(2.12) = X − ST for X/ST ≥ RT . 
The takeover threshold for target is 
βT − 1 
RT(2.13) = ,
βT 
where βT is has the value of 
(2.14) βT = 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 T T T 
The takeover threshold implies that if the ratio of X/ST is greater than R
T , it is 
optimal for target to accept a takeover oﬀer. 
Proof. See appendix. 
The lemma suggests that to fulﬁll the conditions that allow a target to enter 
the deal, the ratio of X to ST must not be not less than (βT − 1)/βT , which 
has a value larger than 1 given βT is negative. This implies that only when the 
immediate payoﬀ from the deal X − ST exceeds a certain premium target ﬁrm is 
willing to sell its ﬁrm. 
1 − µT − 
� 
µT − 1 
�2 
+ 
2r 
< 0 
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2.2.3 The threshold for the deal 
Lemma 1 and 2 essentially give the threshold of each takeover participants. For 
the sake of tractability, the results are repeated here. 
The bidder is willing to make an oﬀer only if 
X βB − 1 
(2.15) ≤ 
(1 + α)ST βB 
The target is willing to accept an oﬀer only if 
X βT − 1 
(2.16) ≥ 
ST βT 
Combing two conditions yields the following lemma 
Lemma 3. The takeover threshold that fulﬁlls both the requirements of bidder 
and target is given by 
βT − 1 βB
(2.17) α ≥ αmin = − 1,
βT βB − 1 
where βB,T are aforementioned. Noting that βT < 0 and βB > 1, αmin must be 
positive. 
Please note that bidder ﬁrm’s stochastic property does not aﬀect either ﬁrm’ 
takeover threshold. It therefore has no impacts on the threshold for the deal. In 
a takeover deal where bidder pays cash to acquire the target ﬁrm, bidder ﬁrm’s 
business should not have any inﬂuence on whether the deal can go through. From 
the target point of view, the decision is based on the value of the cash payment 
and what the target ﬁrm is worth, which includes its fundamental value and the 
option to sell the ﬁrm. From the bidder’s perspective, the decision to acquire 
the target ﬁrm by cash (and as model assumes, the cash is already available) 
is separate from how its own business performs. Regardless of the value of the 
bidder ﬁrm’s fundamental value (which will be introduced in the latter chapter 
as SB ), the bidder ﬁrm will only make the oﬀer if the net payoﬀ from purchasing 
the target ﬁrm exceeds the takeover option value. 
2.3 Conclusions 
Using a continuous-time real options approach I derive conditions for a synergy 
eﬀect threshold under which a takeover can be observed. The threshold to trigger 
a takeover deal is subject to a variety of variables such as the expected growth 
rate and volatility parameter of target ﬁrm as well as the discount rate. The 
chapter provides a foundation for further analysis. 
Chapter 3 
The payment form threshold in tender 
oﬀers 
This chapter develops a real options model of takeovers in which the bidder 
makes a direct tender oﬀer to purchase all the shares of the target ﬁrm and both 
participants have a choice out of three possible payment methods: pure cash 
payment, pure share payment or a combination of cash and share. The takeover 
participants resemble their respective takeover opportunity as an deferred option, 
which deﬁnes the takeover threshold for both sides. Takeover options, however, 
have diﬀerent values associated with diﬀerent methods of payment. As a result, 
the takeover threshold diﬀers in various payment forms. In each case, a synergy 
eﬀect threshold that is able to trigger a deal is derived and compared analytically. 
The model suggests that a mixed oﬀer. i.e., the mixture of cash payment and 
bidder ﬁrm’s company shares, in some cases, requires the lowest threshold. It 
contributes to the literature that provides the theoretical justiﬁcation for a mixed 
oﬀer. The mix of the takeover oﬀer that requires the lowest threshold is also 
derived and provides useful insights for real world situations. 
3.1 Introduction 
The most important decisions to maximize shareholder value from mergers and 
acquisitions, apart from strategic aspects and the integration of the companies, 
are the timing of the transaction in order to obtain a good price and the choice 
of the medium of exchange, i. e. cash, shares or a combination of both. In this 
chapter I will develop a real options model which addresses both of these crucial 
issues, allowing us to derive conditions under which a takeover deal should be 
observed and the structure of a takeover bid. 
Recent years have seen a number of real options models of mergers and acquisi­
tions. The vast majority of these models either assume asymmetric information 
about the valuation of the companies involved or the existence of synergy as a 
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motivation for takeovers. The focus of the following model will be on the exis­
tence of synergy from takeovers, which is not assumed to come from a particular 
source, although they might include economies of scale or increased operational 
eﬃciency. The size of the synergy will determine whether a takeover oﬀer is made 
by the bidder and whether the target accepts this oﬀer. 
The second aspect of the oﬀer, apart from the price which is driven by the syn­
ergy eﬀect, is the medium of exchange. Payment to the target shareholders can 
be in cash, in shares of the bidder ﬁrm or a combination of them. The litera­
ture on the medium of exchange in general assumes that shares are mispriced 
or bidders and targets have asymmetric information about their values. These 
diﬀerences in valuations then determine the choice between cash and share oﬀers, 
where overvalued shares are usually oﬀered to target shareholders. For a more 
detailed literature review please refer to the former chapter. None of these mod­
els, however, is addressing the question of the medium of exchange when the only 
motivation for a takeover is the exploitation of synergy and the existing models 
usually do not allow for oﬀers to consist of a mixture of cash and shares. 
In this chapter these two aspects will be brought into a single real options frame­
work which analyzes the synergy required to justify a takeover as well as the 
inﬂuence the payment form has on this requirement. 
3.2 Why payment form matters 
Before the model goes further into the mathematic detail, I feel it necessary to 
lay out a few important assumptions and illustrate the rationale of the payment 
form choices. At ﬁrst, it is widely discussed in the literature that in a perfect 
market with symmetric information, no taxes and no transaction costs, the choice 
of the medium of the payment is irrelevant (i.e., the Modigliani-Miller theorem). 
Therefore, the studies in takeover payment form investigate the situations where 
market is realistically not perfect. For example, with asymmetric information 
between the takeover participants, a share oﬀer might be a signal that bidder 
ﬁrm’s shares are overvalued and bidder ﬁrm is attempting to take advantage of 
this overvaluation. 
The model also considers an imperfect market where payment form choice is 
relevant. It is worth mentioning two important assumptions that justify the 
relevance of the payment form: 
• It is assumed that cash and shares are not freely convertible. 
• The bidder ﬁrm is assumed to have all the bargaining power so that it can 
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make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the target ﬁrm. 
The ﬁrst statement essentially assumes a certain degree of market friction. It can 
be the case that the transaction cost which includes market impact is high so the 
convertibility between cash and share is constrained. If the target ﬁrm receives 
the payment all in shares and attempts to convert them to cash immediately, 
the market impact will be simply too high to make the transaction feasible. 
The ﬁrst assumption makes the analysis also suitable for deals between unlisted 
ﬁrms. Under this assumption, for example, target ﬁrm cannot simply cash out 
its received bidder ﬁrm’s shares or use the cash payment paid by the bidder 
to acquire shares of the bidding ﬁrm. Put diﬀerently, takeover participants are 
“stuck” with the payment they receive and any takeover decisions should be based 
on the payment form they receive. 
It is also assumed that both bidder and target have complete information about 
each ﬁrm’s stochastic property and the potential synergy eﬀect that can be pro­
duced by the deal. However, the bidder ﬁrm is assumed to have all the bargaining 
power and therefore is able to make it take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. It is hence ratio­
nal for the target to make its takeover decision purely basing on the real options 
evaluation, regardless of the existence of the synergy eﬀect. 
One of the most important implications of the real options analysis is that un­
certainty aﬀects decisions. When one is oﬀered cash against cash, as there is 
no uncertainty involved (one pound of cash will always have the same value as 
another pound), the traditional NPV analysis can provide a simple rule to the 
decision: as long as what one receives is not less than what one gives up, a deal 
can go through. 
The situation of a takeover target that sells its own business is more complicated 
than that. The value of the business of the target ﬁrm is assumed to follow 
a random process, i.e, its value is not constant over time. This random process 
presents a certain degree of uncertainty for the target ﬁrm when it is oﬀered some 
cash to buy its business. Real options analysis suggests that in this situation, 
target ﬁrm will need to require more than what only justiﬁes a non-negative NPV. 
The uncertainty of the target ﬁrm’s value represents a possibility that target ﬁrm 
will obtain more proﬁt in the future by deferring the deal. This option-like 
feature must be compensated for an extra premium. For example, for one pound 
of currently valued asset, target might require one and half pound cash to justify 
giving up its chance to sell the ﬁrm at better terms in the future. 
What even complicates the analysis is that the takeover payment form can be 
made not just by cash. A form of shares or a mixture of cash and shares is not 
uncommon in the practice. What drives the decisions of both bidder and target 
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is then the uncertainty arising from the exchange of two parts: the target ﬁrm 
business and what bidder ﬁrm pays. Interestingly, this deal uncertainty is not 
simply the combination of the uncertainty of two ﬁrms’ business. It is in fact 
the uncertainty associated with the diﬀerence of two businesses. One can look 
at this example. One is oﬀered one share of a business which has a random 
value over time (i.e., it has uncertainty over its value) against one share of an 
identical business. Apparently, both sides of this deal per se have a certain level 
of uncertainty associated with its random value however the deal itself does not 
involve any change of uncertainty - the payoﬀ from the deal will be certain at zero 
regardless how this particular business changes value over time. To summarize, 
it is the change of the uncertainty that drives the decisions of both sides and this 
situation can be analyzed by Margrabe (1978)’s exchange options framework. 
It can be concluded from the above analysis that payment forms with diﬀerent 
mixture of cash and shares can lead to varying levels of change of uncertainty faced 
by bidder and target and in turn aﬀect the takeover decisions of both participants. 
This essentially justiﬁes why payment form matters in my theoretical framework. 
Then it should be further discussed why a particular payment form is used in the 
takeover deals. 
3.3 The bidder’s optimal payment form 
It has been discussed above payment choices inﬂuence both bidder and target’s 
takeover decisions on their thresholds. The complete information assumption 
essentially suggests bidder ﬁrm, with all the bargaining power, is rational to 
make a takeover bid with the payment form that maximizes the payoﬀ of its 
own, assuming free of any agency problems. 
Bidder’s proﬁt from the takeover deal is basically the value enhancement from the 
synergy eﬀect minus the proﬁt taken by the target ﬁrm. Bidder ﬁrm understands 
that target ﬁrm’s proﬁt is purely driven by its takeover options value. The target 
ﬁrm is assumed to have no bargaining power so as long as its minimum require­
ment - the value of option of waiting - is justiﬁed, it will accept the deal. Then 
it is logical for bidder to oﬀer a payment form that minimizes the real options of 
target so the rest of the proﬁt captured by bidder is maximized. 
Nevertheless, the bidder’s decision is still constrained by one important factor. 
The existing synergy eﬀect given exogenously must be large enough to justify 
both bidder and target ﬁrm’s real options to merge. This has been discussed 
in the previous chapter as a synergy eﬀect threshold αmin. The bidder ﬁrm’s 
decision is in fact aﬀected by these two values. The illustration of the idea can be 
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assisted by Figure (3.1). Please note that it is shown further down that payment 
form does aﬀect the real options value for each participant. 
The upper blue curve represents the synergy eﬀect threshold which as discussed 
reﬂects a combined value of both participants’ real options. This is the minimum 
requirement of the synergy eﬀect for one to observe a deal. The curvature suggests 
that this requirement varies with the cash/shares mix. Please note the impact 
of the payment form on the synergy eﬀect threshold can be taken in diﬀerent 
ways as suggested by Figure (3.2) so the current setting is for illustration only. 
The lower dashed red curve gives the value of the target ﬁrm’s takeover option in 
dependence of diﬀerent payment form choices. There are four diﬀerent scenarios 
worth of discussing. 
•	 The synergy eﬀect is at the level of Synergy A - Synergy eﬀect A is lower 
than what is required to justify both bidder and target’s real options for 
any cash/shares mix. In this case, the optimal strategy for the bidder is 
not to make an oﬀer at all. The bidder needs to justify its own real option 
ﬁrst to be able to make an oﬀer. However it understands that the rest of 
the synergy after taking its own portion will not be suﬃcient enough for 
the target to accept the oﬀer so there is no reason to make an oﬀer. 
•	 The synergy eﬀect is at the level of Synergy B - Synergy eﬀect is now 
large enough to make the deal go through, but only with a certain level 
of cash/shares mix - the point B. Certainly, it is the bidder’s interests to 
choose a payment from that lowers target ﬁrm’s options value and therefore 
its portion of the synergy. However, when the payment form moves right 
from B to D, the synergy eﬀect threshold cannot be met any more suggesting 
that no deal can be observed for such circumstances. The optimal strategy 
for the bidder is then to oﬀer a payment suggested by B noting that this 
is the only way to make a deal be accepted by both participants and a 
no-action will lose the opportunity to gain from the deal. 
•	 The synergy eﬀect is at the level of Synergy C - Bidder ﬁrm now has more 
choices. It understands that any payment form choices between point C1 
and C2 will make the takeover happen. Then it is reasonable for it to 
minimize the synergy eﬀect captured by the target. Noting that C2 is the 
payment mix that minimizes target ﬁrm’s options value within the range 
of [C1, C2], C2 is the optimal payment form that bidder should oﬀer in the 
deal. 
•	 The synergy eﬀect is at the level of Synergy D - There is no constraint by 
the synergy eﬀect threshold now. Any payment choices can be chosen to 
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make the deal go through. The decision for the bidder is fairly simple now. 
With all the bargaining power, it can oﬀer 100% shares (point D) and take 
a signiﬁcant portion of the existing synergy, leaving target ﬁrm only a small 
fraction. 
The above analysis suggests the payment form choices selected by the bidder are 
aﬀected by the synergy eﬀect available to the deal. The following analysis will 
focus on the payment choice suggested by point B. 
The merger of any two ﬁrms will either create or destroy value. Under perfect 
information, if there exist any synergy eﬀects between any two ﬁrms that are 
above synergy B, two ﬁrms should have already merged. Therefore the starting 
point of synergy eﬀect should be below B, for example at synergy A. Synergy 
eﬀect is assumed to change value when economy grows and it is assumed that 
this change is continuous over time, i.e., it cannot jump from A to C or D. It is 
further assumed that bidder has the incentive to make an oﬀer as soon as the 
deal becomes feasible, i.e., when the synergy eﬀect between two ﬁrms reaches the 
threshold suggested by synergy B, one can observe a merger. According to the 
analysis laid out above, the payment form choice for any deal should be the one 
that makes the deal feasible at the ﬁrst place and this payment form is deﬁned 
and discussed throughout the thesis as the payment form threshold because it 
indicates the payment form choice when the synergy eﬀect threshold is met at 
the ﬁrst time. 
3.4 Model assumptions 
The previous chapter has laid out the ground for some assumptions that will be 
used throughout all the models in the thesis. The following model will continue 
to use these assumptions unless they are stated otherwise. 
Consider a bidder ﬁrm (B) which is facing an investment opportunity to take 
over a target ﬁrm (T ). Both ﬁrms are assumed to have total fundamental values 
SB and ST respectively, which can be viewed as the present value of their respec­
tive future uncertain cash ﬂows. To be in line with standard literature, those 
fundamental values are assumed to follow geometric Brownian motions: 
(3.1) dSi = µSi Sidt + σSi Sidzi, i = B, T. 
The correlation coeﬃcient between the two sources of uncertainty SB and ST is 
deﬁned to be constant, equal to ρ: 
(3.2) ε[dzBdzT ] = ρdt. 
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It is assumed that both equations (3.1) and (3.2) are open information to both 
bidder and target. 
It is widely discussed that the synergy eﬀect is one of the major reasons driving 
the takeover activity. It is further assumed that bidder believes that is is able to 
generate a certain amount of synergy through the deal, denoted by α · ST . 
Let X denote the value of takeover oﬀer. The takeover transaction is now driven 
by two simple investment decisions: from the prospective of bidder shareholders, 
their potential takeover surplus will be (1 + α)ST − X; from the prospective of 
target shareholders, their potential takeover surplus will be X −ST . As discussed 
in the previous chapter, although target ﬁrm has complete information regarding 
the potential synergy eﬀect, the bidder ﬁrm is assumed to have all the bargaining 
power and therefore is able to make it take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Under these as­
sumptions, it is hence rational for the target to make the takeover decision purely 
based on the real options optimization, regardless of the existence of the synergy 
eﬀect. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a takeover threshold, denoted by αmin can 
be obtained through analyzing the takeover options value of both participants. 
F B + F T 
(3.3) α ≥ αmin = > 0. 
ST 
It is well known that the value of real options is correlated with the level of 
uncertainty. The same decision maker would make diﬀerent investment decisions 
facing diﬀerent levels of uncertainty. An obvious impact from diﬀerent payment 
methods is that each payment form results in diﬀerent levels of uncertainty. For 
instance, in a pure cash oﬀer, since cash has constant value, the only source 
of uncertainty is the fundamental value of the target ﬁrm. When a takeover 
oﬀer consists of a certain amount of company shares1, there are two sources of 
uncertainty: bidder ﬁrm’s shares and target ﬁrm’s shares. As a result, the values 
of F B and F T vary with diﬀerent payment methods and synergy eﬀect threshold 
may have a diﬀerent value in each case, too. 
The competitive bid is not considered in the model. It is also necessary to dis­
tinguish the model from stochastic bargaining power model, like Cripps (1998), 
which considers that in order to reach an agreement, both buyer and seller of 
the goods give up their respective option value to wait. It is assumed that both 
bidder and target determine their respective takeover strategy in a relative iso­
lated circumstance. For instance, a bidder ﬁrm submits its takeover bid whenever 
1 It can be a mixed oﬀer or a pure share oﬀer. 
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it thinks the market condition is favorable enough, i.e., its immediate takeover 
payoﬀ exceeds the option value to wait. On the other hand, target makes its 
takeover decision purely depending on a standard real options optimization. If 
the instantaneous takeover surplus exceeds the option value to wait for a better 
oﬀer, target will accept the oﬀer and one then can observe a takeover. Otherwise, 
target will choose to reject the oﬀer and keep the waiting option alive. 
Another important assumption is made as previously discussed that cash and 
shares of both ﬁrms are not freely convertible. For example, target ﬁrm cannot 
simply convert its received bidder’s shares to cash immediately after the deal. 
Under this assumption, both ﬁrms need to take into account the uncertainty 
introduced by diﬀerent payment forms and make their takeover decisions accord­
ingly. 
3.5 Model development 
The takeover bid consists of two parts: some amount of bidder ﬁrm’s company 
shares xSB and some cash payment C. It is obvious that if x = 0 the takeover bid 
is equivalent to a pure cash payment. On the other hand, if C = 0, the takeover 
bid is equivalent to a pure shares oﬀer. 
The analysis starts from examining an optimization strategy for both ﬁrms. The 
bidder is trying to maximize the value of its takeover option, which depends on 
the net payoﬀ from exchanging the value of takeover bid X = xSB + C for the 
target ﬁrm (1 + α)ST , which includes the synergy eﬀects. Correspondingly the 
target gives up its own ﬁrm ST for the value of takeover oﬀer bidder submits, on 
which its takeover option value depends. 
The model will fall into a standard exchange option category, discussed in detail 
in the literature review chapter, as long as the term X = xSB + C has an explicit 
form of randomness. The insights gained from the literature of the spread option2 
help achieve this objective. A spread option is an option written on the diﬀerence 
of two underlying assets, the value of which normally follows a stochastic process, 
such as a geometric Brownian Motion. In order to obtain the future uncertain 
diﬀerence of two underlying assets, the owner of the option needs to pay a pre-
speciﬁed price, also known as the strike or exercise price. An analogy can be made 
between a ﬁnancial spread option and the investment opportunity of a takeover 
participant. 
The takeover surplus the bidder is expecting at the time of exercise can be shown 
2 Carmona and Durrleman (2003) provide a good review on spread option. 
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as (1 + α)ST − xSB − C ( It can be proved that (1 + α)ST follows the exactly 
same random process as ST 
3 and xSB as SB . One can also ﬁnd out the takeover 
surplus resembles a payoﬀ from a spread option, in which the owner, i.e., the 
bidder, has an opportunity to pay an exercise price C for the diﬀerence of two 
stochastic assets (1 + α)ST − xSB. Therefore the rationale to price a ﬁnancial 
spread option can also be applied to solve the optimization strategy of a takeover 
participant here. 
Most results obtained from spread option pricing problem are rather complicated 
and hardly analytically, due to the fact that the diﬀerence of two lognormal 
distribution is not lognormally distributed. The idea that Kirk (1995) put forth, 
however, sheds a lot of lights on my study. 
Kirk (1995) points out that a spread option can be examined within an exchange 
option framework, where an analytical solution is provided by Margrabe (1978). 
Essentially he suggests to treat the cash payment and the second stochastic asset 
as one “combined” random process and the drift and diﬀusion parameters can be 
determined according to the relative size of random asset and cash payment. A 
constant can be treated as a “stochastic variable” that has the drift and diﬀusion 
parameter that are both zero. Therefore, as an approximation, the combination 
of a random asset and a constant value asset should have the drift and diﬀusion 
parameters that depend on the value weight of its component. 
Let κ denote the the fraction of payments made in shares in a mixed oﬀer upon 
the time of takeover (it is therefore not a stochastic variable): 
(3.4) κX ∗ = xS ∗ B, 
(3.5) (1 − κ)X ∗ = C. 
Please note that S∗ and X∗ refer to the value of SB and X upon the time of the B 
takeover respectively. 
Obviously the value of κ should lie between 0 and 14 . As a result of approxima­
tion, the takeover bid X follows the geometric Brownian motion given by 
(3.6) dX = µX Xdt + σX XdZX , 
where µX = κµSB , σX = κσSB and ZX = ZB . 
3 A very simple derivation of stochastic diﬀerential equation will lead to the result. It is 
known that dST = µST ST dt + σST ST dz. Multiplying (1 + α) by both sides of the equation 
generates d(1 + α)ST = µST (1 + α)ST dt + σST (1 + α)ST dz. Let SˆT denote (1 + α)ST , it 
should follow the random process indicated by dSˆT = µST SˆT dt + σST SˆT dz. 
4 The case when κ equals 0 or 1 actually represents a pure cash or a pure share oﬀer, 
respectively. 
�� 
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It should be mentioned the method above only works as an approximation and 
readers should therefore note the limitation of this approach. A session (A.14) 
in the appendix is dedicated to show numerically the level of the approximation 
errors, which enables me to conclude that for most cases, the approximation error 
is small and the impact on the results is limited. 
Given that approximation provides a fair estimate for most cases, the following 
analysis fall into a standard exchange option analysis. It can be furthermore 
proved that the correlation coeﬃcient between ST and X remains at ρ. As ρX,ST = 
Cov(X,ST ) 1 1and noting µX = µSB and σX = σSB , it can be concluded that σX σST κ κ
 
Cov(SB ,ST )
ρX,ST = = ρ.σSB σST 
The results are given as follows: 
Lemma 4. Deﬁne ST 
∗ as the fundamental value of target at time of takeover, the 
value of takeover option for bidder is given by � �βBX/ST
(3.7) F B = [(1 + α)ST 
∗ − X ∗ ] 
RB 
for X/ST > R
B , 
(3.8) = (1 + α)ST − X for X/ST ≤ RB . 
The takeover threshold for bidder is given by 
βB
RB(3.9) = (1 + α),
βB − 1
where βB has the value of 
(3.10) 
1 κµSB − µSTβB = − 
2 κ2σS
2 
B 
+ σ2 − 2κρσSBST σST �2
κµSB − µST 1 2(r − µST )− − + < 0 
κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2κρσSB 2 κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2κρσSBSB ST σST SB ST σST 
The takeover threshold implies that if the ratio of X/ST is less than R
B , it is 
optimal for bidder to enter a takeover deal. 
Proof. See appendix. 
Lemma 5. Deﬁne ST 
∗ as the fundamental value of target at time of takeover, the 
value of takeover option for target is given by � �βTX/ST
(3.11) F T = [X ∗ − ST ∗ ] RT for X/ST < R
T , 
(3.12) = X − ST for X/ST ≥ RT . 
�� 
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The takeover threshold for target is 
βT
RT(3.13) = ,
βT − 1
where βT is has the value of 
(3.14) 
1 κµSB − µSTβT = − 
2 κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2κρσSB σSTSB ST �2
κµSB − µST 1 2(r − µST )+ − + > 1 
κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2κρσSB 2 κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2κρσSBSB ST σST SB ST σST 
The takeover threshold implies that if the ratio of X/ST is greater than R
T , it is 
optimal for target to accept a takeover oﬀer. 
Proof. See appendix. 
Given the individual takeover threshold for bidder and target, the synergy eﬀect 
threshold to justify a takeover deal can therefore be derived. It should fulﬁll the 
minimum requirements for both bidder and target instantaneously. 
Lemma 6. Consider a takeover transaction where the payment is made by partial 
cash and partial share. The synergy eﬀect threshold, denoted by αM whichmin, 
justiﬁes the option value to wait for both bidder and target of the deal, is given 
by 
βT βB − 1 
(3.15) α ≥ αM = − 1,min βT − 1 βB 
where βB,T are aforementioned. Noting that βT > 1 and βB < 0, α
M must be min 
positive. 
Proof. In order to justify a takeover transaction, the following rationale must 
be fulﬁlled: the maximum value the bidder is willing to oﬀer must be not less 
than the minimum value that is able to drive the target to accept the oﬀer. In 
mathematical terms, the following two conditions must hold in the same time: 
βB βT βB βTX/ST ≤ (1 + α) and X/ST ≥ . It suggest that (1 + α) ≥ .βB −1 βT −1 βB −1 βT −1 
Rearranging it provides the results shown above. 
The result indicates that the synergy eﬀect threshold depends on a variety of 
variables: κ (the fraction ratio of shares), µSB , µST (expected growth rates of 
both bidder and target’s fundamental values), σSB , σST (volatilities of bidder 
and target ﬁrm), ρ (the correlation between two stochastic processes) and r (the 
discount rate). 
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3.6 Characteristics of the takeover threshold 
The synergy eﬀect threshold derived above imposes a minimum requirement on 
the synergy eﬀect for a takeover deal to be observed under the current model 
setting. In this section, the characteristics of this threshold will be examined. 
It starts with the proving the convergence of case for κ = 0, 1. 
Intuitively, the case κ = 1 means that the takeover bid consists of 100 % of 
bidder ﬁrm’s company shares, i.e., X is equivalent to SB. The takeover decision 
is still subject to an exchange option analysis and therefore the results obtained 
converge to a pure share situation. 
The case κ = 0, however, makes the proof a bit more diﬃcult. In a pure cash 
oﬀer, the payment X has a constant value over time and therefore equation(3.6) 
is no longer appropriate. The proof starts with a standard real option analysis 
with only one random variable involved (i.e., the model discussed in the previous 
chapter) and compare the result with what is derived from the model and it has 
been approved that they are identical. Please refer to the appendix for further 
detail. 
To summarize with the following lemma: 
Lemma 7. Let αC and αS denote the synergy eﬀect threshold in a takeover min min 
deal where a pure cash payment or a pure shares oﬀer is provided respectively. 
(3.16) αM = αC when κ ≡ 0min min
 
αM
(3.17) min = αmin
S when κ ≡ 1 
Proof. See appendix. 
In the rest of the section, the ﬁrst order derivative of the synergy eﬀect threshold 
(αM min) will be derived to conduct a sensitivity analysis. Essentially the synergy 
eﬀect threshold is resulted from a combination of two eﬀects: the takeover options 
premiums from both bidder and target. However, it is worth mentioning that 
this combined eﬀect is not simply the linear combination of two respective option 
premium. 
Furthermore, it is clear that αM is strongly related to the takeover optionsmin 
premiums and therefore should share a lot of similarities with the feature of a
 
standard real options premium.
 
The results are shown in the following lemmas.
 
Lemma 8. 
∂αM 
(3.18) min < 0 
∂r 
� 
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Proof. See appendix. 
It is commonly discussed in the real options literature (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994)) that a higher discount rate induces a lower value of option to wait. A 
higher discount rate results in a greater discount eﬀect of forgone cash ﬂows 
from delaying the project and therefore favors the decision to take the immediate 
payoﬀ. This theory applies in both call and put options values. As a result one 
should be expecting a negative correlation between the discount rate and the 
value of the synergy eﬀect threshold. 
Lemma 9. Let 
σM ≡ κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2ρκσSB σST ,SB ST � �2
κµSB − µST 1 2(r − µST )ΠM ≡ − + . 
κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2ρκσSB σST 2 κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2ρκσSB σSTSB ST SB ST 
Then 
(3.19) � √ � 
∂αM (1 + 2 ΠM )σ
2 + 2µSB − 2µST ) (σ2 − 2µSB + 2µST )min M M < 0, If √ < 0, 
ΠM )σ2 − 2µSB∂µST (−1 + 2 M + 2µST 
(3.20) � √ � 
∂αM (1 + 2 ΠM )σ
2 + 2µSB − 2µST ) (σ2 − 2µSB + 2µST )min M M> 0, If √ > 0. 
ΠM )σ2 − 2µSB∂µST (−1 + 2 M + 2µST 
Proof. See appendix. 
Lemma 9 investigates how the takeover threshold interacts with the growth rate 
of the target ﬁrm. To interpret the rationale of the fairly complicated conditions 
seen above, let me start from a simpler situation, where only cash is involved in 
a takeover deal. When a bidder is acquiring a target with cash, its call options 
value increases when the expected growth rate of the target ﬁrm increases. The 
rationale is not hard to explain. A higher growth rate for the target ﬁrm, with 
everything else being equal, makes the waiting more worthwhile (the value for 
the target ﬁrm is more likely to be higher in the future) and therefore increases 
the option value for the bidder ﬁrm. On the other side, the target ﬁrm sees its 
takeover options value decrease when the expected growth rate of its own ﬁrm 
is higher. The target ﬁrm essentially holds a put option on its own asset and 
a high growth rate reduces this put option value and the target ﬁrm therefore 
favors no-waiting in this scenario. 
While the exchanging of two random assets make the analysis a bit more com­
plicated, it follows the exact same rationale as discussed above. As µT increases 
the bidder will have a relatively lower growth rate, which will result in the value 
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of the bidder company to increase relatively slowly. Thus expected beneﬁts from 
exercising the option at a later point of time are lower and the prospects of 
immediate exercise to take advantage of the synergy eﬀect are becoming more 
important. Thus the option value for the target reduces and thereby reducing the 
synergies required to make an oﬀer. For the bidder the opposite is true, the higher 
growth rate of the target will provide the bidder with an incentive to postpone 
the acceptance of a bid, increasing the option value and increasing the synergy 
level at which an oﬀer will be accepted. When looking at the synergy threshold 
at which an oﬀer is accepted, its change will depend on the relative strength 
of these two opposing eﬀects. Essentially (3.19) gives the conditions when the 
eﬀect of a changing µST on the target real options value is larger than that on 
the bidder real options value and hence an increasing µST reduces the synergy 
eﬀect threshold. (3.20) provides the conditions when the eﬀect of a changing 
µST on the target real options value is less than that on the bidder real options. 
Consequently, when the expected growth rate of the target ﬁrm increases, the 
synergy eﬀect threshold becomes higher. 
Lemma 10. 
(3.21) � √ � 
∂αM min (1 + 2 ΠM )σ
2 
M − 2κµSB√ 
2 
M + 2κµSB+ 2µST ) (σ − 2µST )
 < 0, If
 < 0,

2 
M + 2κµSB∂µSB (−1 + 2
 ΠM )σ − 2µST 
(3.22) � √ � 
(1 + 2 ΠM )σ
2 
M − 2κµSB√ 
2 
M∂α
M 
min + 2µST ) (σ + 2κµSB − 2µST )
 > 0, If
 > 0.
 
2 
M + 2κµSB∂µSB (−1 + 2
 ΠM )σ − 2µST 
Proof. See appendix. 
The analysis for lemma 10 can be conducted in a similar fashion. When bidder 
ﬁrm’s expected growth rate becomes higher, with everything else being equal, it 
reduces its own takeover options value but enhances the takeover options value 
for the target, with the same rationale explained in lemma 9. Again, the synergy 
eﬀect threshold αM is a combination of two opposing eﬀects. The combined min 
eﬀect therefore relies on the relative power of two eﬀects. Conditions that the 
decrease in the bidder ﬁrm’s takeover options value will more than oﬀset the 
increase in the target ﬁrm’s takeover options value by per unit of increase in the 
expected growth rate of the bidder is given by (3.21). As a result, a fast growing 
bidding ﬁrm will in fact reduce the synergy eﬀect threshold. The opposite scenario 
is speciﬁed by condition (3.22). 
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Lemma 11. 
∂αM 
(3.23) min < 0, If σST < ρκσSB ,∂σST 
∂αM 
(3.24) min > 0, If σST > ρκσSB . ∂σST 
Proof. See appendix. 
Lemma 12. 
∂αM 
(3.25) min < 0, If κσSB < ρσST ,∂σSB 
∂αM 
(3.26) min > 0, If κσSB > ρσST . ∂σSB 
Proof. See appendix. 
It is widely discussed in real options literature (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) 
that volatility/uncertainty delays investment decision. While shown in a diﬀerent 
form, the same rationale applies in the analysis for this lemma. Essentially the 
takeover deal involves the exchange of two random assets: payment X with the 
volatility of κσSB and target ﬁrm’s business with the volatility of σSB . The 
volatility of the takeover deal in essence has a form given by σM , which has 
the value of σM = κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2ρκσSB σST . What simpliﬁes the analysis SB ST 
is both the bidder and target faces the same exchange volatility, i.e., when σM 
increases, the value of both bidder and target ﬁrm’s options value will increase 
and therefore the synergy eﬀect threshold will increase. Having said that, the 
analysis now boils down to investigating how the change of σSB and σST aﬀects 
the value of σM . With the above analysis in mind, the results in the Lemma 
11 and 12 are not diﬃcult to understand. Under the condition σST < ρκσSB , an 
increase in the target ﬁrm’s volatility will in fact reduces the total volatility in the 
deal and therefore reduces the synergy eﬀect threshold and when σST > ρκσSB , 
an increase in the target ﬁrm’s volatility will increase the uncertainty/volatility 
of the deal and therefore increase the threshold. Lemma 12 can be analyzed in 
the similar fashion. 
Apart from κ5, there is only one parameter yet to discuss, which is the correlation 
coeﬃcient ρ. A simple argument tells that a higher correlation coeﬃcient means 
that both sides of exchanging assets have more similarity in terms of randomness, 
and therefore the total volatility of the exchanging deal should be reduced. The 
5 Analyzing κ generates the most important implication of the model, which will be con­
ducted in an individual section. 
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insinuation is simply to put down. A higher correlation between two exchange 
assets means the lower uncertainty involved with the exchange deal and therefore 
drive down the takeover threshold of both side and therefore the total takeover 
threshold. 
Lemma 13. 
∂αM 
(3.27) min < 0 
∂ρ 
Proof. See appendix. 
As Dixit and Pindyck (1994) explain, holding the variances ﬁxed, a greater 
correlation between the changes in two exchange assets implies less uncertainty 
over their ratio, and hence a reduced incentive to wait. 
3.7 The payment form threshold 
The parameter κ plays a crucial role in the analysis. As shown in lemma 7, the 
model results apply to a pure cash oﬀer deal when κ = 0 and a pure share oﬀer 
deal when κ = 1. 
As discussed above, the synergy eﬀect threshold is the minimum requirement 
for a takeover to be observed. The lower the threshold, the higher the chance 
that a takeover will emerge for each of the takeover participant to realize the 
synergy eﬀect. It this section, the model explores the payment form threshold 
that requires the lowest value of the synergy eﬀect threshold. This payment form 
threshold will in turn maximize the probability of realizing value creation through 
corporate takeover deals. 
Noting that κ is within the interval [0, 1], it can be concluded that pure cash oﬀer 
results in the lowest takeover threshold, i.e., the lowest αM , if one can prove that min
αM min is a monotonic increasing function of κ ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand, if αM min 
is a monotonic decreasing function of κ ∈ [0, 1], pure shares, i.e., κ = 1, should 
be the payment form threshold. Clearly, mixed oﬀer will be observed if a certain 
value of κ ∈ (0, 1) minimizes the αM min. 
This section conducts an analysis on the synergy eﬀect threshold αM in depen­min 
dence of κ. The results suggest that it is possible to require less synergy eﬀect 
than the other two payment forms for a mixed oﬀer. The results are summarized 
in the following lemma: 
� 
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Lemma 14. Deﬁne the value of κ1 and κ2 as follows: 
(3.28) 
µ2 + 2rσ2 + ρµSB σSB σSTSB SBκ1,2 ≡ 
σ23µSB SB 
(µ2 + 2rσ2 + ρµSB σSB σST )
2 + 3µSB σ
2 [µSB (σ
2 − 2µST ) − 4rρσSB σST ]SB SB SB ST ± . 
σ23µSB SB 
The rule to determine the payment form threshold should be given by the following 
statements. 
1. If κ1 > 1 > 0 > κ2, then α
M is a monotonic increasing function of κmin 
during the interval [0, 1] which indicates that pure cash oﬀer is the payment 
form that requires the lowest synergy eﬀect threshold. 
2. If κ1 > κ2 > 1 then α
M is a monotonic decreasing function of κ duringmin 
the interval [0, 1] which indicates that pure share oﬀer is the payment form 
that requires the lowest synergy eﬀect threshold. 
3. If κ1 > 1 > κ2 > 0, then α
M is a decreasing function of κ during the in­min 
terval [0, κ2] and an increasing function of κ during the interval [κ2, 1]which 
indicates that partial cash and partial shares is the payment form that re­
quires the lowest synergy eﬀect threshold. The value of threshold κ is given 
by κ2. 
Proof. See appendix. 
An illustrative numerical example should help understand the above proposition. 
Consider a base with the parameter value given by µSB = µST = 0.01 σSB = 
0.05, σST = 0.1, r = 0.05, In ﬁgure 3.2, it is shown numerically the synergy eﬀect 
threshold in dependence of diﬀerent correlation coeﬃcients. When ρ = −0.5, the 
value of κ1 = 9.2336 and κ2 = −0.5770 i.e. κ2 < 0. According to the ﬁrst 
criteria of the lemma, αM is increasing when κ increases, the pure cash oﬀer min 
has the lowest required synergy. When ρ = 1, κ1 = 9.0452 and κ2 = 1.6215. 
Since κ2 > 1, the lemma suggests a negative relationship between α
M and κmin 
which is consistent with what numerical example represents. Under this market 
condition, pure shares oﬀer requires the least synergy eﬀect threshold. When 
ρ has a value 0.2, it is easy to obtain that κ1 = 9.1635 and κ2 = 0.4352. As 
a result, αM hits its minimum value within the range κ ∈ [0, 1] at the point min 
κ = κ2 = 0.4352. The illustrative example demonstrates numerically what the 
proposition puts forward, as shown by the top right sub-ﬁgure in ﬁgure 3.2. In 
this case, the payment form threshold should consist of 43.52% of company shares 
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of the bidder ﬁrm and 56.46% of the cash payment because this oﬀer requires the 
lowest possible synergy eﬀect to justify a takeover transaction. 
It can be observed further from the above lemma that the characteristics of each 
ﬁrm’s randomness (µSB , µST , σSB , σST ) have an impact on the payment form 
threshold. Besides, the discount factor (r) and the correlation coeﬃcient between 
the two randomness (ρ) also aﬀect it. The non-linear feature of equation (3.28) 
makes it very diﬃcult, if not impossible, to conduct an analytical sensitivity 
analysis on the results. Therefore a numerical analysis is shown in Figures 3.3 
and 3.4. 
Lemma 15. The partial derivatives of κmin, which is deﬁned as the payment form 
threshold that leads to the lowest required takeover threshold, are given by 
∂κmin• > 0
∂ρ 
∂κmin• > 0
∂µST 
∂κmin• > 0
∂σST 
∂κmin• < 0 except for the conditions that σST has a relatively low value (the ∂µSB 
interval close to 0) or µST has a relatively high value (the interval close to 
0.1) 
∂κmin• > 0 except for the conditions that σST has a relatively high value (the ∂σSB 
interval close to 0.5) or µST has a relatively low value (the interval close to 
0) 
The above properties represent those parameter constellations which can be 
deemed to be most relevant in applications. 
It is clear that the higher the correlation coeﬃcient between the two ﬁrms, the 
more the similarity they share in terms of their stochastic property. As discussed 
above, a higher correlation between two ﬁrms reduce the uncertainty of the deal, 
which in turn drives down the options value of both participants. As a result, 
when the correlation coeﬃcient is high, a higher proportion of the shares in the 
mixed oﬀer is more likely to require a lower value of synergy eﬀect threshold and 
therefore fulﬁls the requirement of the payment form threshold. 
The lemma also shows that a fast growing target ﬁrm or a volatile target ﬁrm 
tends to result in a higher proportion of shares used in the takeover oﬀer to reduce 
the required synergy eﬀect. To be able to understand the rationale behind these 
results, one needs to explore more how these two parameters interact with the 
takeover threshold in a pure cash oﬀer. In a pure cash oﬀer, as bidder ﬁrm’s shares 
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is not involved in the deal, the only source of the uncertainty is from the target 
ﬁrm. The volatility of the deal essentially is in proportion with the volatility of the 
target ﬁrm. To summarize, one should always observe a higher takeover threshold 
with a higher volatility of the target ﬁrm. Target ﬁrm’s expected growth rate, 
as discussed in the previous lemma, however tends to have opposing impacts on 
target and bidder ﬁrm’s takeover options value. Fortunately, for a pure cash oﬀer, 
it can be approved that the impact on the bidder ﬁrm’s options value will always 
more than oﬀset the impact on the target ﬁrm’s options value. Said diﬀerently, an 
increasing µST will always increase the takeover threshold in a pure cash situation 
(Mathematical proof simply requires diﬀerentiating αM (κ = 0) with respect to min
µST . The result will be always positive). However, as shown in the previous 
lemmas, µST and σST can in many cases eﬀectively reduce the takeover threshold 
when bidder’s business is part of the deal. In order to reduce the synergy eﬀect 
threshold, it is then not diﬃcult to understand that a higher expected growth 
rate or a higher volatility of the target ﬁrm increases the attractiveness of the 
shares in a mixed oﬀer. 
The impact of bidder ﬁrm’s characteristics (µSB and σSB ) on the payment choice 
are, however, more ambiguous. As one can observe, an increasing proportion 
of shares is resulted by either a higher value of µSB when µST is relatively high 
or a lower value of µSB when µST is relatively low. The impact of σSB on the 
payment form choice is also unclear. In some cases when σST or µST is small, a 
higher volatility of bidding ﬁrm seems to favor the choice of cash in the mixed 
oﬀer. In other situations, it has an opposite impact. Due to the ambiguous 
results, the further empirical analysis will only focus on the results the provide 
clear implications. 
This lemma can now be used to test the results of the model empirically by 
comparing the medium of exchange for various takeovers. To summarize, the 
takeover oﬀer has an increasing fraction of share payment if volatility of the target 
increases, target performance (expected growth rate) increases, or correlation of 
the two companies increases. 
As most of the existing literature investigating the medium of exchange has fo­
cused on the announcement returns and post-takeover performance, the coming 
section will also investigate these aspects in my model. 
3.8 Division of tender oﬀer beneﬁts 
Apart from analyzing the payment form threshold, it is also interesting to analyze 
the size and division of beneﬁts between the bidder and target. The expected 
� � 
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announcement returns of the bidder and target should be aﬀected by the synergy 
eﬀect as well as the the medium of exchange being employed. The returns to the 
bidder and target, ReB and ReT , are given as follows: 
(1 + αM )S∗ − X∗ ST ∗ βT(3.29) ReB = min T = 1 + αM − ,
S∗ S∗ min B B βT − 1 
X∗ − ST ∗ 1 (3.30) ReT = = . 
S∗ T βT − 1 
Furthermore, given the total takeover beneﬁts being αM ST , the fraction of sur­min
plus accrued to the target, denoted by fT , should have the value of 
X∗ − S∗ ReT 
(3.31) fT = 
T = . 
αMαST 
∗ 
min 
Figures 3.5 -3.9 numerically demonstrate the return to bidder and target and 
division of surplus between the two participants in dependence of some relative 
parameters. 
One might ask since the takeover deal results from the exercise of the real options, 
does the return change in the same pattern of the value of option? The answer 
is that it is only partially correct. As an illustration, one can take a look at the 
correlation coeﬃcient eﬀect on the return. 
It is noted that a higher correlation will result in a stronger diversiﬁcation eﬀect 
and therefore reduce the total risk involved in an exchange option. As a result, 
a decreasing return with respect to correlation should be expected. However, as 
one can observe from ﬁgure 3.5 - (b), this is not the case. There is a non-linear 
relationship between return to target and correlation especially when µSB tends to 
be high. The explanation to this inconsistency with standard real options analysis 
can be laid out as follows. The change of correlation coeﬃcient, apart from 
aﬀecting the diversiﬁcation eﬀect, has an impact on the payment form threshold, 
which in turn, via κ, aﬀects the real options values. The combination of these 
two eﬀects aﬀects the impact from a correlation coeﬃcient. As a result it is not 
always true that a small correlation leads to a higher return. 
I can now summarize the main results obtained from the numerical analysis. Since 
the trends for some parameters are too unclear to provide any useful implications, 
I only lay out the ones that provide a relatively clear cut. 
Lemma 16. The partial derivatives of the bidder returns are 
∂ReB • > 0,
∂µST 
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∂ReB • > 0,
∂σST 
• ∂ReB < 0, except for the conditions that σSB has a relative low value (the ∂µSB 
interval close to 0) or σSB has a relatively high value (the interval close to 
0.5) 
∂ReB • < 0.
∂ρ 
The results on the volatility of the bidder, σSB , are aﬀected by the restriction 
that κ ∈ [0; 1], such that relationships are sometimes not monotonic. The above 
properties represent those parameter constellations which can be deemed to be the 
most relevant in applications. 
A higher expected growth rate of the target ﬁrm’s fundamental value, a more 
volatile target ﬁrm or a lower correlation coeﬃcient between the two ﬁrms result 
in a higher takeover return to the bidder. Apart from the conditions speciﬁed in 
the lemma, a lower growth term for bidder ﬁrm will have the same eﬀect. While 
it has been discussed that the takeover returns are not identical to takeover op­
tions premium, it is undeniable that they should share a lot of similarities. These 
similarities make the interpretation of the results much easier. Essentially, the 
bidder exchanges its own business with those of target ﬁrm. As aforementioned, 
a higher expected growth rate for the target ﬁrm, a lower expected growth rate 
of its own ﬁrm or a lower correlation coeﬃcient will increase the beneﬁt of wait­
ing therefore increasing the options premium. The announcement returns to the 
bidder will increase as a result. These observations are consistent with the ar­
guments in the previous lemmas. Interestingly, it is shown that a more volatile 
target ﬁrm will in eﬀect increase the options premium for the bidder ﬁrm and 
subsequently its takeover return. This observation provides the support that 
for the parameters considered in the numerical demonstration above, an increas­
ing target ﬁrm volatility will increase the uncertainty of deal facing bidder ﬁrm, 
therefore requiring more returns to justify the exercise of its takeover option. 
Lemma 17. The partial derivatives of the target returns are 
∂ReT • < 0,
∂µST 
∂ReT • > 0,
∂σST 
∂ReT • > 0,
∂µSB 
• ∂ReT < 0 except for the conditions that σSB has a relatively low value (the ∂ρ 
interval close to 0) or µSB has a relative high value (the interval close to 
0.1). 
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The results on the volatility of the bidder, σSB , are aﬀected by the restriction 
that κ ∈ [0; 1], such that relationships are sometimes not monotonic. The above 
properties represent those parameter constellations which can be deemed to be the 
most relevant in applications. 
The rationale for analyzing the target ﬁrm’s return is not diﬀerent. The return 
to target ﬁrm is negatively correlated with the expected growth rate of its own 
ﬁrm. A higher µST accelerates the takeover decision for target when it gives 
up ST , because it is unlikely that waiting will result in better deals. Target is 
more likely to wait and therefore the takeover option value increases when it is 
expecting to receive a high growth asset. A higher σST results in a higher total 
volatility involved in a takeover deal and therefore increases target ﬁrm’s options 
premium. A higher correlation, however, aﬀects total uncertainty in an opposite 
way and therefore reduces target returns. 
The analysis then move to the distribution of takeover surplus between bidder 
and target, measured by fT . 
Lemma 18. The partial derivatives of the fraction of takeover beneﬁts gained by 
targets are 
∂f T • < 0,
∂µST 
∂f T • > 0.
∂µSB 
The results on σSB , σST , ρ, are aﬀected by the restriction that κ ∈ [0; 1], such 
that relationships are sometimes not monotonic. The above properties represent 
those parameter constellations which can be deemed to be the most relevant in 
applications. 
There are only two parameters that have a clear impact on the fraction of takeover 
surplus allocated to target. Note that fT essentially reﬂects how the takeover 
surplus is allocated between two participants or the relative size of bidder and 
target ﬁrms’ options premium. A higher growth term for target results in both a 
higher return for bidder and a lower return for target. It therefore should lead to 
a lower faction of takeover beneﬁts captured by the target. On the other hand, 
a higher growth rate of bidder ﬁrm brings the bidder ﬁrm a lower return and 
target ﬁrm a higher return. It consequently should enable the target to take an 
increasing faction of the synergy eﬀect. For other parameters, the returns are 
ambiguous and cannot provide a clear implication. 
Furthermore, it is found that in most cases bidder ﬁrm obtains a larger return 
than the target, which is obviously against the widely accepted empirical ﬁnd­
ings that the vast majority of takeover beneﬁts go to the target. This can be 
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explained by the model’s lack of consideration of bidding competition, which 
normally drives asymmetric distribution of the takeover surplus. Besides, ignor­
ing any negotiation process over the surplus, the model purely looks at the size 
of the real options to wait for better conditions at a later point in time. These 
real options, under some certain circumstances, can be higher for the bidder than 
the target. 
3.9 Empirical implications 
The results presented above constitute the empirical hypotheses that require 
further research on. I therefore provide a summary of the empirical implications 
generated from the above analysis. 
The tender oﬀer has an increasing fraction of share payments if 
• volatility of the target increases, 
• target performance (expected growth rate) increases, 
• correlation of the two companies increases. 
The bidder obtains an increasing return in a tender oﬀer transaction 
if 
• volatility of the target increases, 
• target performance (expected growth rate) increases, 
• correlation of the two companies decreases. 
The target obtains an increasing return in a tender oﬀer transaction 
if 
• volatility of the target increases, 
• target performance (expected growth rate) decreases, 
• bidder performance (expected growth rate) increases. 
The target receives a larger fraction of beneﬁts in a tender oﬀer trans­
action if 
• bidder performance (expected growth rate) increases, 
• target performance (expected growth rate) decreases. 
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3.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a real options model of takeovers motivated by synergies is de­
veloped. The results show how the synergy eﬀect required to conduct a takeover 
depend not only on the parameters of both ﬁrms but also on the medium of 
exchange. Diﬀerent payment forms aﬀect the takeover decisions by introducing 
diﬀerent opportunity costs for both bidder and target to enter the deal. Analyz­
ing the conditions which require the smallest synergy eﬀect, it is obtained that in 
many realistic cases an oﬀer consisting of both cash and shares is required. The 
criteria of determining the method of payment - the payment form threshold ­
is also provided. The model further discusses the characteristics of the payment 
form threshold and the takeover returns to both bidders and targets when that 
payment form is used. The model suggests that high growth target ﬁrms should 
result in more returns captured by bidder ﬁrms and fast growing bidders produce 
more takeover returns to target ﬁrms. 
Chapter 4 
The payment form threshold in mergers
 
4.1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted that corporate takeovers are normally justiﬁed by positive 
cash ﬂow synergy. The operational synergy is the major motive for takeover trans­
actions and is examined by parameter α in the previous chapter. In this chapter, 
it is my aim to consider a new structure how the takeover deal is conducted, 
therefore checking the consistency of the results to further test the robustness of 
the model. 
In the previous model, a tender oﬀer deal where the exchange of two ﬁrms is 
viewed on a stand-alone base. For example, when the target makes its decision, 
it considers 1) the stochastic process of its own ﬁrm, and 2) the stochastic process 
of takeover payment, which in turn depends in part on the stochastic process of 
the bidder ﬁrm. In this chapter, it is assumed that the stochastic property of the 
shares component does not only depend on the shares of the bidder ﬁrm, it also 
depends on the target ﬁrm. Put diﬀerently, the shares component of the pay­
ment form reﬂects the integration of two businesses. Therefore the target ﬁrm 
eﬀectively exchanges 1) its own ﬁrm with 2) a fraction of newly created ﬁrm. 
As Leland and Skarabot (2003) suggest, the expected growth and volatility 
parameters of the newly created ﬁrm depend on the growth and volatility param­
eters of each ﬁrm, the correlation coeﬃcient of the two ﬁrms and the relative size 
of the two ﬁrms at the time of the deal. 
The second new feature arises from the fact that cash payment of a takeover deal 
can be paid out from the newly created ﬁrm. The cash payment, if suﬃciently 
large, can also inﬂuence the stochastic process of the merged ﬁrm. As a result, 
the takeover strategy should change accordingly. 
Thirdly, the synergy eﬀect is deﬁned as a value enhancement over the newly joint 
ﬁrm, instead of over the target ﬁrm only. It essentially suggests that the operating 
synergy is from the integration of two businesses, where not only post-deal target 
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ﬁrm value increases as a result of the deal, the bidder ﬁrm also beneﬁts from the 
transaction and hence sees its value increase as well after the deal. 
However, it should be noted that these new assumptions do not suggest the 
invalidity of previous chapter’s assumptions. The previous chapter is appropriate 
for deals where the size of the target is relatively small so that the impact of 
the merger on the bidder ﬁrm’s fundamentals can be ignored. In these deals, the 
newly acquired newly acquired target remains as a separately run business and 
the synergy eﬀect is achieved through for example a better management of the 
new business instead of the business integration of the two ﬁrms. 
Apparently, the new assumptions make the model suit better for a more typical 
merger deal where the size of the target ﬁrm is relative large enough to be able 
to have an impact on the fundamental feature of the newly created ﬁrm. How­
ever, the additional complexity of the model makes the analytical solutions very 
diﬃcult, if not impossible, to obtain and therefore the analysis in the chapter is 
mainly numerical based. 
4.2 Model development 
The model assumptions are consistent with what is stated in the previous chapters 
unless otherwise discussed. Consider two companies who contemplate a takeover 
deal, where one acts as the potential bidder, denoted B, and the other as the 
S∗ 
target, denoted T . Δ is deﬁned as Δ = T , which reﬂects the relative size 
S∗ +S∗ T B 
of these two companies upon the time of the deal. Si, i = B, T , denotes the 
fundamental values of the bidder and the target. For consistency with the notion 
of target and bidder I assume without loss of generality that Δ ≤ 1
2 
,i.e., the size 
of the target should not be larger than the bidder at the time of the deal. The 
two companies follow a standard geometric Brownian motion: 
(4.1) dSi = µiSidt + σidzi, i = B, T, 
where dzi is a standard Wiener process and E[dzB dzT ] = ρdt. 
If the bidder approaches the target it has the choice of oﬀering either a cash 
payment X ≥ 0 or shares giving the target a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of the newly 
formed company, or a combination of these two payment forms. For simplicity it 
is assumed that cash is available in any required quantity at no additional costs, 
i.e., the bidder is cash rich and therefore there are no ﬁnancing activities involved. 
The value of the newly formed company, denoted by N , will consist of the values 
of the target and the bidder, SB + ST , reduced by the amount of cash paid out 
to target shareholders, X, as well as a synergy eﬀect which is a fraction α of the 
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joint company after the takeover: 
(4.2) SN = (1 + α) (SB + ST − X) . 
With this assumption it can also take into account the fact that paying out cash 
to the shareholders of the target company reduces the assets and thus the value 
of the joint company. Furthermore, it is proposed that cash payment can in fact 
come from the cash holding of the bidder or the target, thus allowing the cash 
holding of the target to be used to ﬁnance the takeover. 
Further the model explicitly takes into account the reduction in the risk of the 
merged company due to the diversiﬁcation of assets from the initially separate 
companies, an aspect usually not considered in the literature. It is done by in­
terpreting the merged company as a portfolio consisting of the two original com­
panies, in the way that Leland and Skarabot (2003) suggest. In technique 
terms, the newly created ﬁrm has a stochastic process satisfying 
(4.3) dSN = µ N SN dt + σN SN dz, 
where the values of µN and σN are given by the following analysis. 
According to Leland and Skarabot (2003), the expected growth and variance 
of the combination of the bidder and the target, SB + ST can be approximately 
given by 
(4.4) µ � = ΔµT + (1 − Δ)µB, � � 1 
(4.5) σ� = (1 − Δ)2σ2 +Δ2σ2 + 2Δ(1 − Δ)σB σT ρ 2 ,B T 
where Δ is as aforementioned. 
κ ≡ δSN ∗ 
SN 
∗ is deﬁned as the fraction of the payment the target receives in shares 
T 
upon the time of the deal (therefore κ is a constant). Note that ST
N ∗ represents 
what the target receives after the deal and is a combination of a fraction of 
the newly created ﬁrm and some cash payment. It therefore has a value of 
ST
N ∗ = δSN ∗ + X. Given that SN ∗ = B + ST 
∗(1 + α) (S∗ − X), I can solve after 
inserting for the expression of the cash payment X to be 
(1 − κ)(1 + α)δ(SB ∗ + ST ∗ )(4.6) X = . 
κ + δ(κ − 1)(1 + α) 
Inserting this relationship it can be obtained 
SB 
∗ + ST 
∗ 1 − κ 
(4.7) ζ ≡ = 1 + (1 + α)δ, 
SB 
∗ + ST 
∗ − X κ 
where ζ speciﬁes the eﬀect of cash paid out to shareholders on the merged ﬁrm’s 
stochastic property and can be viewed as a leverage eﬀect. Again, please note 
�	 � 
�	 � 
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that all variables in the equation (4.6) and (4.7) refer to their values upon the
 
time of takeover and therefore ζ has a constant value.
 
Following a similar approximation method discussed in the previous chapter,
 
the results obtained above can be used to determine the expected growth and
 
volatility of the new company:
 
(4.8)	 µ N = ζµ� , 
(4.9)	 σN = ζσ� . 
In a general case where the medium of exchange consists of a combination of cash 
and shares the target and the bidder will after the deal receive total payments of 
SN(4.10)	 T = δSN + X, 
(4.11)	 SN = (1 − δ)SN ,B 
respectively. Again, using a similar approximation method, the expected growth 
rates and standard deviations bidder and target shareholders receive will thus be 
approximately given by 
(4.12)	 µ N = µ N ,B 
σN σN(4.13)	 B = , 
N(4.14)	 µT = κµ
N , 
(4.15)	 σT
N = κµN . 
What bidder ﬁrm receive is essentially a fraction of the ﬁrm N . It therefore has 
the same stochastic property with SN . On the other side, target ﬁrm receives 
a certain amount of cash in addition to the rest of the ﬁrm. Its growth and 
volatility term is therefore “diluted” by the cash payment as suggested in the 
approximation method and its eﬀect is captured by κ. 
In the appendix, there is an independent session (A.15) demonstrating the magni­
tude of the approximation error and readers should refer to it for the limitations 
of this particular approximation method. However, in most cases it has been 
shown that approximation error is modest. 
Further denoting the covariances between the returns on the initial holding of 
the shareholders of the bidder (target) , SB (ST ), and its holding after the deal, 
SB
N (ST
N ), by σBB (σTT ), one can get 
1 − κ �	 � 
(4.16) σBB = 1 +	 (1 − Δ)σ2 ,(1 + α)δ B +ΔσT σBρ κ 
1 − κ �	 � 
(4.17) σTT = κ 1 +	 (1 + α)δ ΔσT 
2 + (1 − Δ)σT σBρ . 
κ 
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I can now interpret the decision of the target and the bidder to conduct a takeover 
as a real option on the exchange of their initial holdings of ST and SB for ST
N and 
SB
N , respectively. The analysis of these real options for the bidder and the target 
follows standard exchange real options procedures, which are similar to the ones 
conducted in the previous chapter. In short, bidder ﬁrm exchanges SB for SB
N 
and target ﬁrm exchanges ST for ST
N . The stochastic properties of all variables 
have been discussed above (equations 4.12 to 4.15). 
Lemma 19. The condition under which the target and the bidder would engage 
into a takeover is given as follows: A takeover can be observed iﬀ α ≥ αmin with 
αmin implicitly deﬁned as the solution to the equations 
SN B βB(4.18) = ,
SB βB − 1
SN βT
(4.19) T = 
ST βT − 1 
where βB and βT depend on the parameters µB , µT , σB, σT , ρ, α, Δ as well as 
the decision variables δ and X, and the risk-free rate r: 
1 µN B − µBβB = − 
2 σN 
2 
+ σ2 − 2σBB 
(4.20) �� B B 
N 
�2 
µ − µB 1 2(r − µB)
+ B − + 
σN 
2 2 σN 
2 
+ σ2 + σ2 B B − 2σBB B B − 2σBB 
N1 µT − µTβT = − 22 σN + σ2 T T − 2σTT 
(4.21) �� 
N 
�2 
µ − µT 1 2(r − µT )
+ T − + 
σN 
2 
+ σ2 2 σN 
2 
+ σ2 T T − 2σTT T T − 2σTT 
Proof. See appendix. 
S∗ 
Rearranging Δ ≡ T gives 
S∗ +S∗ B T 
SB 
∗ 1 − Δ 
(4.22) = 
ST 
∗ Δ 
S∗ Δ 
(4.23) T = 
SB 
∗ 1 − Δ 
(κ−1)(1+α)δ(S∗ +S∗ )
Noting X = B T the above equations become 
δ(κ−1)(1+α)−κ 
κ(1 + α)(1 − δ) βB
(4.24) = 
[(κ − 1)(1 + α)δ − κ](Δ − 1) βB − 1 
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−(1 + α)δ βT
(4.25) = 
[(κ − 1)(1 + α)δ − κ]Δ βT − 1 
The above equations have two unknown variables - the synergy eﬀect threshold 
α (discussed by αmin in the following analysis) and the allocation rule δ. Noting 
that βT and βB are also dependent on α and δ itself is a function of α it can 
only be solved numerically. The properties of the synergy eﬀect threshold are 
analyzed in the coming section. 
It should be noted that the analysis above does not apply to the case κ = 0 as κ 
appears in the denominator for some expressions. In other words, the above anal­
ysis does not apply to a pure cash oﬀer. Therefore further analysis is conducted 
below. 
When a cash oﬀer is used, the analysis for the bidder’s decision remains the same 
as the exchange still involves two stochastic variables - its own ﬁrm and the newly 
created entity. However, from a target point of view, there is only one stochastic 
variable involved, i.e., the takeover transaction is simply exchanging a constant 
value cash payment and a stochastic value, the target ﬁrm’s business. As a result, 
the exchange options analysis still applies to bidder’s takeover decision while a 
standard real options analysis will now apply to target. 
The analysis start from the target. In a pure cash oﬀer, the target exchanges 
the value of its ﬁrm ST for a cash payment X and the bidder exchanges SB for 
SB
N = SN = (1 + α)(SB + ST − X). The target holds a standard real put option 
to sell its shares at a price of X which has been discussed in Lemma 2 in Chapter 
2. Applying its result one can get 
θ − 1 
S ∗ (4.26) X = T ,θ �2 �� � 12
1 µT 1 µT 2r 
(4.27) θ = − − − + . 
2 σ2 2 σ2 σ2 T T T 
The bidder’s situation can be analyzed in a similar way as a mixed oﬀer. What 
bidder ﬁrm pays is the its own ﬁrm (SB). What bidder ﬁrm receives is the newly 
created ﬁrm SN as target has no ownership in the new ﬁrm. Then it boils down 
to an exchange option discussed before and the analysis from equation (4.3) to 
(4.25) applies. 
θ−1 TPlugging the result that X = S∗ and Δ = S
∗ 
into equation (4.7) yields 
θ T S∗ +S∗ T B 
� � 
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that ζ = θ , which in turns gives 
θ+Δ(1−θ) 
θN	 �(4.28) µB =	 µ ,θ + Δ(1 − θ)
θ 
σN	 σ�(4.29) B =	 ,θ + Δ(1 − θ) 
θ � � 
σBB B(4.30) =	 (1 − Δ)σ2 +ΔσBσT ρ . θ + Δ(1 − θ) 
Using these parameters one can solve for the exchange option of the bidder in 
the same way as in the case of κ > 0. Consequently, equation (4.24) becomes 
Δ βB
(4.31)	 (1 + α) 1 + = ,
θ(1 − Δ) βB − 1
where βB has the value given by equation (4.20). 
Solving α for the above equation gives the synergy eﬀect threshold in a pure 
cash oﬀer. Please note that analytical solution still does not exist for the above 
equation and therefore numerical method is required. As both analysis requires 
numerical solutions, it is not possible to show the convergence when κ is close 
to zero analytically. A number of parameter constellations have shown the con­
vergence numerically. For example, one can refer to the result in right-down 
sub-ﬁgure for Figure 4.1. The results for κ = 0 show perfect convergence to the 
cases of κ > 0. 
4.3 Synergy eﬀect threshold 
Using the numerical solution to αmin, it is straightforward to evaluate the synergy 
eﬀect threshold for a large range of parameter constellations. As one can see from 
ﬁgure 4.1, the synergy eﬀect threshold does not only depend on the characteristics 
of the two companies involved, µB, µT , σB, σT , ρ and Δ, but also on the method 
of payments as represented by κ, the fraction of payments made in shares. The 
following properties are observed: 
Lemma 20. The partial derivatives of the synergy eﬀect threshold αmin required 
to conduct a takeover are 
∂αmin• > 0,
∂µB 
∂αmin•	 
∂µT 
> 0, except for the condition that µSB has a relatively high value (the 
interval close to 0.1) 
∂αmin• 
∂σB 
> 0, 
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∂αmin• 
∂σT 
> 0, 
∂αmin• 
∂ρ 
< 0, 
∂αmin• 
∂Δ 
> 0, 
∂αmin• 
∂r 
< 0, 
One can furthermore observe that the smallest synergy eﬀect is required for a 
combination of cash and shares as payment for the takeover. The result is similar 
to that obtained in the previous tender oﬀer model, further proving the robustness 
of the model. 
Clearly the results share some features with the corresponding lemma in the pre­
vious chapter such as the cases for r and ρ. It it clear that a higher discount rate 
negatively aﬀects the real options premiums for both participants of a takeover 
deal and therefore requires a lower total takeover threshold, i.e., a lower αmin. In 
terms of parameter ρ, companies that exhibit a high correlation will only provide 
very limited diversiﬁcation beneﬁts as the companies are becoming more alike. As 
a result, the exchanging deal for both bidder and target involves less uncertainty 
due to the high correlation and asks for less synergy eﬀect to justify a deal. 
Regarding other parameters, both higher σB and higher σT result in a higher αmin. 
To understand the results one should be noted that this chapter introduces the 
eﬀect of ﬁnancial diversiﬁcation. Bidder’s stochastic characteristics play a role 
in the stochastic characteristics of the newly merged ﬁrm, which in turns aﬀects 
the uncertainty of the takeover deal. For the reasonable parameters chosen in the 
lemma, it is shown that when bidder ﬁrm’s volatility or target ﬁrm’s volatility in­
creases, they increase the total volatility/uncertainty of the deal, which therefore 
make the deal require higher synergy eﬀect to justify both bidder and target’s 
real options. 
The result suggests that a higher expected growth rate of the bidder ﬁrm increases 
the synergy eﬀect threshold. The impact of the bidder ﬁrm’s growth rate is 
twofold. First, a higher µB means that what the bidder is giving up has a higher 
expected growth rate. Everything else being equal, it would accelerate bidder’s 
takeover decision as waiting may deteriorate the deal. Consequently, the takeover 
premium the bidder requires should be lower. Second, as the newly joint ﬁrm is a 
combination of both assets, a higher µB will lead to a higher expected growth rate 
for the newly created ﬁrm (µN ), which represents a stronger incentive for both 
the bidder and the target, who will receive part of the joint ﬁrm, to delay the 
deal. As a result, both bidder and target will need to require a higher premium to 
exercise their respective options. The result suggests within a reasonable range 
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of parameter constellation, this eﬀect is eﬀectively larger than the ﬁrst eﬀect and 
justiﬁes the observation that a fast-growing ﬁrm needs a higher synergy eﬀect 
threshold. A similar analysis can be applied to µT . 
With a relatively small target the synergy eﬀect mostly arises from the bidder, 
thus the target is willing to accept an oﬀer which provides it with only a small 
fraction of the synergy, which the bidder is happy to oﬀer even for small synergy 
eﬀect as measured by α. It explains why the small Δ is associated with a small 
αmin. 
This result makes it clear that for a given synergy eﬀect α the form of payment 
has an impact on the decision whether a takeover goes through or not. One 
can thus now contemplate the medium of exchange, κ, which should be used to 
conduct the takeover. Provided companies are fully rational as assumed in this 
model, one would expect them to merge once the synergy eﬀect α exceeds the 
minimum value which is needed for any payment form κ, i. e. one would need 
to ﬁnd the κ with the smallest αmin. Denote the synergy eﬀect α
∗ and the min 
associated payment form κ∗ . 
In ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3 the solution to this problem for a wide range of parameter 
constellations is shown. Although the restriction that κ ∈ [0; 1] makes a detailed 
analysis more diﬃcult once these boundaries are reached, one still can deduct a 
number of general properties which are summarized in the following lemma: 
Lemma 21. The partial derivatives of the fraction of shares κ∗ which requires 
only the smallest synergy eﬀects, α∗ are min 
∂κ∗ •	 
∂µB 
< 0 except for the condition that µST has a relatively high value (the 
interval close to 0.1), 
∂κ∗ • > 0,
∂µT 
∂κ∗ •	 
∂σB 
< 0, 
∂κ∗ •	 
∂σT 
> 0, 
∂κ∗ •	 
∂ρ 
> 0, 
∂κ∗ •	 
∂Δ 
> 0, 
The results on the expected return of the bidder, µB , are aﬀected by the restriction 
that κ ∈ [0; 1], such that relationships are sometimes not monotonic. The above 
properties represent those parameter constellations which can be deemed to be the 
most relevant in applications. 
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[] [] 
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Fig. 4.2: Payment form threshold κ∗ requiring the smallest synergy eﬀect α∗ min. 
The base case consists of the following parameter constellation: µT = 
0.02, µB = 0.04, σT = 0.1, σB = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, Δ = 0.25, r = 0.25. 
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Fig. 4.3: Smallest possible synergy eﬀect α∗ for a merger in dependence of min 
a range of parameter constellations. The base case consists of the 
following parameter constellation: µT = 0.02, µB = 0.04, σT = 0.1, 
σB = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, Δ = 0.25, r = 0.25. 
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It is interesting to compare the results with lemma 15 from the previous tender 
oﬀer deal. One can observe the same feature for ρ and µT . A higher correlation 
between the two ﬁrms obviously makes shares exchanging more attractive. A 
higher correlation reduces total uncertainty of the deal and the level of this eﬀect 
should be positively related to the amount of shares employed in a deal. 
The attractiveness of shares also depends on the expected growth rate of the tar­
get. The rationale has been discussed in the previous chapter. Higher proportion 
of shares in the payment means target ﬁrm is able to participate in the post-deal 
growth and therefore willing to accept lower price. This will in turn result in a 
lower overall synergy eﬀect threshold. 
Regarding size eﬀect, it is found in some cases that large targets require a larger 
proportion of shares in the oﬀer. One possible explanation could be that when 
the size of the target ﬁrm becomes closer to the bidder (i.e., Δ is getting close 
to 1/2), the ﬁnancial diversiﬁcation eﬀect of the merger is greater given that 
correlation between two ﬁrms is low, therefore reducing the volatility of the deal. 
This eﬀect should be positively related to the shares oﬀered in the deal as target 
ﬁrm beneﬁts increasingly from this eﬀect when more shares are oﬀered and then 
is able to accept lower price. It should be noted that this result is consistent with 
the widely discussed evidence that larger target ﬁrm increases the diﬃculty of 
raising enough cash and therefore requires more shares. However, it should also 
be noted that the real options model does not consider any constraints on the 
availability of cash - the result is simply the outcome of rational decision-making 
by the target and bidder. 
The result on the volatility of the target ﬁrm is consistent with what is obtained 
in the previous chapter - higher target ﬁrm volatility favors the use of the more 
shares. A highly volatile ﬁrm essentially increases the business risk of the newly 
merged ﬁrm and from a bidder point of view, it is therefore willing to oﬀer more 
shares to the target to share this risk. 
Similarly one can derive the properties of the synergy eﬀect threshold α∗ min asso­
ciated with κ∗ . It is necessary to distinguish between the αmin aforementioned 
and the α∗ is the lowest value of the synergy eﬀect to justify a takeover min. αmin 
deal, in the context of real options analysis, given any speciﬁc payment form. 
α∗ min is deﬁned as the lowest value of the synergy eﬀect to observe a deal, given 
κ = κ∗, i.e., when the payment form threshold is employed. α∗ min is therefore the 
lowest αmin provided that κ is taking the value at the range of [0, 1]. 
Its properties (Figure 4.3) are summarized below: 
Lemma 22. The partial derivatives of the smallest synergy eﬀect α∗ for which min 
a takeover can be observed are 
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∂α∗ min• 
∂µB 
< 0 when µT is close to 0.1, 
∂α∗ • min > 0 when µT is close to 0, ∂µB 
∂α∗ min•	 
∂µT 
> 0 except for the condition that µB has a relatively high value (the 
interval close to 0.1), 
∂α∗ min•	 
∂σB 
> 0 except for the condition that σT has a relatively high value (the 
interval close to 0.5), 
∂α∗ • min > 0,
∂σT 
∂α∗ min• 
∂ρ 
< 0, 
∂α∗ • min > 0,
∂Δ 
The results on the expected return of the target, µT , and the volatility parameter 
for bidder, σB , are aﬀected by the restriction that κ ∈ [0; 1], such that relationships 
are sometimes not monotonic. The above properties represent those parameter 
constellations which can be deemed to be the most relevant in applications. 
Please note that the characteristics of the smallest synergy eﬀect α∗ may not min 
be exactly the same as αmin, described by lemma 20. The reason is that payment 
form threshold is chosen to obtain the lowest value of αmin. As argued in the 
previous chapter, any parameters aﬀect both the payment form threshold and 
the synergy eﬀect threshold and it is the combination of these two eﬀects that 
determines the interaction laid out in the lemma. It should be noted that results 
and the rationale do share a lot of similarities with what is shown in Lemma 
20 and therefore the interpretation for the results for σT , ρ and Δ can refer to 
lemma 20. 
From numerical analysis of the results one can also easily see that for realistic 
parameter constellations synergy eﬀect of approximately 10% are suﬃcient to 
enable a takeover. In that case the oﬀer should consist of a sizeable fraction of 
both, cash and shares as indicated in Figure 4.2. For instance, with an increas­
ing correlation between two businesses, an increasing number of deals should be 
ﬁnanced by a combination of cash payment and the bidding ﬁrm shares. When 
two takeover participants approach a perfect correlation, which can be a good 
candidate to describe horizontal mergers, it can be shown from the results the 
deal should be paid approximately by half the cash and half the shares. 
� � 
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4.4 Division of takeover beneﬁts 
Apart from analyzing the payment form and synergy eﬀect required for a takeover, 
it is furthermore of interest to analyze the size and division of the takeover beneﬁts 
between the bidder and the target. The expected announcement returns of the 
bidder and the target should be aﬀected by synergy eﬀect as well as the size of 
the cash payments to target shareholders, which reduces the returns to bidders. 
It is of further interest to investigate the total return arising from a takeover deal 
as well as the division of takeover beneﬁts. The returns to the target (RT
N ), and 
bidder (RN ), total return (RN ) and the fraction of surplus of target (ψ) are given B 
by 
SN 
∗ 
T − S∗ 1 (4.32) RN = T = ,T S∗ βT − 1T 
SN 
∗ − S∗ 1 
(4.33) RN = B B = ,B S∗ B βB − 1
SN 
∗ 
RN 
− (SB ∗ + ST ∗ ) κ∗αmin ∗ (4.34) = =	 ,
S∗ + S∗ κ∗ + (1 − κ∗)(1 + α∗ )δB T	 min
δSN 
∗ 
+ X − S∗ (1 + α∗ )δ[1 − (1 − κ∗)Δ] − κ∗ΔT min(4.35) ψ = =	 . 
SN ∗ − (S∗ + S∗ )	 κ∗α∗ B T	 min 
In a pure cash oﬀer: 
−1 
RN(4.36)	 T = ,θ 
(4.37)	 RN =
1 
,B βB − 1
θ − 1 
RN α ∗ (4.38)	 = min 1 − Δ θ 
Δ 
(4.39) ψ =	 . 
α∗ [(Δ − 1)θ − Δ]min
Numerical analysis is then conducted on the formulations obtained above. From 
ﬁgure 4.4, one can have 
Lemma 23. The partial derivatives of the takeover returns RN are 
•	 ∂RN < 0 when µT is close to 0.1, ∂µB 
•	 ∂RN > 0 when µT is close to 0, ∂µB 
∂RN •	 
∂µT 
> 0 except for the condition that µB has a relatively high value (the 
interval close to 0.1), 
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Fig. 4.4:	 Aggregate announcement returns of a takeover in dependence of a 
range of parameter constellations. The base case consists of the fol­
lowing parameter constellation: µT = 0.02, µB = 0.04, σT = 0.1, 
σB = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, Δ = 0.25, r = 0.25. 
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Fig. 4.5:	 Announcement returns of a takeover to the target in dependence of 
a range of parameter constellations. The base case consists of the 
following parameter constellation: µT = 0.02, µB = 0.04, σT = 0.1, 
σB = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, Δ = 0.25, r = 0.25. 
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Fig. 4.6:	 Announcement returns of a takeover to the bidder in dependence of 
a range of parameter constellations. The base case consists of the 
following parameter constellation: µT = 0.02, µB = 0.04, σT = 0.1, 
σB = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, Δ = 0.25, r = 0.25. 
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Fig. 4.7:	 Fraction of merger beneﬁts going to the takeover in dependence of 
a range of parameter constellations. The base case consists of the 
following parameter constellation: µT = 0.02, µB = 0.04, σT = 0.1, 
σB = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, Δ = 0.25, r = 0.25. 
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∂RN •	 
∂σB 
> 0 except for the condition that σT has a relatively high value (the 
interval close to 0.5), 
∂RN • > 0,
∂σT 
∂RN • 
∂ρ 
< 0, 
∂RN • 
∂Δ 
> 0, 
One can easily observe that the results above are very similar to the results 
in lemma 22 and ﬁgure 4.3. The model assumes that the only source of the 
takeover returns is the synergy eﬀect. It is therefore not diﬃcult to understand 
the similarity between two lemmas. For example, a higher correlation coeﬃcient 
makes two ﬁrms more alike and therefore reduces the uncertainty of the deal 
when more shares are used. In this case, both the synergy eﬀect threshold and 
the total return of the deal should be reduced. The interpretation of other results 
can be done in a similar way. 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the respective return to bidder and target in the deal. 
Lemma 24. The partial derivatives of the takeover returns to target ﬁrm RT
N are 
∂RN • T > 0,
∂µB 
∂RN • T > 0.
∂σT 
The relationships for σB, µT and ρ are not monotonic. The size parameter Δ 
hardly aﬀects the results. 
Lemma 25. The partial derivatives of the takeover returns to bidder ﬁrm RN B 
are 
∂RN • B < 0,
∂µB 
∂RN • B > 0,
∂µT 
∂RN • B > 0,
∂σT 
∂RN B• 
∂ρ 
< 0, 
∂RN • 
∂Δ 
B > 0, 
The relationship for σB is not monotonic. 
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The return to bidder has a very similar feature with that of the total return of 
the deal. It can be explained that with Δ = 0.25, at time of the takeover, bidder 
ﬁrm is three times larger than target ﬁrm and therefore is expected to receive a 
large part of the newly created ﬁrm. Its return therefore is similar to the total 
synergy eﬀect. 
On the other side, the return to target ﬁrm has a greater value when the growth 
term of bidder ﬁrm or when target ﬁrm’s volatility is higher. A higher expected 
growth parameter for bidder ﬁrm increases the expected growth rate of the newly 
created ﬁrm. This in turn increases the options value of the target ﬁrm and in 
turn the takeover return to the target ﬁrm. Under the conditions discussed in 
the numerical results, a higher volatility of target ﬁrm introduces greater deal 
uncertainty for the target hence it requires more return to exercise its takeover 
option. 
Empirically it is widely accepted that the vast majority of takeover beneﬁts goes 
to the target. With the assumption that the target only gets oﬀered its reservation 
price (i.e., only justify its options value), it is not surprising that the bidder 
obtains a substantial fraction of merger beneﬁts. Nevertheless, as ﬁgure 4.7 shows, 
the target can obtain a large fraction of the beneﬁts under some conditions, e.g, 
when target ﬁrm has a low growth rate with high volatility. This is because the 
the value of the option to wait for better merger conditions can be substantially 
higher for the target than the bidder. Results are summarized in the following 
lemma: 
Lemma 26. The partial derivatives of the fraction of takeover beneﬁts going to 
target ψ are 
• ∂ψ > 0,
∂µB 
• ∂ψ < 0,
∂µT 
• ∂ψ < 0
∂σB 
∂ψ • 
∂σT 
> 0, 
∂ψ • 
∂ρ 
> 0, 
• ∂ψ > 0,
∂Δ 
Despite that the majority of takeover beneﬁts goes to the bidder in general, the 
target obtains a large return due to its relatively small size. It thus conﬁrms 
the widely discussed result that returns to targets are higher. More empirical 
implications from the results will be summarized at the following section. 
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4.5 Empirical implications 
Based on the results obtained in the previous two sections I can now collect a 
number of properties that allow the validity of the model to be tested. The 
following relationships can be tested using data from actual takeovers: 
The takeover oﬀer has an increasing fraction of share payments if the 
•	 volatility of the bidder decreases, 
•	 volatility of the target increases, 
•	 target performance (expected growth rate) increases, 
•	 correlation of the two companies increases. 
•	 size of the target increases 
The target receives a larger fraction of the takeover beneﬁts if the 
•	 volatility of the bidder decreases, 
•	 volatility of the target increases, 
•	 the correlation of the companies increases, 
•	 the target becomes larger, 
•	 bidder performance (expected growth rate) increases, 
•	 target performance (expected growth rate) decreases, 
These properties will be tested by using publicly available market data to verify 
the model in the later chapter. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a model is presented to consider a diﬀerent structure how the 
takeover deal is conducted 
•	 When two ﬁrms merge, ﬁnancial synergy can be achieved, 
•	 The cash payment can inﬂuence the stochastic property of the newly merged 
ﬁrm 
•	 Operating synergy have a form of the value enhancement of the joint ﬁrm 
as opposed to the target ﬁrm only. 
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Despite a number of changes in assumptions as shown above, the results are very 
consistent with the previous chapter. The consistency of results can be seen as 
an indication of robustness of the model speciﬁcation. In both models, results 
show that a higher correlation of two ﬁrms, a fast growing target ﬁrm and a 
more volatile target ﬁrm all contribute to an increasing attractiveness of shares 
payment in a mixed payment form. A lower volatility of bidder ﬁrm or a larger 
target ﬁrm leading to a larger faction of shares is a new ﬁnding of the model in 
this chapter, which is the result of incorporating a diversiﬁcation eﬀect of the 
merged ﬁrm. 
In terms of the announcement returns to the bidder and target, most results are 
consistent with the previous model: bidder returns are higher when the expected 
growth rate and volatility of the target are higher. The lower correlation between 
two ﬁrms seems to have the same impact. The low expected growth rate for the 
bidder is found to increase the announcement returns to bidders in this model 
and can be explained by considering the impact of the expected growth rate of 
bidder on the stochastic property of the newly created ﬁrm. In this model a 
new parameter is also introduced - the relative size of the target compared to 
the bidder- and it is found that a smaller target ﬁrm is likely to result in higher 
returns to bidders. For the target, both models support that the higher volatility 
of the target and the higher expected growth rate of the bidder lead to higher 
returns to targets. However, in this chapter, there is no strong evidence that the 
lower expected growth rate of target produces the lower returns to targets. 
Numerical results are constrained by the parameters constellations used and 
therefore impossible to cover every possible situation. The empirical analysis 
in the next chapter is then conducted to provide further support to the results. 
Chapter 5 
Method of payment: the US evidence 
5.1 Introduction 
Before this chapter starts, please note that this chapter is a join work (please 
refer to the Disclaimer part at the beginning of the thesis for the detail) by my 
supervisor, Dr Andreas Krause, Dr Ahmad Ismail and myself and therefore “we” 
instead of “I” will be used throughout the context to reﬂect this arrangement. 
In the previous chapters, a variety of real options models are constructed and 
developed with the aim to provide implications to one of the widely discussed 
topics in mergers and acquisitions literature: what drives the payment form in 
M&A deals? It been obtained that, as shown in the previous chapters, a wide 
range of factors have signiﬁcant impact on the choice of payment form and cor­
responding synergy allocation mechanism between bidders and targets. In this 
chapter, we collect data from US mergers and acquisitions markets during the 
period between 1985 and 2004 to examine these implications empirically. 
5.2 Data description 
5.2.1 Sample Selection 
The sample for our investigation is determined by identifying all mergers and 
acquisitions announced by US publicly listed bidders for publicly listed targets 
in the time period from 1 January 1985 to 22 April 2004 using the Thomson 
Financial SDC database. From this sample we exclude all ﬁnancial institutions 
deals and any deals with a value below US$ 1 million. We furthermore only 
consider those deals that were completed and resulted in the bidder gaining an 
ownership stake of at least 50%. 
From this sample we only consider those deals where both the bidder and the 
target have share price data available in the CRSP database and accounting 
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information on COMPUSTAT. With these restrictions we identify 1,670 deals. 
In order to identify the synergy eﬀect we search the SEC ﬁlings and media for 
estimated cost savings and revenue enhancements from the proposed deal and 
are able to identify 338 completed deals with all available information. Our 
ﬁnal sample is further reduced to 94 due to the availability of data on corporate 
governance as detailed below. 
5.2.2 Determination of explanatory variables 
We determine the expected growths rate of the target and the bidder, TARG­
RET and ACQ-RET, as well as the target and bidder volatility, TARG-VOL and 
ACQ-VOL, and the correlation between them, CORR, from daily data in the 
time window from 210 to 20 trading days prior to the merger announcement. We 
annualize our daily estimate to annual data over 252 trading days. 
The amount of cash available to the bidder, ACQ-CASH, is determined as the 
ratio of cash plus marketable securities and the book value of assets as taken from 
the accounts at the end of the ﬁscal year prior to the merger announcement. The 
free cash ﬂow of the bidder is similarly determined as the sales minus cost of goods 
sold, selling and general administrative expenses, taxes, change in net operating 
working capital and change in capital expenditures. We then divide this number 
by the book value of assets to obtain the variable ACQ-FCF. 
We also obtain the price-earnings ratio of the target and bidder, TARG-PE and 
ACQ-PE, as the market price at the end of a ﬁscal year prior to the merger 
announcement divided by the earnings of that year. The leverage of the target 
and bidder, TARG-LEV and ACQ-LEV, is obtained as the ratio of the debt 
and the book value of assets at the end of the ﬁscal year prior to the merger 
announcement. 
The premium paid by the bidder, PREMIUM, is determined as the ratio of the 
deal value and the market capitalization of the target. The deal value is the total 
value of the transaction as paid by the bidder and the market capitalization is 
the value of the target 2 months prior to the merger announcement. 
The synergy, SYNERGY, is not determined that simple. We deﬁne this variable 
as the ratio of the synergy expected from the merger and the market capitalization 
of the target. Following Houston and Ryngaert (2001) we collect information 
from the SEC ﬁlings (8-k ﬁlings and proxy statements) as well as press releases 
in the immediate aftermath of the merger announcement from Lexis-Nexis as in 
Bernile (2005). We attempt to obtain information on estimated cost savings, 
revenue enhancements and any costs of the merger, such as fees paid to advisors. 
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We use as much detailed information as possible from these sources and in cases 
where a target date for the realization of synergy is given, we assume that in each 
year prior to this the gains were half that the following year. The ﬁnal projected 
gains are then assumed to be perpetual and throughout we assume a tax rate of 
36%. This methodology is identical to that used in Houston and Ryngaert 
(2001) and Bernile (2005). 
We use these annual incremental gains from the merger to calculate its present 
value and after deducting the merger costs we obtain the size of the synergy. The 
discount factor to determine the present value is given by the cost of capital as 
determined from the CAPM. The beta is the weighted average of the beta of the 
bidder and the target, where the weights are the relative market capitalizations 
of the two companies 2 months prior to the merger announcement. The betas are 
estimated from daily data in the time window from 210 to 20 trading days prior to 
the merger announcement. As for market we use CRSP value weighted index and 
set a ﬁxed risk premium of 7.5% p.a., in line with other similar investigations such 
as Bernile (2005) use 8%, Houston and Ryngaert (2001) 7 % and Gilson 
et al. (2000) 7.4 % and as for risk free rate we use the 10 year US government 
bond. In cases we obtain a negative beta, we set the beta equal to the average 
beta in our sample which is 0.86 for bidders and 0.71 for targets. 
We also determine the relative size of the target in the joint company, REL-SIZE, 
deﬁned as the ratio of the market capitalization of the target 2 months prior to 
the merger announcement and the combined market capitalizations of the target 
and bidder at that time. 
We also use a corporate governance index for the target and bidder, TARG-GOV 
and ACQ-GOV. This index is based on the IRRC database and focuses on anti-
takeover provisions and a higher score implies more anti-takeover measures, with 
a maximum score of 24. For more details of this index see Gompers et al. 
(2003). The inclusion of this index for targets and bidder reduces our sample size 
to 94 with data only available from 1990 onwards, but the importance of such 
measures for the success of mergers justiﬁes their inclusion into our analysis. 
Finally we also include the risk free rate, RATE, in form of the yield of the 10 
year US government bond. 
5.2.3 Determination of independent variables 
We determine the fraction of shares (SAHRES) as the ratio of the value of the 
shares oﬀered on the day the merger is announced and the total value of the 
transaction. 
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Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables 
SHARES 0.7864 0.3584 0.0000 1.0000 
TARG-CAR 0.1405 0.1782 -0.2342 0.7705 
ACQ-CAR -0.0275 0.0794 -0.2362 0.1473 
Target characteristics 
TARG-RET -0.0255 0.5673 -0.9205 3.0082 
TARG-VOL 0.4269 0.2496 0.1617 1.3676 
TARG-PE 17.3551 40.7313 -256.2500 145.0893 
TARG-LEV 0.6411 0.2062 0.0363 1.3849 
TARG-GOV 10.0000 2.8053 3.0000 16.0000 
SYNERGY 0.2635 1.2872 0.0001 11.0736 
PREMIUM 1.6416 1.9470 0.8254 21.6833 
Bidder characteristics 
ACQ-RET -0.0276 2.5340 -0.9636 27.6041 
ACQ-VOL 0.3894 0.3663 0.1427 3.3684 
ACQ-PE 18.1383 239.1890 -840.6667 2462.5000 
ACQ-LEV 0.6138 0.1753 0.0428 1.1246 
ACQ-GOV 10.0000 2.9754 1.0000 15.0000 
ACQ-CASH 0.0242 0.1370 0.0000 0.8461 
ACQ-FCF 0.0810 0.0606 -0.1986 0.4424 
Deal characteristics 
CORR 0.2613 0.2125 -0.0678 1.0000 
REL-Size 0.2645 0.1604 0.0126 0.6988 
RATE 0.0557 0.0075 0.0401 0.0766 
Tab. 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
In order to assess the market reaction to a merger, we determine the announce­
ment returns (TARG-CAR and ACQ-CAR) as the cumulative abnormal returns 
in a time window from 5 days prior to the merger announcement to 5 days after. 
As for benchmark returns we use the market model calibrated in the time period 
of 210 to 20 days prior to the merger announcement and using a risk premium of 
7.5% p.a. and the risk-free rate as the 10-year US government bond. 
We show the descriptive statistics for the explanatory and dependent variables 
in table 5.1. 
5.3 Hypotheses 
The main part of the hypotheses to be examined in this chapter is the collection 
of ﬁndings and implications of previously developed models. We provide a brief 
summary of the factors that inﬂuence the payment form and returns to each 
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participant as follows. It is worth restating that the models developed in the 
thesis are distinct from most other empirical studies on takeover payment forms 
because of their pure focus on the risk-reward characteristics of both takeover 
participants, properly modelled by a real options analysis, and therefore taking no 
account of misevaluations in the market, moral hazard, asymmetric information 
or tax eﬀects, the factors that most other studies normally incorporate. 
Payment form choice hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 The mergers and acquisitions deals are more likely to be ﬁnanced 
by a higher fraction of shares (SHARES) if the correlation (CORR) of the 
two companies are high. 
Hypothesis 2 The mergers and acquisitions deals are more likely to be ﬁnanced 
by a higher fraction of shares (SHARES) if the target ﬁrm has a higher 
expected growth rate (TARG-RET) 
Hypothesis 3 The mergers and acquisitions deals are more likely to be ﬁnanced 
by a higher fraction of shares (SHARES) if the target ﬁrm has a higher 
volatility (TARG-VOL) 
Hypothesis 4 The mergers and acquisitions deals are more likely to be ﬁnanced 
by a higher fraction of shares (SHARES) if the bidding ﬁrm has a lower 
volatility (ACQ-VOL) 
Returns to bidders hypotheses 
Hypothesis 5 The announcement returns to bidding ﬁrms (ACQ-CAR) are in­
creasing in the expected growth rate of the target ﬁrm (TARG-RET) 
Hypothesis 6 The announcement returns to bidding ﬁrms (ACQ-CAR) are in­
creasing in the volatility of the target ﬁrm (TARG-VOL) 
Hypothesis 7 The announcement returns to bidding ﬁrms (ACQ-CAR) are de­
creasing in the expected growth rate of the bidding ﬁrm (ACQ-RET) 
Hypothesis 8 The announcement returns to bidding ﬁrms (ACQ-CAR) are de­
creasing in the correlation of the two companies (CORR) 
Hypothesis 9 The announcement returns to bidding ﬁrms (ACQ-CAR) are in­
creasing in the size of the target ﬁrm in relation to the bidding ﬁrm (REL­
SIZE) 
134 Chapter 5. Method of payment: the US evidence 
Returns to targets hypotheses 
Hypothesis 10 The announcement returns to target ﬁrms (TARG-CAR) are 
decreasing in the expected growth rate of the target ﬁrm (TARG-RET) 
Hypothesis 11 The announcement returns to target ﬁrms (TARG-CAR) are 
increasing in the volatility of the target ﬁrm (TARG-VOL) 
Hypothesis 12 The announcement returns to target ﬁrms (TARG-CAR) are 
increasing in the expected growth rate of the bidding ﬁrm (ACQ-RET) 
Apart from the implications from previous real options models, we also conduct 
empirical investigation on the widely discussed hypotheses in the literature, with 
the focus on the determination of the takeover payment forms. The hypotheses 
are described as follows. 
Hypothesis A The mergers and acquisitions deals are more likely to be ﬁnanced 
by a lower fraction of shares (SHARES) if the bidder has suﬃcient cash ﬂows 
(ACQ-CASH, ACQ-FCF). 
Following the free cash ﬂow theory initially discussed by Jensen (1986), 
the free cash ﬂow should be paid out to ﬁnance mergers and acquisitions 
deals, giving rise to the fact that bidders with high level of free cash ﬂows 
are more likely to launch a cash oﬀer. Martin (1996) also provides support 
to the free cash ﬂow hypothesis. 
Hypothesis B The mergers and acquisitions deals are more likely to be ﬁnanced 
by a higher fraction of shares (SHARES) if the target is relatively large 
compared to the bidder (REL-SIZE). 
The predication can be justiﬁed by the fact that relatively large target 
increases the diﬃculty in ﬁnancing with enough cash, therefore is more 
likely to be involved with shares. 
Hypothesis C The mergers and acquisitions deals are more likely to be ﬁnanced 
by a higher fraction of shares (SHARES) if the stock market performance 
for bidder is strong (ACQ-PE). 
The strong market performance of bidding ﬁrm can be explained by two 
possible reasons. Firstly, booming stock market might indicate that the 
bidding ﬁrm has tremendous growth potential. As a result, the target ﬁrm 
is willing to accept share exchange as it can beneﬁt from future growth of the 
newly-created ﬁrm (contingent-pricing characteristic). A high-growth ﬁrm 
with plenty of proﬁtable investment opportunities would also like to ﬁnance 
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the deal by shares as it is normally associated with low level of free cash 
ﬂows. Secondly, strong market performance might be the manifestation of 
market over-optimism concerning the growth potential, i.e., the bidder ﬁrm 
is overvalued. Asymmetric information between the bidder and the target 
on the value of the bidder shares allows the bidder to oﬀer shares if they 
are overvalued and to oﬀer cash if they are undervalued (Houston and 
Ryngaert (2001)). In our model, we use ACQ-PE as the proxy of market 
performance of the bidder. 
Hypothesis D : If the pre-deal performance of the target ﬁrm is bad (TARG­
PE is low), the bidder tends not to keep the ineﬃcient manager of the target 
ﬁrm, giving rise to cash ﬁnancing more preferred. (Zhang (2003)) 
These hypotheses can now serve as the basis for an empirical investigation, where 
we will also include additional variables such as the leverage eﬀect (ACQ-LEV, 
TARG-LEV), anti-takeover provisions (ACQ-GOV, TARG-GOV), the synergy 
and the takeover premium (SYNERGY, PREMIUM). This will allow us a much 
more complete picture of the factors driving the choice of payment form. 
5.4 Empirical methodology 
When investigating the payment form of mergers and acquisitions, we use the 
fraction of shares as part of the total price oﬀered by the bidder to the target 
shareholders as the dependent variable. This variable will be in the interval 
[0;1], although it is can be favorable for the bidder to oﬀer a fraction of shares 
above one, thus requiring an additional cash payment by target shareholders, or 
a negative fraction of shares, requiring target shareholders to sell the bidder their 
own stock. With such option not realistically available to bidders, the observed 
variable can thus be interpreted as censored such that for the observed fraction 
of shares, s*, and the actually desired fraction of shares, s, are related as follows: ⎧ ⎨ 1 if s > 1
 
S ∗ = s if 0 ≤ s ≤ 1
 ⎩ 
0 if s < 0 
We thus have established that the fraction of shares oﬀered is a censored variable 
and the appropriate econometric methodology to use to analyze such censored 
dependent variables is the Tobit model. We estimate a linear model of indepen­
dent variables regressed against the latent variable s* using maximum likelihood. 
This methodology is similar to Faccio and Masulis (2005). 
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Coeﬃcient z-statistics 
CONSTANT 0.2246 0.2039 
Target characteristics 
TARG-RET 0.4032∗∗ 2.1329 
TARG-VOL 0.9308∗∗ 2.2609 
log(TARG-PE) -0.1162 -1.0922 
TARG-LEV 0.8739∗∗ 2.4335 
TARG-GOV 0.0110 0.3672 
SYNERGY 0.0987 1.1831 
PREMIUM -0.7195∗∗∗ -4.3981 
Bidder characteristics 
ACQ-RET 0.2186 1.2906 
ACQ-VOL -0.2957 -1.2398 
log(ACQ-PE) 0.5243∗∗∗ 3.3458 
ACQ-LEV -0.1079 -0.2935 
ACQ-GOV -0.0182 -0.7442 
log(ACQ-CASH) -0.0769 -1.5385 
log(ACQ-FCF) 0.1420 1.6342 
Deal characteristics 
CORR 0.2698 0.7336 
REL-SIZE 0.6471 1.1757 
RATE -5.0782 -0.5498 
R2 0.4829 
Tab. 5.2: TOBIT regression of payment form: this table shows the maxi­
mum likelihood parameter estimates of a Tobit regression of the frac­
tion of shares used for payment in a merger on various explanatory 
variables, explained in the main text. It is assumed that censoring 
occurs at 0 and 1. Signiﬁcance of a parameter at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
The announcement returns are investigated in a linear regression using a range 
of independent variables whose parameters are estimated using OLS. 
5.5 Empirical investigation 
As mentioned before, we have collected a number of explanatory variables, which 
are not limited to the variables discussed in the previous real options models, to 
test their impacts on the choice of the payment form. 
We see clearly from table 5.2 that as predicted the expected growth rate of 
the target (TARG-RET) and its volatility (TARG-VOL) have a positive impact 
on the fraction of shares oﬀered in a merger deal, which is consistent with our 
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hypotheses (Hypothesis 2 and 3). 
In the previous real options analysis1 , it is discussed that the volatility that 
matters (which in turn inﬂuences the value of takeover options and takeover 
threshold) is a function of both participants’, volatility, and their correlation. 
Therefore the impact of the target’s volatility on the payment form choice must 
be analyzed in this context. Given a reasonable estimate of the other parameters 
such as expected growth rate of both ﬁrms and correlation, we can argue that for 
most cases covered in our empirical observation, a higher volatility of the target 
ﬁrm can actually reduce the total volatility of the deal and the level of this eﬀect 
is positively related to the amount of shares in the deal, which therefore favors 
the use of the shares. 
The result shows a higher expected growth rate of the target tends to increase the 
use of the shares in the payment. The real options explanation has been discussed 
thoroughly in the Chapter 3 and therefore will be not repeated here. We attempt 
to provide alternative explanations here: if the expected growth of the target 
ﬁrm is low, it is normally the result of ineﬃcient utilization of available assets 
or simply because available investment opportunities are not attractive. Despite 
that mergers are aimed to deal with this ineﬃciency, the newly merged ﬁrm 
will still has a relatively lower expected growth rate compared to acquiring a 
high growth target ﬁrm. Therefore, it is not hard to understand that the target 
ﬁrm would prefer receiving cash rather than the low growth merged ﬁrm shares. 
Zhang (2003) (the target pre-deal performance hypothesis) also argues that if 
the target pre-deal performance (we use the expected growth rate of target ﬁrm 
before the deal to measure the target per-deal performance as opposed to the 
Return on Equity used by Zhang (2003)) is bad, the bidder is more willing to 
eliminate the ineﬃcient management of the target ﬁrm through a cash deal. 
We further ﬁnd that a lower premium (PREMIUM) paid by the bidder or a highly 
leveraged target (TARG-LEV) tends to increase the amount of shares oﬀered; all 
other characteristics of the target are statistically insigniﬁcant. 
A reason for the observation in relation to takeover premium could be that cash 
rich companies would be able to preempt its potential competitors by making a 
large premium bid. As a result, a high takeover premium is more likely to be 
associated with a cash payment. The eﬀect of target ﬁrm’s leverage can also be 
easily explained. When two ﬁrms are merged, the newly created ﬁrm will take 
on all the liability. A highly leveraged target ﬁrm requires more cash payment 
from the merged ﬁrm to repay the debt in due course - as a result, cash will be 
less favored to use in the takeover payment. 
1 Please refer to model development in Chapter 3 and 4 for more detail. 
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Of the characteristics we investigate for the bidder, the only variable is statis­
tically signiﬁcant in explaining the payment form choice is ACQ-PE, which is 
consistent with our hypothesis C. Theories that provide support to this hypothe­
sis can be found in the hypothesis section. It is worth mentioning that our models 
do not ﬁnd strong evidence for free cash ﬂows hypothesis (Hypothesis A). 
We also conduct regressions using alternative speciﬁcations, most notably a linear 
OLS regression and an ordered logit regression by setting all cash oﬀers as 0, 
mixed oﬀers as 1 and all share oﬀers as 2. Overall we ﬁnd results that are broadly 
consistent with those reported here, suggesting that our results are robust to the 
exact speciﬁcation of the model. 
Apart from the valuation of the bidder, none of its properties seems to aﬀect the 
decision, hence restrictions arising from the amount of borrowing or available cash 
seem to be as much absent as the size of the target. The takeover defences of the 
target are also not aﬀecting the payment form, thus overcoming these obstacles 
or engaging in a friendly takeover seems to have no eﬀect. Nevertheless, we might 
see an indirect inﬂuence as a merger overcoming takeover defences will generally 
result in a higher premium to be paid by the bidder; this premium reduces the 
fraction of shares used in the payment. This relationship might explain the 
statistical signiﬁcance of the premium we ﬁnd in the regression and it tallies well 
with the common observation that hostile takeovers, situations in which takeover 
defences become relevant, are more commonly paid for cash. 
We can also investigate the determinants of cumulative abnormal returns for both 
the target and the bidder. For the bidder we ﬁnd that the average return (ACQ­
CAR) is slightly negative, consistent with other investigations. Using cumulative 
abnormal returns for 10 trading days following the merger announcement we 
conduct an OLS regression on the same set of explanatory variables as for the 
payment form and additionally include the payment form. We observe from 
table 5.3 that only two variables show signiﬁcant parameters, the volatility of the 
target (TARG-VOL) and the governance of the bidder (ACQ-GOV). The former 
part of the statement is in line with our hypothesis 6. The acquisition of a risky 
target reduces abnormal returns as would be expected from normal risk-return 
relationship. We also ﬁnd a weak impact of the quality of corporate governance 
of the bidder, the less good corporate governance the smaller the announcement 
returns. This result is intuitively clear as barriers to takeovers will often result 
in poor merger decisions due to hubris and empire building, thus the market will 
see merger announcements not that positively. 
None of the other variables included in the regression is showing any statistical 
signiﬁcance and are generally showing very small parameters. This result con­
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Coeﬃcient t-statistics 
CONSTANT 0.0952 0.7449 
Target characteristics 
TARG-RET -0.0020 -0.0868 
TARG-VOL -0.1295∗∗ -2.4103 
log(TARG-PE) 0.0053 0.4218 
TARG-GOV 0.0024 0.7564 
SYNERGY 0.0068 0.5964 
PREMIUM 0.0001 0.0171 
Bidder characteristics 
ACQ-RET -0.0004 -0.0712 
ACQ-VOL -0.0128 -0.3388 
log(ACQ-PE) -0.0008 -0.0656 
ACQ-GOV -0.0060∗ -1.9319 
log(ACQ-CASH) -0.0031 -0.4422 
log(ACQ-FCF) 0.0067 0.4571 
Deal characteristics 
CORR 0.0199 0.4297 
REL-SIZE -0.0949 -1.5957 
RATE -0.9280 -0.7240 
SHARES -0.0163 -0.6123 
R2 0.2402 
Tab. 5.3: OLS regression of announcement returns of bidders: this table 
shows the parameter estimates of an OLS regression of the bidder 
announcement returns on various explanatory variables, explained in 
the main text. Signiﬁcance of a parameter at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
ﬁrms the common notion that all merger gains actually accumulate for the target 
shareholders rather than the bidder. 
Conducting the same regression for the target company, we ﬁnd a slightly diﬀerent 
picture; several statistically signiﬁcant parameters can be found, see table 5.4. 
We ﬁnd that a well performing target (TARG-RET) shows a lower abnormal 
return, which is in line with our hypothesis 10. It provides further support to the 
robustness of our model results - real options analysis can have a supplemental 
role in explaining the payment form choice and returns to takeover participants. 
Empirical evidence also shows that a higher-growth target ﬁrm normally suﬀer 
from a merger deal as it is acquired by a relatively slow-growth bidder - negative 
synergy is achieved from targets’ standpoint. 
We observe that larger targets (REL-SIZE) attract lower abnormal returns. A 
common argument states that a relatively large target ﬁrm should beneﬁt from its 
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Coeﬃcient t-statistics 
CONSTANT 0.4989∗∗ 2.2281 
Target characteristics 
TARG-RET -0.1040∗∗ -2.5925 
TARG-VOL -0.0398 -0.4228 
log(TARG-PE) 0.0130 0.5926 
TARG-GOV 0.0093 1.6474 
SYNERGY 0.0100 0.4973 
PREMIUM 0.0091 1.0346 
Bidder characteristics 
ACQ-RET 0.0112 1.2786 
ACQ-VOL -0.0989 -1.4955 
log(ACQ-PE) -0.0079 -0.3771 
ACQ-GOV -0.0042 -0.7651 
log(ACQ-CASH) -0.0020 -0.1627 
log(ACQ-FCF) 0.0330 1.2815 
Deal characteristics 
CORR -0.0421 -0.5201 
REL-SIZE -0.3007∗∗∗ -2.8880 
RATE 0.8415 0.3749 
SHARES -0.2122∗∗∗ -4.5524 
R2 0.5320 
Tab. 5.4: OLS regression of announcement returns of targets: this table 
shows the parameter estimates of an OLS regression of the target 
announcement returns on various explanatory variables, explained in 
the main text. Signiﬁcance of a parameter at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
strong bargaining power and therefore should be able to obtain higher proportion 
of the synergy created. Consequently, a higher announcement return should be 
expected. Clearly our empirical results do not support this argument, which 
concludes that returns to targets are lower when targets are relatively large. 
A possible explanation can focus on the fact that when targets are relatively 
large compared to bidders, the diﬃculty of ﬁnancing the deals from the bidders’ 
perspective is increased, and therefore the probability that bidders overpay is 
reduced due to this ﬁnancing constraint. Holding the view that a large component 
of targets returns is from the overpayment from bidders, one should be able to 
explain the results. 
Finally, we observe along with a large number of other observations that targets 
beneﬁt more from cash oﬀers than from share oﬀers (SHARES) - in a highly 
competitive environment, a large amount of cash can be used to preempt or 
outbid other potential bidders, resulting in higher returns to targets. Asymmetric 
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information theory also states that target ﬁrm shareholders beneﬁt from cash 
payment as they avoid receiving possibly overvalued shares. (Travlos (1987), 
Fishman (1989), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990)) 
In this chapter, we ﬁnd that only a small number of factors seem to inﬂuence 
the choice of payment form. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that almost 
all the hypotheses tested here are the implications of the models that ignore 
both competitive structure among bidders and asymmetric information between 
bidders and targets. It would also be interesting to evaluate whether other factors 
inﬂuence the decisions, e.g. whether they are accumulating at speciﬁc periods 
of time, but such an investigation is beyond the scope of the thesis and requires 
future eﬀort. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter conducts an empirical investigation on the predictions produced by 
previous real options models by analyzing the US mergers during the period of 
1985-2004. Tobit regression models using maximum likelihood estimation enable 
us to examine the payment form choice and OLS regression models are applied 
to study the returns to takeover participants. 
The results support the hypotheses that target ﬁrm characteristic, such as its 
expected growth rate and volatility, positively impacts the weight of shares used 
in a mixed oﬀer as predicted. In addition, a highly leveraged target ﬁrm and/or 
a high takeover premium results in increasing attractiveness of shares. Our em­
pirical analysis also provides support that shares are more likely to be used when 
the bidder ﬁrm has a high price-earnings ratio. 
Despite these new ﬁndings, we ﬁnd that there is still a signiﬁcant gap in our 
understanding of the determinants of the payment form. In future research, it 
might be interesting to include additional factors that are not directly related to 
the target, the bidder or the deal itself, but the environment in which they are 
announced, e.g. the general conditions of the stock market or any herding eﬀect 
arising from the conditions in other mergers. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Mergers and acquisitions transactions diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to the pay­
ment forms. In standard terms, bidders can pay the shareholders of targets with 
cash - either from internal free cash ﬂows or external debt ﬁnancing - or the 
shares of the newly created ﬁrm. 
Previous research attempts in this area argue that there are a number of factors 
impacting the choice of payment forms, predominantly from the perspective of 
asymmetric information, tax consideration, manager control, and cash availability 
etc. While its appearance is not as frequent as either a pure cash or a pure share 
oﬀer, a mixed payment scheme, i.e., a ﬁxed amount of cash and a ﬁxed amount 
of the shares of the bidder exchanged for one share of the target, has seen its 
importance grow in mergers and acquisitions, particularly for large deals. In 
relatively large transactions, the requirement of large amount of capital makes it 
diﬃcult and sometimes inadequate for a single medium of payment to satisfy the 
terms and conditions of both bidder and target shareholders. Takeovers therefore 
have seen their increasing reliance on the mixed payment form. 
This thesis investigates the combination of cash and share payments in takeovers, 
with a strong focus on the conditions of its mix and its subsequent impact on 
the takeovers surplus allocation strategy. The payment form is considered in the 
context of real options optimization process. Conditions are obtained in terms of 
minimizing both bidder and target’s takeover options values - so that the deals 
can be observed with the least obstacle. This unique feature distinguishes the 
thesis from most of the other models in the form that the factors notably taken 
into account in previous work such as information asymmetry do not play any 
roles in decisions with respect to the payment form. In my models, takeover 
participants independently consider their own takeover decisions in the context 
of real options analysis, considering immediate payoﬀ from the deal and potential 
beneﬁt from delaying the deal, and have come to the decision to participate only 
when the combination of these two values is maximized. As a result of real options 
optimization process for both the bidder and the target, a takeover threshold, in 
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the form of an additional value enhancement to the combined entity, i.e., synergy, 
can be obtained. I subsequently deﬁne a payment form threshold as the one that 
results in the lowest value of the required synergy eﬀect enough to move a takeover 
deal forward. This is the main focus of the discussion of Chapter 3, following a 
simple attempt to describe the interaction of takeover participants in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 4 sets up to consider a new takeover structure. Firstly, it is argued 
that ﬁnancial synergy can be achieved when two ﬁrms have diﬀerent growth 
perspectives and volatilities - the idea is similar to the diversiﬁcation process 
in a portfolio of diﬀerent assets. As a result of this diversiﬁcation eﬀect, the 
stochastic process of the newly created ﬁrm should be adjusted accordingly and 
the strategy for both takeover participants will also alter accordingly. Secondly, 
I suggest that the cash payment can inﬂuence the stochastic property of the 
new ﬁrm and in turn aﬀect the takeover strategies of each participant. At last, 
instead of interpreting the synergy as value enhancement to the target ﬁrm only, 
it is modelled as the form of value dependent on the combined value of both the 
bidder and the target. While these new assumptions do not suggest invalidity of 
the previous chapter, they provide a further step to understanding the interaction 
of takeover participants. 
A number of implications are obtained through the analysis mentioned above. 
The factors that have a positive inﬂuence on the weight of shares component in 
a mixed oﬀer include: 
• A high correlation of the two companies (Chapter 3 and 4) 
• A fast-growth target ﬁrm (Chapter 3 and 4) 
• A high-volatility target ﬁrm (Chapter 3 and 4) 
• A low-volatility bidder (Chapter 4 only) 
• A larger target (Chapter 4 only) 
I am also able to derive announcement returns for the target and the bidding 
ﬁrms and speciﬁcally I ﬁnd that for bidders announcement returns are higher 
when 
• The expected growth rate of the target is high (Chapter 3 and 4) 
• The volatility of the target is high (Chapter 3 and 4) 
• The expected growth rate of the bidder is low (Chapter 4 only) 
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•	 The correlation of the two companies is low (Chapter 3 and 4) 
•	 The target ﬁrm is relative small compared to the bidder ﬁrm (Chapter 4 
only) 
For targets, the announcement returns are higher when 
•	 The expected growth rate of the target is low (Chapter 3 only) 
•	 The volatility of the target is high (Chapter 3 and 4) 
•	 The expected growth rate of the bidder is high (Chapter 3 and 4) 
As shown above, while most of the results from Chapter 3 and 4 are consistent, 
it is clear that changing assumptions leads to slightly diﬀerent results, such as 
the bidder volatility factoring in the payment form, relative size eﬀect of returns 
to bidders, and the impact of expected growth rate of the target on targets 
announcement returns. The ﬁnancial diversiﬁcation of the two assets in the 
newly merged ﬁrm should play a signiﬁcant role in explaining the diﬀerences. 
In Chapter 5, data has been collected from the US in the time period from 1 
January 1985 to 22 April 2004 using the Thomson Financial SDC database. The 
ﬁnal sample size is 94, mainly due to availability of data on corporate governance 
issues.The hypotheses generated by the previous models are tested and it is found 
that the target characteristics such as target ﬁrm expected growth rate and target 
ﬁrm volatility can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the choice of takeovers payment form. 
This conﬁrms the results from the theoretical models. On the bidder side, while 
none of the model generated variables is found to have a signiﬁcant impact on 
the choice of the payment form, the data shows strong evidence for the relative 
value theory (bidder’s shares will be paid when they are considered overvalued). 
The premium of the deal and the leverage level of the target ﬁrm are also found 
to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on takeover payment form choice. 
At the very end of this thesis, I would like to discuss a bit about the limitations 
of our models, which I hope can shed some lights on future research in this area. 
One of the major limitations is that I completely ignore the interaction between 
bidders and targets, unlike Lambrecht (2004) for example. In the assumptions, 
each takeover participant can make its own takeover decision - through a real 
options type value optimization process - on a totally isolated basis. Bidding ﬁrms 
make their takeover bids when the combined value of immediate payoﬀ from the 
deal and their expected value from potential future movements are maximized, 
regardless of what target ﬁrms will react to these bids. Target ﬁrms, on the other 
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hand, make their takeover decisions only considering their value optimization 
strategy, ignoring the possibility that when a bid is rejected, a better bid might 
never appear in the future - it might not be worth waiting! In this context, I 
suggest that a stochastic bargaining game (e.g. Cripps (1998)) setting might be 
better positioned to analyze the interaction among takeover participants. 
Theoretical extensions could also incorporate an agency problem when the in­
terest of managers and shareholders are not aligned - the optimal timing of the 
deal might not be achieved, which in turn impacts the payment form threshold. I 
recommend Lambrecht and Myers (2007) as a starting point to consider such 
issues. One can also incorporate the costs of takeover deals, i.e., the fees paid to 
investment bankers, auditors, lawyers and consultants, by slightly changing the 
optimization strategies of both participants. The costs of the deal should play 
a similar role as cash payment and should change the payment form structure 
accordingly. 
In terms of the determinants of the takeover payment form, more factors need 
to be considered, suggested by the empirical study at a latter part of the the­
sis. Factors such as asymmetric information, taxation and managerial control, if 
properly modelled, can greatly enhance the real options analysis by gaining more 
practical exposures and providing more practical implications. 
Finally, it will also be interesting to consider factors such as the limits and impacts 
of borrowing, restrictions on available cash and regulatory constraints of various 
payment forms. For example, the model can be further developed to consider the 
situation where the debt is issued to ﬁnance the cash payment when internal cash 
ﬂows are not suﬃcient for required cash payment. The debt issuing will change 
the capital structure of the bidding ﬁrm, as well as the merged ﬁrm, which in 
turn impacts their respective stochastic property. As a consequence, the takeover 
strategies of both the bidder and the target should be adjusted accordingly and 
the payment form threshold might need to be adapted as well. 
Appendix A 
Appendix 
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 
As Dixit and Pindyck (1994) suggest, the takeover opportunity yields no cash 
ﬂows up to the time when the takeover is executed, as a result, the Bellman 
equations in the continuation region is: 
(A.1) rF Bdt = ε(dF B ), 
which states that over a time interval dt, the total expected return on the takeover 
opportunity, rF Bdt, is equal to its expected rate of capital appreciation ε(dF B). 
ε(dF B ) can be expanded using Ito’s Lemma to: 
(A.2) dF B = F B dST +
1 
F B (dST )
2 
ST ST ST2 
Substituting equation (2.1) for dST into above expression and noting that 
ε(dzST ) = 0 gives: 
(A.3) ε(dF B) = 
1 
σ2 S2 F B dt + µT ST F 
B dtT T ST ST ST2 
Hence the Bellman equation becomes: 
(A.4) 
1 
σ2 S2 F B + µT ST F 
B − rF B = 0 T T ST ST ST2 
In addition, the takeover option value must satisfy the following boundary con­
ditions: 
(A.5) F B |ST =S∗ = (1 + α)S ∗ − XTT 
(A.6) F B |ST =S∗ = 1 + αST T 
(A.7) lim F B = 0 
ST →0 
��
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The value-matching condition (A.5) imposes equality between the values of the 
takeover option and the payoﬀ of the option upon exercise. In other words, upon 
exercise of the takeover option, the value of it should be equal to the payoﬀ, or the 
surplus that the takeover will yield. The smooth-pasting condition (A.6) ensures 
that the takeover occurs along the optimal path by requiring a continuity of the 
slopes at the trigger threshold. 
Condition (A.7) arises from the observation that if ST goes to zero, it will stay 
at zero with the implication of the stochastic process for ST , therefore the option 
to takeover will become worthless. 
The general solution to ordinary diﬀerential equation (A.4) has the expression: 
(A.8) F B = ASβ1 + BSβ2 ,ST T T 
where A and B are constants that yet to be determined, and β1 and β2 are known 
constant whose values are given by � �2
1 µT µT 1 2r 
(A.9) β1 = − + − + > 1 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 T T T 
� �2
1 µT µT 1 2r 
(A.10) β2 = − − − + < 0 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 T T T 
It is clear that if the value of target ﬁrm ST goes to zero, the value of purchasing 
it will become worthless, which therefore rules out the term BST
β2 . The value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions then become 
(A.11) AST 
∗β1 = (1 + α)ST 
∗ − X, 
(A.12) Aβ1ST 
∗β1−1 = 1 + α, 
Solving the above equation for ST 
∗ and A and letting βB denote β1 gives the 
lemma. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2 
The target’s threshold can be derived in a similar but not exactly same fashion. 
The target’s takeover opportunity is analogous to American put option rather 
than call option, which must satisfy the following equation: 
(A.13) 
1 
σT 
2 ST 
2 F T + µT ST F 
T − rF T = 0 ST ST ST2 
��
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The boundary conditions are given by: 
(A.14) F T |ST =S∗ = X − S ∗ TT 
(A.15) FS
T 
T 
|ST =ST ∗ = −1 
F T(A.16) lim = 0 
ST →+∞ 
The general solution again is given by: 
(A.17) F F = ASβ1 + BSβ2 ,ST T T 
where A and B are constants that yet to be determined, and β1 and β2 are known 
constant whose values have the following expression: � �2
1 µT µT 1 2r 
(A.18) β1 = − + − + > 1 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 ST T T 
� �2
1 µT µT 1 2r 
(A.19) β2 = − − − + < 0 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 T T T 
It is clear that if the value of target ﬁrm ST goes to inﬁnity, the value of selling 
becomes worthless, which therefore rules out the term AST
β1 . The value-matching 
and smooth-pasting conditions then become 
(A.20) BS T 
∗β2 = X − ST ∗ , 
(A.21) Bβ2ST 
∗β2−1 = −1, 
Solving the above equation for ST 
∗ and B and letting βT denote β2 gives the 
lemma. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4 
Let F B(X, ST ) denote the bidder’s takeover option value. It should satisfy the 
following diﬀerential equation: 
(A.22) 
1 1 
F B F B σ2 X2 F B σ2 S2 X µX X+FS
B 
T 
µST ST + XX X + ST ST ST T +FXS
B 
T 
ρσX σST XST −rF B = 0,2 2 
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Upon the time of exercise, the immediate payoﬀ ((1 + α)ST 
∗ − X∗) from the 
option must equal the value of the option (F B (X∗, ST 
∗ )). In additional, to avoid 
arbitrage, smooth-pasting conditions must be satisﬁed: 
(A.23) F B (X ∗ , S T 
∗ ) = (1 + α)ST 
∗ − X ∗ , 
(A.24) FS
B ∗ (X ∗ , S T 
∗ ) = 1, 
T 
(A.25) FX
B 
∗ (X ∗ , S T 
∗ ) = −1. 
An additional boundary condition is given by requiring that, as the ratio of two 
exchanging assets (X/ST ) is suﬃciently large, the ratio of option value to ST 
tends to be zero. The idea behind it is not hard to explain. If takeover cost, X, 
is too large compared to its payoﬀ (1 + α)ST , bidder should ﬁnd the option very 
unattractive because the takeover opportunity would never be proﬁtable. 
F B (X, ST )
(A.26) lim = 0 
(X/ST )→+∞ ST 
Intuitively, the optimal investment decision should depend on the ratio X/ST 
rather than the absolute value of either X or ST . A new variable is created: 
R ≡ X/ST . Thus 
(A.27) F B (X, ST ) = ST f(X/ST ) = ST f(R), 
where f is the function to determined. 
Successive diﬀerentiation gives: 
(A.28) FX (X, ST ) = fR(R), 
(A.29) FST (X, ST ) = f(R) − RfR(R), 
(A.30) FXX (X, ST ) = fRR(R)/ST , 
(A.31) FXST (X, ST ) = −RfRR(R)/ST , 
(A.32) FXST (X, ST ) = R
2fRR(R)/ST . 
Substituting them into the partial diﬀerential equation (A.22) and the boundary 
conditions yields: 
(A.33) 
1 
(σX 
2 + σS
2 
T 
− 2ρσX σST )R2fRR(R) + (µX − µST )RfR(R) − (r − µST )f(R) = 0,2
with boundary conditions: 
(A.34) f(RB) = 1 + α − RB, 
(A.35) fRB (RB) = −1, 
(A.36) lim f(R) = 0. 
R→+∞ 
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The general solution for equation (A.33) is given by: 
(A.37)	 f(R) = ARβT + BRβB , 
where A and B are constants, and β1 and β2 are given by 
1 µX − µSTβT = − 
2 σ2 + σ2 − 2ρσX σST 
(A.38)	 �� X ST �2 
µX − µST 1 2(r − µST )+	 − + > 1 
σ2 + σ2 − 2ρσX σST 2 σ2 + σ2 − 2ρσX σSTX ST	 X ST 
1 µX − µSTβB = − 
2 σ2 + σ2 − 2ρσX σST 
(A.39) �� X	 ST �2 
µX − µST 1 2(r − µST )−	 − + < 0 
σ2 + σ2	 σ2 + σ2 X ST − 2ρσX σST 2 X − 2ρσX σSTST 
Boundary condition (A.36) indicates that A = 0 and reduces the two solutions 
for β to a single one: 
(A.40)	 f(R ∗ ) = BRβB B 
Substituting (A.40) into (A.34) and (A.35) yields: 
(A.41)	 B(RB )
βB = 1 + α − RB 
(A.42)	 BβB (RB)
βB −1 = −1 
Solving it for B and RB gives the optimal investment rule: 
βB
RB(A.43)	 = (1 + α). 
βB − 1
Please note that µX = κµSB amd σX = κσSB . Inserting them into the expression 
of βB cpmpletes the proof. 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5 
The threshold of target can be drived in a similar fashion. Its takeover option 
should justify 
(A.44) 
F T	 F T σ2 X2 F T σ2 S2 X µX X +F 
T µST ST +
1 
XX X +
1 
T +F 
T ρσX σST XST −rF T = 0 ST	 ST ST ST XST2 2 
�� 
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Its boundard conditions are given by 
(A.45) F T (X ∗ , S T 
∗ ) = X ∗ − ST ∗ , 
(A.46) FX
T 
∗ (X ∗ , S T 
∗ ) = 1, 
(A.47) FS
T ∗ (X ∗ , S T 
∗ ) = −1, 
T 
F T (X, ST )
(A.48) lim = 0. 
(X/ST )→0 X 
Solving them yields the results stated in the lemma. 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 7 
As aformentioned, the rationale of αM min when κ = 1 is obsivous. One can min = α
S 
just replace X wih SB in the analysis and then is able to observe the convergence. 
In a pure cash oﬀer model, i.e., κ = 0, bidder has a takeover opportunity to 
pay cash payment X = C to acquire the target ﬁrm (1 + α)ST . On the other 
hand, target ﬁrm expects to give up its own ﬁrm at the value of ST for some 
amounts of cash payemnt X = C. The only uncertainty inolvled is the target 
ﬁrm’s fundamental value. This has been discussed in Chapter 2, which enables 
me to use the results directly below. Please note that the notations and the way 
of describing the takeover threshold are slightly diﬀerent. 
The value of takeover option for bidder if the medium of payment is pure cash is � �θ1ST
(A.49) F B = [(1 + α)ST 
∗ − X] for ST < S T ∗ ,S∗ T 
(A.50) = (1 + α)ST − X for ST ≥ ST ∗ . 
The takeover threshold for bidder is 
1 θ1
S ∗ (A.51) T = X, 1 + α θ1 − 1
where θ1 has the value given by �2
1 µST µST 1 2r (A.52) θ1 = − + − + > 1. 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 ST ST ST 
The takeover threshold implies that if the value of ST is greater than ST 
∗ , it is 
optimal for bidder to submit its takeover oﬀer. 
The value of takeover option for target if the medium of payment is pure cash is � �θ2ST
(A.53) F T = [X − ST ∗ ] for ST > S T ∗ ,S∗ T 
(A.54) = X − ST for ST ≤ ST ∗ . 
�� 
�� 
�� 
�� 
�� 
�� 
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The takeover threshold for target is 
θ2
S ∗ (A.55) T = X, θ2 − 1
where θ2 has the value given by �2
1 µST µST 1 2r (A.56) θ2 = − − − + < 0. 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 ST ST ST 
The takeover threshold implies that if the value of ST is less than ST 
∗ , it is optimal 
for target to sell its ﬁrm ST 
Consider a pure cash takeover transaction. The synergy eﬀect threshold, denoted 
by αC min, which justiﬁes the option value to wait for both bidder and target of the 
deal, is given by 
θ1 θ2 − 1 
(A.57) α ≥ αC = − 1,min θ1 − 1 θ2 
where θ1,2 are aforementioned. 
When κ ≡ 0, then 
1 κµSB − µSTβT,B = − 
2 κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2κρσSB σSTSB ST �2
κµSB − µST 1 2(r − µST )± − + 
κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2κρσSB 2 κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2κρσSBSB ST σST SB ST σST �2
1 µST −µST 1 2(r − µST )(A.58) = + ± − + 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 ST ST ST �2
1 µST µST 1 2r = + ± − + 
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 ST ST ST 
Then it can be approved that �2
1 µST µST 1 2r (A.59) 1 − βT = − − − + = θ2
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 ST ST ST 
�2
1 µST µST 1 2r (A.60) 1 − βB = − + − + = θ1
2 σ2 σ2 2 σ2 ST ST ST 
As a result 
βT βB − 1 θ1 θ2 − 1 
αM(A.61) = − 1 = − 1 = αC min minβT − 1 βB θ1 − 1 θ2 
It completes the proof. 
� � 
� 
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 8 
(A.62) 
∂αM 8 − 2(κµSB − µST )2 + (κµSB + µST − 2r)(σS2 T + κ2σS2 B − 2κρM σSB σST )min �= ,√ � � ��2∂r 4(µST −κµSB )2 4(κµSB +µST −2r)σ2 ΠM 2κµSB + 2µST − 4r + σ2 − 1 + 1 + −M M σ4 σ2 M M 
where 
σM ≡ κ2σ2 + σ2 − 2ρκσSB σSTSB ST 
and � �2
κµSB − µST 1 2(r − µST )ΠM ≡ − + . 
σ2 2 σ2 M M 
Since ρ ∈ [−1, 1], I have 
(κσSB − σST )2 ≤ σS2 T + κ2σS2 B − 2κρσSB σST ≤ (κσSB + σST )2 , 
which proves that the term σ2 + κ2σ2 − 2κρσSB σST is non-negative. Moreover, ST SB 
the fact that κ ∈ [0, 1] and the discount rate must be higher than any drift 
parameter leads to r > µSB ≥ κµSB . The term (κµSB +µST −2r) therefore should 
be negative. Any other terms in the equation is obviously positive, and I can 
∂αM 
conclude the partial derivative min is negative for any κ value. Consequently, 
∂r 
αM is a decreasing function of discount rate r.min 
A.7 Proof of Lemma 9 
(A.63) � √ � 
∂αM 4 (1 + 2 ΠM )σ
2 + 2κµSB − 2µST ) (σ2 − 2κµSB + 2µST )min M M = √ � √ �2� √ � ∂µST ΠM (−1 + 2 ΠM )σ2 + 2κµSB − 2µST (−1 + 2 ΠM )σ2 − 2κµSB + 2µSTM M 
√ � √ �2 
The term and (−1+2 ΠM )σ2 +2κµSB should always be noneg­ΠM M −2µST 
ative. The results should be easily obtained. 
A.8 Proof of Lemma 10 
(A.64) � √ � 
∂αM 4κ (1 + 2 ΠM )σ
2 − 2κµSB + 2µST ) (σ2 + 2κµSB )min M M − 2µST = √ � √ �� √ �2 ,∂µSB ΠM (−1 + 2 ΠM )σ2 + 2κµSB − 2µST (−1 + 2 ΠM )σ2 − 2κµSB + 2µSTM M 
√ � √ �2 
The term ΠM , κ and (−1 + 2 ΠM )σM 2 − 2κµSB + 2µST should always be 
nonegative. The results should be easily obtained. 
�	 � 
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A.9 Proof of Lemma 11 
∂αM	 −32(r − κµSB )(r − µST )(κρσSB )min	 − σST(A.65)	 = √ � √ �2∂σST ΠM σ2 4r + σ2 − 2κµSB − 2µST − 2 ΠM σ2 M M	 M 
Clearly, noting the κ ∈ [0, 1], if κρσSB − σST is positve then the partial derivative 
will be positive. If κρσSB − σST is negative then the partial derivative should be 
nagative. 
A.10 Proof of Lemma 12 
∂αM	 32κ(r − κµSB )(κσSB − ρσST )min	 )(r − µST(A.66)	 = √ � √ �2 . ∂σSB ΠM σ2 4r + σ2 − 2κµSB − 2µST − 2 ΠM σ2 M M	 M 
Clearly, If κσSB − ρσST > 0 , the synergy eﬀect threshold obtained in a mixed 
oﬀer model is a strictly increasing function of σSB . Otherwise they are a strictly 
decreasing function of σSB apart from the changing point. 
A.11 Proof of Lemma 13 
∂αMmin 32κ(−r + κµSB )(r − µST )σSB σST(A.67)	 = √ � √ �2∂ρ ΠM σ2 4r + σ2 − 2κµSB − 2µST − 2 ΠM σ2 M M	 M 
All the terms on the denominator should be positive. It is the standard assump­
tion in real options analysis that the expected growth rate (µSB or µST ) should 
be less than the discount rate r. Noting that κ ∈ [0, 1], it is easy to obtain that 
−r + κµSB < 0 and r − µST > 0. Consequently, the partial deriviate should be 
negative. 
A.12 Proof of Lemma 14 
The eﬀect of	 κ on the synergy eﬀect threshold can be analytically obtained by 
mindiﬀerentiating it with respect to αM The value of 
∂αM 
should be given by min.	 ∂κ 
(A.68) 
8(r − µST ) 2κµ2 + 4rσSB (κσSB − ρσST ) + µSB (−2µST − 3κ2σ2 + 2κρσSB σST + σ2 )SB	 SB ST√ �	 √ �2 . 
ΠM σ2 4r + σ2 − 2κµSB − 2 MM M − 2µST ΠM σ2 
� 
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Apparently the value of denominator should be always non-negative. The term 
8(r − µST ) should also be positive due to the assumption that r > µST . Conse­
minquently, the sign of 
∂αM 
should totally depend on the term 2κµ2 +4rσSB (κσSB −∂κ SB 
ρσST ) + µSB (−2µST − 3κ2σ2 + 2κρσSB + σ2 ).SB σST ST 
Solving the equation 2κµ2 + 4rσSB (κσSB − ρσST ) + µSB (−2µST − 3κ2σ2 +SB SB 
2κρσSB σST + σ
2 ) = 0 for κ and noting that the parameter of κ2 , −3µSB σ2 isST SB 
negative, one can obtain the results stated in the lemma. 
Another issue that should be mentioned about is under the conditions that 
r > µSB > 0, r > µST > 0, σSB > 0, σST > 0 and ρ ∈ [−1, 1], I can prove 
2 σ2 (σ2that (µ + 2rσ2 + ρµSB σSB σST )
2 + 3µSB [µSB − 2µST ) − 4rρσSB σST ]SB SB SB ST 
2 2+3rσµ
is greater than rσ2 − ρµSB and therefor κ1SB σSB σST >
 SB SB > 1. It then
 23µSB σSB 
rules out the probability that κ1 is less than 1 and simpliﬁes the analysis. 
A.13 Proof of Lemma 19 
Let F B(SB
N , SB ) denote the bidder’s takeover option value. It should satisfy the 
following diﬀerential equation: 
(A.69) 
F B N SN X+F B 
1 
F B σN 
2 
SN 
2 1 
F B σ2 S2 SN µ µB SB+ SN SN + B +FS
B 
N σBBS
N ST −rF B = 0,B B SB B B SB SB B SB B B B B B2 2 
The boundary conditions are given by 
(A.70) F B(SN 
∗ 
, S ∗ ) = SN 
∗ − SB ∗ ,B B B 
(A.71) F B (SB
N ∗ , S B 
∗ )SN ∗ = 1, B 
F B 
(A.72) lim = 0. 
(SN /SB )→0 SBB 
Intuitively, the optimal investment decision should depend on the ratio SN /SBB 
and therefore a new variable is created: R ≡ SBN /SB. Thus 
(A.73) F B(SB
N , SB ) = SBf(SB
N /SB ) = SBf(R), 
where f is the function to determined. 
Successive diﬀerentiation gives: 
(A.74) FSN (SB
N , SB) = fR(R), 
B 
(A.75) FSB (SB
N , SB) = f(R) − RfR(R), 
(A.76) FSN SN (SB
N , SB) = fRR(R)/SB , 
B B 
(A.77) FSN SB (SB
N , SB) = −RfRR(R)/SB, 
B 
(A.78) FSN (SB
N , SB) = R
2fRR(R)/SB. 
B SB 
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Substituting them into the partial diﬀerential equation (A.69) and the boundary 
conditions yields: 
1 2 N(A.79) (σN + σ2 − 2σBB )R2fRR(R)+ (µB − µB )RfR(R) − (r − µB)f(R) = 0,B B2
with boundary conditions: 
(A.80) f(R ∗ ) = R ∗ − 1, 
(A.81) fR∗ (R 
∗ ) = 1, 
(A.82) lim f(R) = 0. 
R→0 
The general solution for equation (A.79) is given by: 
(A.83) f(R) = ARβ1 + BRβ2 , 
where A and B are constants, and β1 and β2 are given by 
1 µN − µB
β1 = − B 
2 σN 
2 
+ σ2 B B − 2σBB 
(A.84) �� 
N 
�2 
µ − µB 1 2(r − µB )
+ 2 
B − + 2 > 1 
σN + σ2 2 σN + σ2 B B − 2σBB B B − 2σBB 
N1 µB − µBβ2 = − 22 σN + σ2 B B − 2σBB 
(A.85) �� 
N 
�2 
µB − µB 1 2(r − µB )− − + < 0 
+ σ2 + σ2σB
N 2 
B − 2σBB 2 σBN 2 B − 2σBB 
Boundary condition (A.82) indicates that B = 0 and reduces the two solutions 
for β to a single one: 
(A.86) f(R ∗ ) = AR ∗β1 
Substituting (A.86) into (A.80) and (A.81) yields: 
(A.87) A(R ∗ )β1 = R ∗ − 1 
(A.88) Aβ1(R 
∗ )β1−1 = 1 
Solving it for A and R gives the optimal investment rule: 
SN 
∗ 
B β1R ∗ (A.89) = = 
S∗ B β1 − 1 
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∗ S∗ (κ−1)(1+α)δ(S∗ +S∗ )T B TNoting that SN = (1−δ)(1+α)(SB ∗ +S∗ −X), Δ = , X = B T S∗ +S∗ B T δ(κ−1)(1+α)−κ 
and β1 is just βB, the above equation becomes 
κ(1 + α)(1 − δ) βB
(A.90) = 
[(κ − 1)(1 + α)δ − κ](Δ − 1) βB − 1 
The proof for the target’s threshold can be done in a very similar fashion by 
replacing SB
N with ST
N and SB with ST . The threshold for target is given by 
SN 
∗ 
T βTR ∗ (A.91) = = 
S∗ T βT − 1 
∗ ST ∗ Noting that SN = δ(1 + α)(S∗ + S∗ − X) + X, Δ = and X = T B T S∗ +S∗ B T 
(κ−1)(1+α)δ(S∗ +S∗ )B T the above equation becomes 
δ(κ−1)(1+α)−κ 
−(1 + α)δ βT
(A.92) = 
[(κ − 1)(1 + α)δ − κ]Δ βT − 1 
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A.14 Approximation errors in Chapter 3 
In chapter 3, an approximation approach has been used to provide the SDE of 
the takeover payment form (X), which therefore allows for an analytical solution 
for the takeover options for both participants. The aim of this appendix is to 
explore the magnitude of the approximation errors and their subsequent impacts 
on the takeover options thresholds and the payment form choice solutions. 
The approximation has been set up as follows. 
Assume that κ is the fraction of the shares in the takeover payment form upon 
the time of the deal (therefore it is a constant not a random variable), the mixed 
oﬀer, which consists of a random-value shares component and a ﬁxed-value cash 
component, should approximately follow a geometric Brownian motion described 
by 
(A.93)	 dX = µX Xdt + σX XdZX , 
where µX = κµB , σX = κσB and ZX = ZB.
 
However, according to Ito’s lemma, the takeover payment form X should follow
 
(A.94)	 dX = µBSBdt + σBSB dZB , 
and note that since X = SB + C, X does not follow a geometric Brownian notion.
 
The question would be how well the approximation works.
 
The ﬁrst step sets up to simulate two random processes:
 
1. The exact process of X (Xexact), which has two components: 
•	 The cash component that has a constant value 1-κ and 
•	 The shares component that has an initial value of κ, but following a 
standard GBM with drift and diﬀusion terms µB and σB respectively. 
2. The approximated process of X (Xapprox), which has an initial value of 1, 
but over time following a GBM with drift and diﬀusion terms µX and σX 
respectively. 
Simulations of Xexact enables me to show graphically the diﬀerence between X 
and a GBM. The log return of each simulated path of X has been taken and 
5,000 realizations of log returns are plotted against the normal distribution in a 
Quantile-quantile graph, as shown in Figure A.1 and A.2. 
The base case parameters are given by µB = 0.05, σB = 0.1, κ = 0.25 (Figure 
A.1(a)) and the case is expanded to explore the impact of diﬀerent κ: 
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• µB = 0.05, σB = 0.1, κ = 0.95 (Figure A.1(b)), 
• µB = 0.05, σB = 0.1, κ = 0.05 (Figure A.1(c)), 
diﬀerent level of µB: 
• µB = 0, σB = 0.1, κ = 0.25 (Figure A.1(d)), 
• µB = 0.1, σB = 0.1, κ = 0.25 (Figure A.2(a)), 
and, at last, diﬀerent level of σB: 
• µB = 0.05, σB = 0.01, κ = 0.25 (Figure A.2(b)), 
• µB = 0.05, σB = 0.2, κ = 0.25 (Figure A.2(c)). 
From the results, it is fair to conclude that the exact process of X is very close to 
a GBM in most cases. The quantile of the log returns of X reasonably matches 
the quantile of a normal distribution in all scenarios shown in our simulations. 
However it is worth noting that the approximations error becomes notable when 
the volatility is high. 
The above results only demonstrate that the approximation errors to assume that 
X follows a GBM are within reasonable levels. It does not provide any evidence 
demonstrating µX and σX are as well the reasonable estimates of the drift and 
diﬀusion parameters of X. 
The next step therefore goes on to simulate the log returns of Xapprox as given 
by equation (A.93) and Xexact and compare the ﬁrst to fourth moment of the 
returns distribution in diﬀerent parameter constellations. 
The results are shown in Figure A.3 - 6. In each ﬁgure, approximation errors 
for mean returns/expected growth rate and standard deviations are calculated in 
relative terms. For example, given the simulated mean value of the log returns 
of Xexact = 0.09 and the mean value of the log returns of Xapprox = 0.11, the 
estimation error is calculated by 2∗(0.11−0.09) ∗100% = 20%, i.e., the approximated 
0.11+0.09 
value can be 20% diﬀerent than the true value. With a diﬀerent approach, the 
approximation errors for skewness and excess kurtosis are basically equivalent to 
those of Xexact because the log returns of Xapprox (as a GBM) should have the 
skewness and excess kurtosis both equal to zero. 
The interpretation of the results is presented below with each ﬁgure. To sum­
marize the results, under the parameter constellation (which is µB ∈ [0, 0.1], 
σB ∈ [0, 0.2] and κ ∈ [0, 1])1: 
1 To justify the parameter constellation I have used in the analysis, please note the µB and 
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•	 The approximation errors for the mean are within the range of [0, 3.5%] of 
the exact value, 
•	 The approximation errors for the standard deviation are within the range 
of [0, 7%] of the exact value, 
•	 The approximation errors for the skewness are within the range of [0, 0.4], 
•	 The approximation errors for the excess kurtosis are within the range of 
[0, 0.3]. 
The last step to check the approximation errors involves using the values of µB 
and σB from the simulated process of Xexact to replace the ones from Xapprox to 
estimate the impact of these errors on the output of the models in Chapter 3, in­
cluding the takeover threshold for each participant, the overall takeover threshold 
and the payment form threshold. Please note that these impacts are not exactly 
the errors of the approximation as essentially the approach discussed above sets 
up to check the errors generated from using a GBM with biased drift and diﬀu­
sion terms, while in fact X does not follow exactly a GBM. Therefore, while, as 
demonstrated by the results above, the ignorance of non-normality issue should 
not lead to excess biases, I would like to remind the readers the existence of this 
bias. 
The results are shown by Figure A.7 - 18. An interpretation of the process and 
the results is given below. Figure A.7 - 9 illustrates graphically the diﬀerence 
with regard to the takeover and payment form thresholds when the parameters 
from Xexact and Xapprox are used respectively. Then Figure A.10 - 18 explore 
the magnitude of these diﬀerence. In each ﬁgure, the top-left part focuses on 
the approximation errors for bidder’s takeover threshold given by equation (3.9). 
The top-right part explores the approximation errors for the takeover options of 
the target ﬁrm, given by equation (3.13). The bottom-left part demonstrates the 
approximation errors for the overall takeover threshold, i.e., the lowest required 
synergy eﬀect given by equation (3.15). The above three error terms are shown 
in relative terms. The last part, the bottom-right part, looks at the impact of 
the approximation errors of the X on the payment form threshold, of which the 
σB refer to the parameters of the fundamental values of the bidder ﬁrm, i.e., the present 
value of the future cash ﬂows generated from its core business. If a certain degree of 
market ineﬃciency is allowed, i.e., the price can overshoot or undershoot, it is therefore 
reasonable to believe that the true volatility should be lower than the one implied by the 
stock market and 20% annualized volatility can be a reasonable cap for many businesses. 
A long term annual growth rate of 10%, which is multiple time of the real GDP growth 
in most developed countries, should be a reasonable cap of the expected growth rate for 
most ﬁrms. 
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solution is given by equation (3.28). As the payment form threshold can be 0% 
in shares, i.e., the threshold of κ can be 0, the errors are calculated in absolute 
terms, i.e., if the calculated κ threshold shows that 10% shares should be used 
in the payment form and our error show a level of 1%, the correct payment form 
threshold that account for the approximation errors should be either 9% or 11%. 
As target ﬁrm’s characteristics can also inﬂuence the takeover thresholds and the 
payment form choice, apart from checking the impact of diﬀerent µB , σB, and 
κ, target ﬁrms with diﬀerent growth prospects and correlation with bidder ﬁrm 
are also considered. The base case for Figure A.10 - 12 includes the assumption 
that µB = 0.05, σB = 0.1, µT = 0.03, σT = 0.06, κ = 0.25, ρ = 0.25, r = 0.2. 
Figure A.13 - 15 considers a fast-growing and high-volatility target ﬁrm where 
µT = 0.06 and σT = 0.12. Figure A.16 - 18 explores a high correlation (ρ = 0.75) 
between two takeover participants. 
Again, the results are summarized as below 
•	 The approximation errors for the bidder takeover thresholds are within the 
range of [0, 0.5%] of the correct value, 
•	 The approximation errors for the target takeover thresholds are within the 
range of [0, 0.8%] of the correct value, 
•	 The approximation errors for the overall takeover thresholds are within the 
range of [0, 4%] of the correct value, 
•	 The approximation errors for the payment form threshold are within the 
range of [0, 3%] of the deal. 
A.15 Approximation errors in Chapter 4 
Equations (4.4) - (4.15) specify the approximation method utilized in Chapter 4. 
It follows the method used in Chapter 3 where the cash payment results in a “di­
luted” eﬀect to the stochastic process of newly merged ﬁrm (i.e., equations (4.14) 
and (4.15)). The approximation errors for this method has been discussed in the 
last section. Equations (4.4) and (4.5), following Leland and Skarabot (2003), 
introduce a new approximation approach, which essentially argues that the newly 
merged ﬁrm approximately follow a GBM of which the drift and volatility terms 
are functions of those of the bidder and target. This section focuses on checking 
the approximation errors for this method and concludes with the impact of the 
total approximation errors on the takeover thresholds for the bidder and target. 
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Equations (4.7) -(4.9) also specify the diﬀerence between our method and what 
is used in Leland and Skarabot (2003). Basically a “leverage” eﬀect has been 
introduced, where the cash paid out to the shareholders of the target ﬁrm will 
impact the growth prospective and volatility of the newly jointed ﬁrm. In the 
following, it is my aim to check (1) whether it is reasonable to argue that the newly 
merged ﬁrm SN (equation 4.2) follows approximately a GBM and (2) whether 
equations (4.8) and (4.9) provide a reasonable approximation to the drift and 
volatility term. 
Figures A.19 and A.20 show the Quantile-quantile graph with diﬀerent parameter 
combinations, where the log return of each simulated path of SN has been taken 
and 5,000 realizations of log returns are plotted against the normal distribution. 
It is easily observed that in almost all cases, the log returns of SN can be closely 
approximated by a normal distribution. 
Again, the next step goes on to simulate the log returns of SN as given by equa­
tions (4.8) and 4.9 (i.e., the GBM with deﬁned drift and diﬀusion terms) and the 
exact process of SN (i.e., a combination of two GBMs with some constant valued 
deducted) and compare the ﬁrst to fourth moment of the returns distribution 
in diﬀerent parameter constellations. To be consistent with the previous section, 
approximation errors for the ﬁrst and second moments are shown in relative terms 
while the errors for third and fourth moments are shown as the values of skewness 
and excess kurtosis for the simulated exact process. 
Figures A.21- 26 present the results. In general, the approximation errors for 
each moment depend on the parameter combination being chosen. For all the 
parameter constellations used in the ﬁgures, 
•	 The approximation errors for the mean are within the range of [0, 2%] of 
the exact value, 
•	 The approximation errors for the standard deviation are within the range 
of [0, 2%] of the exact value, 
•	 The skewness of the exact process is within the range of [−0.1, 0.1], 
•	 The excess kurtosis of the exact process is within the range of [0, 0.2]. 
It is worth mentioning that the approximation errors for each moment become 
increasingly large when X, i.e., the cash paid out from the merged ﬁrm, becomes 
large. However even for the upper range of the X (X=0.5 essentially means the 
half of the value of the merged ﬁrm is paid out to the target as a cash payment. 
It is a conservative assumption considering in most hostile takeovers, the bidder 
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ﬁrm is much larger than the target ﬁrm, therefore even in a pure cash deal, the 
cash payment is unlikely to exceed more than half of the combined value of the 
bidder and target), the approximation errors are still modest. 
Then in the ﬁnal step I intend to check the impact of the approximation errors 
on the takeover thresholds for bidder and target, which are the results of the real 
options model in Chapter 4. Again, bearing in mind that from the results shown 
above, the impact of non-normality should be limited and therefore I focus on 
checking the impact of the “biased” drift and diﬀusion terms. 
As shown in equations (4.18) and (4.19), the takeover thresholds for bidder and 
target depend on the synergy eﬀect threshold α and in the mean time, α, as a 
threshold for the takeover deal, is dependent on the threshold for each participant. 
The numerical methods for non-linear equations from MATLAB help solve the 
values for α and δ, while it is diﬃcult to incorporate the approximation errors 
discussed above into the solving process. It is therefore important to clearly 
deﬁne the approximations errors that will be presented below. 
Essentially for every set of assumption (for µB , µT , σB , σT . ρ, κ, r, Δ), the 
solution for α and δ, along with the takeover threshold for bidder (i.e., βB )
βB −1 
and target (i.e., βT ) can be provided by equations (4.18) and (4.19). The val­
βT −1 
ues of α and δ and the assumption for other parameters will then be available 
to simulate the correct process of SN and SN . The simulation in the next step B T 
yields new values for equation (4.12) to (4.17) and these information will be 
used to calculate new takeover thresholds for bidder and target. The approx­
imation errors presented below in ﬁgures A.27 - 29 are deﬁned as the relative 
diﬀerence between takeover thresholds without incorporating the approximation 
errors and the takeover thresholds from the simulation. However please note that 
this approximation errors are simply the approximation errors for the ﬁrst step of 
iteration because the new takeover thresholds will impact the synergy threshold 
α, which in turn will impact the stochastic properties of involved assets. The 
correct takeover thresholds that fully incorporate the approximated errors (for 
mean and volatility) will be values that converge eventually from multiple itera­
tions. Bearing in mind that simulation errors, which are inevitable, will make the 
convergence very diﬃcult and time-consuming, I therefore present the approxi­
mation errors as a form of the error terms for the ﬁrst step of iteration. It should 
provide a good proxy for the true approximation errors. 
It is clear from the results that the approximation errors for bidder and target’s 
takeover thresholds are less than 1% in all the parameter combinations considered. 
Due to the non-linear features of equations (4.18) and (4.19), it is very diﬃcult, if 
not impossible, to check the impact of the approximation errors on the payment 
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form choices presented in the later part of the Chapter 4. However, a similar level 
of approximation errors in Chapter 3 for bidder and target’s takeover thresholds 
result in a modest level of errors for payment form choices, it is reasonable to 
assume the errors in this chapter is also likely to be small. 
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